Understanding Enkratic Reasoning

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RECEIVED: 28-09-2012 • ACCEPTED: 20-07-2013

ABSTRACT: Beginning from John Broome’s approach to Enkraasia, the paper quickly moves to giving a condensed presentation of an approach to practical reasoning motivated by a Fregean approach to inference (in theoretical reasoning). The suggested account of practical reasoning avoids using rationality requirements to do explanatory work when accounting for correct reasoning, and thus avoids lots of problems. It is strictly conservative in its approach, and no new inference rules are required for moving from the theoretical to the practical case. It is suggested that we can stick to deductive reasoning when accounting for practical reasoning proper; the crucial premiss from theoretical reasoning about practical matters cannot normally be established this way. The paper moves on to tackle counterarguments to the effect that there will simply be too little correct practical reasoning on the present (deductive) approach. The simple account of correct reasoning has too high a cost, it is argued. The paper meets this objection when it argues that much reasoning is enthymematic or incomplete reasoning. By making specific claims about how there may be practical premisses to which we do not attend even when they are, in some sense, before the mind, the approach is defended.


1. Introduction

The question of how the belief that you ought to do something relates or should relate to your intending to do that thing is of great interest. John
Broome’s general strategy is to argue that *rationality* requires you to intend to do what you believe you ought to do, and that you can bring yourself to satisfy this requirement of rationality through *reasoning*. An important requirement of rationality in Broome’s account is therefore the following, now commonly called *Enkrasia*:

Rationality requires of you that, if you believe you ought that you F, you intend that you F.

This formulation will do for now. It exhibits a ‘rational’ connection between what you believe and what you intend, such that if you fail to exhibit this connection, you are not (fully) rational. What I shall now call Broome’s *associated claim* is a claim to the effect that reasoning can make you satisfy this requirement. It is surely possible, I suggest, to accept the first claim, which we might call the *rationality claim*, without accepting this *associated claim*.

Broome takes a stand on various questions and endorses specific views on reasoning in making this *associated claim*. His account of reasoning has a rule of inference that identifies correct enkratic reasoning. Having this kind of rule might be seen as unmotivated and problematic, and, consequently, as unable to substantiate the *associated claim*.

This paper will argue that we can accept a version of the *associated claim* without having to introduce a specific rule of inference for the enkratic case. In order to show this, I shall outline a view on correct enkratic reasoning which introduces no special rule. I shall make comparisons between my approach and Broome’s, and argue in support of my view.

Actual cases of correct enkratic reasoning might be thought to be somewhat less frequent on my view than on Broome’s. That is, correct enkratic reasoning might be thought to be too rare on my approach. I shall aim to show that this need not be so as long as a more substantive account of rationality is correct, and we also allow for enthymemetic reasoning, as indeed Broome also does. The more general methodology of enthymemetic cases will in fact favour the present approach, I shall argue. In the theoretical choice between this approach and Broome’s, the former approach to reasoning and also to enthymemetic reasoning should be favoured. First, let me outline the present approach to reasoning.

1 Correct reasoning can be enthymemetic on Broome’s account, as it also can on those of most others.
2. Background for the present approach

The approach I suggest starts from a general approach to inference. I think of an actual inference as an act. This is important in at least two ways: to see what inferences are and what they are not. What they are: Mental acts are things we engage in as persons, and should not be characterized merely by the relationship between propositional contents, which is how logicians often characterize inference. Inferences are acts by us. What they are not: I shall distinguish between acts and actions in contending that basic sorts of mental activity, like judging and inferring, are acts, not actions. Actions are processes in time, subject to agential control; judgings and inferrings are not subject to the same type of control, and are not temporal processes.

My theoretical starting point lies in current neo-Fregean approaches to inference. This sort of view can be best appreciated by considering the case of normal theoretical inference, where inferring is an act in which you move from the premisses to the conclusion. Each premiss is characterized by the semantic content of a proposition, and also by the way in which we relate to that content when we judge it as true. The latter is represented by the Fregean judgment stroke, normally taken to indicate judgment or assertion. This approach, and the crucial use of the judgment stroke, has languished in some disrepute until recently when it comes to accounting for inference, but is gaining currency again. Here is Dag Prawitz’s account of inference:

An inference in the course of an argument or proof is not an assertion or judgment to the effect that a certain conclusion $B$ ‘follows’ from a number of premisses $A_1, A_2, ..., A_n$, but is first of all a transition from some assertions (or judgments) to another one. In other words, it contains the $n+1$ assertions $A_1, A_2, ..., A_n$, and $B$, and in addition, the claim that the assertion $B$ is supported by the assertions $A_1, A_2, ..., A_n$, a claim commonly indicated by words like ‘then’, ‘hence’, or ‘therefore’.

This is how Frege saw an inference, as a transition between assertions or judgments. To make an assertion is to use a declarative sentence $A$ with assertive force, which we may indicate by writing $\vdash A$, using the Fregean assertion sign. We may also say with Frege that a sentence $A$ expresses a thought or proposition $p$, while $\vdash A$, the assertion of $A$, is an act in which $p$ is judged to be true. (Prawitz forthcoming)
It is thus very important that we do not think of inference as ascertaining whether a relation of logical consequence holds between two expressions; we are not thinking of inference as judging that there is an entailment relation between two propositional contents, but as an act of transition from the premisses to the conclusion. And, moreover, the simplest case is the deductive case. It is therefore worth working with as long as we can.

Now the interesting thing when we think about Enkrasia is the possibilities that present themselves if we extend and generalize the Fregean picture and apply it to all inference, theoretical and practical. (Frege’s concern was always demonstrative science.) Consider, then, the possibility of introducing a *practical stroke* parallel to the judgment stroke. This stroke then represents a practical way of being related to a propositional content, as opposed to the theoretical way represented by the judgment stroke. This practical way of being related to a propositional content might, in the primary case, simply be an intentional action, i.e. a case of doing something intentionally. The case of intending to do something I take as a derived case, to be explained and illuminated from the philosophically prior case of doing something intentionally.

In practical inference, on this picture, we need a relevant practical way of taking a premiss for a practical conclusion, and the conclusion might simply be an action B that follows from engaging in another action A together with a premiss of the sort “In order to do A I need to do B”. If this is the picture, the pattern of reasoning might be instrumental deductive reasoning. Furthermore, it is basic to the account of reasoning and inference I am defending here that if it is true that I am practically related to p, I am theoretically/judgmentally related to p. One can, on this view, always go from premiss practical stroke p to premiss theoretical/judgment stroke p, but not the other way. (One is aware of what one is doing intentionally.) The relationship is modeled along the lines of the relationship between knowledge and belief, as that relationship has to be modeled on the knowledge-first approach; it is not an inferential relationship, and believing is not an isolatable part of knowing.

We think of the way we are related to a propositional content that is signified by the judgment stroke, as characterized by the rule for assertion, as a rule we might think of as the constitutive rule for assertion. This has consequences, the first being that even if we typically move downstream when inferring q from p, the conclusion might be a proposition we subsequently might realize we cannot assert. When that happens, and the con-
clusion cannot be asserted, we have to withdraw the assertion of at least one premiss. This stems simply from the nature of assertion plus the entailment relations of the case. Now, if practical stroke p commits us to theoretical (judgment) stroke p, we get the same result in the practical case as in the theoretical case. This feature of the practical commitment to the propositional content at hand explains all there is to explain about what in the literature is discussed as the scope of rationality requirements. All the truths about the scope of those requirements, which John Broome has done so much to establish, are simply direct consequences of a Fregean approach to inference, a reasonable approach to assertion along the lines of Williamson, and a recognition of Anscombe’s view that in doing something intentionally we know (are aware of) what we are doing. (This latter I see as legitimizing the move from practical stroke p to theoretical stroke p.) All these points are controversial, but enjoy nevertheless fairly widespread acceptance today.2

3. The relationship to Broome’s current account of enkratic reasoning

Let us now take this basic picture and contrast it with John Broome’s approach. Broome works out the rule for correct enkratic reasoning by starting with what he calls Enkratic Permission. Here is Broome:

**Enkratic Permission**
Rationality permits N that
N believes at some time that she herself ought that p, and N believes at some time that it is up to her herself whether or not p
N intends at some time that p, and N’s intention that p is based on N’s belief that she herself ought that p and belief that it is up to her herself whether or not p.

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2 For a list of Broome’s works, see the reference section below. The discussion about rationality requirements is highlighted in Broome’s interaction with Kolodny (2005). I cannot here go into that interchange. My approach leaves no explanatory room for rationality requirements beyond what stem from the ways we are related to propositional contents. There is some similarity to Kolodny, but there are also differences; the ways we are related to contents in judging might change when we realize the consequences of what we judge to be true. For my references to Anscombe and Williamson, see the reference section below.
This is derived from Enkasia. The corresponding rule is:

From

<If I ought that \( p \); belief> and
<If it is up to me whether or not \( p \); belief>
to derive
<\( p \); intention>.

Your reasoning, given below, about taking a break is correct only if it follows this rule. If it is enthymemematic it might still follow this rule if the second premiss is before the mind in some sense. Fully spelt out and made explicit, correct enkritic reasoning would be:

I ought to take a break.
It is up to me whether or not I take a break.
So I shall take a break.

Let me start by stating a point of agreement. I agree with Broome that we need to be able to distinguish between a practical and a theoretical way of being related to propositions in the account of correct reasoning. I accomplish this by means of the technical apparatus of strokes, the judgment stroke and the practical stroke. Broome does it with ‘belief’ and ‘intention’.

We also agree that we need to be able to account for the correctness and incorrectness of reasoning. We differ on how we do that. Broome’s view is given above by a specific rule for Enkasia. I hold, and this stems from a generalized approach to reasoning, that we recognize correctness also by the semantic/logical relations between the contents in question, which on my view require entailment relations. We agree to a large extent about the roles of the practical/theoretical attitudes we have to the semantic contents, but I require a practical premiss to get a practical conclusion. Broome manages without that with his rule for Enkasia, which bridges the theoretical and the practical. On this point, my view is the more conservative, as it only recognizes inference rules of the sort we find in theoretical reasoning (semantic entailment relations), and has no inference bridging the theoretical and the practical. I get back to this later.

Broome and I agree that we have uncontroversial cases of practical reasoning in instrumental practical reasoning. Think of cases where
I intend to F,
Realize (believe) that to do F I must do G,
and (via the route of practical inference)
intend to G.

One reason why this is uncontroversial between us is that we here have a parallel theoretical inference: it would also be correct to infer from

judging that I am F-ing, and also
judging that if I am F-ing I have to be G-ing, to
judging that I am G-ing.

Contrary to Broome, I think we can make use of this structure of instrumental practical reasoning for practical reasoning proper in its entirety, including enkratic reasoning. Broome takes a different approach, and formulates the rule for the correctness of the reasoning in question.

Broome considers objections to his account of reasoning. In the very last section of his 2009 manuscript “How to be Rational”, an early version of his new book, but also in its present version, he considers a view which objects to his full account of enkratic reasoning by invoking the “Motivation out, Motivation in” principle, named so by Jay Wallace (see Wallace 2001). The principle boils down to saying that a practical premiss is needed for a practical conclusion, as is also the case in instrumental practical reasoning.

Here is something of what Broome says against Wallace:

If there is such a thing as enkratic reasoning, the premiss-belief does incorporate a motivation of sorts. Suppose your premiss-belief is that you ought to take a break, and suppose you are rational. Being rational, you are supposed to do enkratic reasoning. Therefore you are disposed to reason your way from your belief to an intention to take a break. This intention is itself a sort of disposition to take a break. So your belief that you ought to take a break constitutes a sort of disposition to take a break. And a disposition to take a break is a motivation to take a break. 3

I agree with much of what Broome is saying here, but not all. I resist the view that a belief, or perhaps we should rather say my judging something to be correct, is at all a disposition to act in a particular way. I see the

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3 Quoted from Broome’s 2009 manuscript. More or less the same statement is found on page 305 in the present manuscript, first long paragraph.
essential nature of belief as given by its aim in truth (or knowledge). Of course, a belief, for instance the belief that ‘snow is white’, will interact with existing motivations and thus be a factor behind new motivational states and actions when such interaction in reasoning brings about new motivations. Think of a case where I intend to see something white and believe there is snow behind my house. I also believe that snow is white, and that the easiest way to get to see something white to go behind my house. I then intend to go behind my house and proceed to do so. The fact that a belief can interact with motivational states and in this way make up a factor in bringing about new motivational states does not make the belief that snow is white, or my believing that snow is white, itself into anything like a motivational state or disposition. I think this point generalizes to all belief.

There are thus two points here. There is in general no source in the nature of belief to see belief as a motivational disposition for doing particular things. Furthermore, the fact that belief in conjunction with motivational states lead to new motivational states does not show that belief is a motivational state. For that to follow, we would need to hold that there are cases of the sort we are interested in where all crucial factors behind a particular motivational state are beliefs. That is, I take it, the issue we are discussing, and that is a contested issue when it comes to beliefs about what we ought to do.

There is a caveat. The argument Broome gives is about reasoning. Of course, my believing that snow is white might simply cause me to intend to see some snow. Similarly, my belief that I ought to do F might cause me to intend to do F. Beliefs can cause intentions without this causal relationship being one of reasoning. When a belief causes an intention, and it also is rationally required that we have that intention if we have that belief, we have both a rational connection, and a causal connection. But the existence of such a causal connection does not automatically make of it a piece of reasoning. One causal route will be via reasoning, but there will also be other causal routes. There are constraints on how the enkratic requirement can be implemented by reasoning also on Broome’s view. A causal connection is not enough in and of itself.

Note also that accepting Wallace’s ‘Motivation out Motivation in’ principle does not in itself lead to rejecting the claim that we implement the enkratic requirement by reasoning. What it does, though, is rather to modify or constrain the bigger picture both of rationality and of reasoning, of causal connections and reasoning connections. One complication is this:
someone who accepts that rationality requires us to be enkratic might at the same time be subscribing to a more substantive and quite different conception of rationality than Broome endorses. According to the present approach, it is true that more premisses ‘will be required than on Broome’s view to derive an intention by reasoning in the enkratic case where we believe we ought to do something. As I shall argue in a separate step below, we should think of these further premisses as practical states (or intentions).

Still, it might be thought, cases of enkratic reasoning may nevertheless be very rare on this approach, though on a more substantive conception of rationality, certain standing intentions or standing actions of engaging in doing what you ought to do might in fact be required (in some sense) for you be rational. There might be many intentions to which we do not really attend. Clearly, if such ‘higher-level’ intentions were not in place, one would not be able to reach the conclusion required by Enkraasia by the present conception of reasoning. Broome at this point has a less substantive conception of what it is to be a rational person, and on his view enkratic reasoning, by the present standards, would be rare. Still, a different account of reasoning might also come with a more substantive account of what it is to be a rational person, and distinguish between intentions we have and intentions we attend to.

While there are clear similarities between Broome’s ‘intending’ and my practical stroke, let me add something more about our differences. From my perspective Broome might be making a mistake by not digging more deeply into the possibly explanatory connections between doing something intentionally and intending something. If the explanatory connections go from doing something intentionally to intending something, and doing something intentionally connects with exercising specific types of rational capacities when acting in response to reasons, then that brings a conception of agency into the picture. On such a view, it is the relationship of intending to doing something intentionally that gives intending the practical character it has, and also restricts what we can intend. When seen this way, we might also be able to acknowledge the further point that the conclusion of practical reasoning might indeed be the act of doing something intentionally.  

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4 At this point there are of course very clear differences between Broome’s and my views. There are important questions about the relationship between prior intention and the general state of intending something, and how they both relate to doing something intentionally. I do not address them here. I take the explanatory prior state to be
My more substantive conception of rationality does, it seems, raise some very tricky issues about what it takes to have something like an intention, or to have ‘in some sense’ an intention in some case of enthymematically reasoning. Such issues need, however, to be faced by all of us. It is easy to overlook the possibility that many intentions and things we do intentionally do not have to be clearly attended to in consciousness even if we engage in them and are in some sense aware of them. It is therefore easy to overlook the possibility that the reasoning that we think is fine might be enthymematically. I shall defend the view that much practical reasoning is indeed incomplete, and that if it is widespread, then it raises many issues about self-knowledge I will not be able to address those issues in the present context, but I shall nevertheless defend the possible criticism that there will be too few satisfactory practical inferences on the present approach by arguing that it is not true; the inferences are, however, incomplete or enthymematically. We can extend this line to an answer to the view that that type of practical reasoning does not require validity or correctness; it simply provides an aspect under which the action is seen as good. This is naturally seen as enthymematically reasoning as well.

4. Enkratic reasoning on the present view

Let us then, at least for the sake of argument, consider the possibility that the actual cases Broome calls enkratic reasoning are incomplete or enthymematically pieces of reasoning, in this specific way, that there is a “hidden” further premiss. There are typically good grounds for ascribing this “hidden” (enthymematically) premiss to a person seriously engaged in judging that “I ought to do F”. I shall for now also assume that this ‘hidden’ premiss is held in a motivational way. I will later argue for this assumption.

The case is Broome’s in which you move from the recognition that you ought to take a break to an intention to take a break. ‘B’ stands for belief when we render Broome’s approach, and stands for the judgement stroke on my approach. The ‘I’ stands for intention on Broome’s approach, and for the practical stroke on my approach. This is done for comparative purposes; I don’t think it causes any problems.

the latter, and the primary case of reasoning to be the case where both premisses and conclusion are factive states.
This is the practical reasoning (all simplified in various ways):

2. B (I ought to take a break)
3. I (I shall take a break)

On Broome’s view this reasoning is enthymematic: I also need to believe that it is up to me whether I take a break or not. The correct reasoning is something like this:

2. B (I ought to take a break)
2* B (It is up to me whether or not I take a break.)
3. I (I shall take a break)

On the view I am suggesting this is not correct reasoning. There is a move from the modality of ‘ought’ to ‘shall’, which is not correct reasoning in as much as the one modal predicate does not entail the other.

This is the practical reasoning on my view:

1. I (If I ought to take a break then I shall take a break)
2. B (I ought to take a break)
3. I (I shall take a break)

Let us now compare these views of what is enthymematic in these cases. Some points are obvious. In the type of enkratic reasoning I endorse, the premiss-belief does not have to incorporate any motivation of any sort. I therefore need not subscribe to the following statement by Broome, quoted above: “So your belief that you ought to take a break constitutes a sort of disposition to take a break. And a disposition to take a break is a motivation to take a break.” The belief in question, the belief Broome mentions, would still be the same belief even if you had no disposition whatsoever to do what you ought to do in relation to taking a break. In that case there would not be a disposition to take a break, and no corresponding intention.

The very possibility that the first (possible) premiss has no direct phenomenological presence seems to support Broome’s approach, which tries to do without such an intention among the premisses. But if the reasoning is incomplete or enthymematic, then this point does not necessarily support his approach any more than it supports my approach. That being the case the situation is left quite open, and the favoured option must be the
most theoretically satisfactory approach that fits in with a number of other philosophical commitments.

Enthymemetic reasoning is tricky business. I follow Grice here, who has done interesting work, in taking enthymemetic reasoning to imply that in addition to the actual argument there is also a non-actual or ideal argument that is formally valid (see Grice 2005, especially Chap. 2). The premises of this ideal argument are in some sense to be specified present to the mind of the reasoning person. The ‘some sense’ is the hard bit; a brute disposition to act is not enough for what we are after. That presence before the mind is furthermore, in some sense, required in order for the reasoning person is to be considered rational. I note that Broome’s approach here differs from Grice’s. Of course, there is great need to say more about the notion of being present to the mind in some sense, but that is another a problem we both face, indeed, we all face.

In the rest of the paper I shall develop and support my view further. In doing this, I shall invoke Grice’s somewhat neglected work on incomplete reasoning. From it we learn how hard it is to specify what reasoning is and what it isn’t. We can also learn this: Methodologically speaking we ought to start with paradigmatic and undisputed examples of reasoning. In these cases the activity of the reasoning person is characterized both by the formal/semantic relations between the contents entertained and also by the reasoning person’s relations to such contents. And as we also will shortly see, we need a broader conception of reasoning than the actual cases of reasoning that fit the paradigmatic cases. This is particularly so in the case of incomplete reasoning.

5. Incomplete reasoning

In trying to pin down what reasoning is, we face some deep methodological issues. The prime examples involve correctly engaging in impeccable deductive or inductive structures. We need, for all cases of reasoning, an independent grasp of the correctness conditions. We normally get this from logic, from soundness proofs, etc.

Reasoning involves more than the prime examples, and we want to extend our account of reasoning, possibly to bad reasoning and definitely to incomplete reasoning. When we do so, we extend our conception of reasoning to new cases, to be understood against the background of the primary cases.
As I have explained, my worries about Broome’s approach to Enkrasia have their root in worries that the account of reasoning invoked does not satisfy correctness criteria that can be seen as independent from the case at hand. It moves from and ‘ought’ premiss to a ‘shall’ conclusion, which is not a valid inference in the normal sense of valid. On the other hand, a conception of reasoning as conscious explicit reasoning is too limited. We need to include incomplete reasoning.

While incomplete reasoning is in fact very common, it is also hard to pin down. I shall give a very brief exposition of Paul Grice’s account of incomplete reasoning (cf. Grice 2005).

Here is one case discussed by Grice:

Jack sustains a head injury, Jill says
He is an Englishman, so he will be brave.

Grice identifies three ways of dealing with this as a piece of reasoning, and he endorses the third. The first holds that there is a suppressed premiss (namely that ‘All Englishmen are brave’). There is a particular problem with this suppressed premiss thesis: you cannot object to Jill “That does not follow”. This is because it does follow, given the suppressed premiss.

The second approach sees “Englishmen are always brave” not as a premiss but as an inference rule. This second approach accepts contingent inference rules. They carry with them lots of problems. One might, after all, believe that Englishmen seldom are brave etc.

The third approach holds that there are two arguments at play, the actual and the non-actual or ideal. The ideal argument incorporates the premiss which in some sense is before Jill’s mind, namely that “Englishmen are always brave”, and is formally valid. Jill’s actual argument is (informally) valid just in case there is a formally valid argument with premisses Jill in some sense has in mind.

Without going further into Grice’s reasons for preferring the third approach, let us note there will be a range of cases where the “suppressed” premiss is not explicit because it is generally, in some sense, taken for granted by all parties. Grice has a lot to say about the pragmatics around such cases – maybe the premisses can be taken for granted because they are part of a general concept of rationality that we must see as applicable to the reasoning person.
6. Enkratic reasoning as incomplete/enthymematic

Focus then on the enkratic case, illustrated above:

2. B (I ought to take a break)
3. I (I shall take a break)

There are two competing enthymematic approaches. The crucial bit of reasoning on Broome’s account that is not formally valid on my view is the move from one modality to another, from “ought” to “shall” or “will”.\(^5\) We seem from the perspective of this view to be missing a premiss that connects the two modal verbs, ought and shall/will in the required way. This is not difficult to supply, however. I have supplied it above, in the extra premiss. Can we think of this premiss as being present in some sense? What does it take to be present? Are there tests that can illuminate whether the premiss is present in some sense or not? To provide something like a test I will introduce predictions. But I stress that the test gives only a strong indication, not a proof, and is not a reductive account of what it is to have the premiss before the mind.

6.1. Predictions as tests

Imagine you are doing predictions about yourself or another. At the moment you are not doing practical reasoning, you are simply trying to predict whether A will do F. Stipulate that A realizes that he ought to do F. We can on that basis try to predict that A will F, but this is neither a solid nor well-founded prediction as long as it is unknown whether A is likely to do as he ought to do. The prediction would be on a substantially more secure footing if we also knew that A was set to do what he ought to do in relation to doing F or not. In that case we could make a solid prediction.

Notice that we might also be able to make this same prediction if we took this “suppressed” premiss to be an inference rule. Doing so, however, would open its own can of worms. Think of a very different situation where Akratic A knew or believed that he would not do what he ought to

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\(^5\) This modal verb could possibly be understood differently from the way I understand it. I understand ‘shall’ to be proximate in meaning to ‘will’, and that we use ‘shall’ in the first person, ‘will’ in the third. ‘Ought’, on my view, is straightforwardly normative, the other two are not.
do in relation to F. In that case the picture would be that he did not reason
according to the inference rule in question and also that the fact that he
did not reason in accordance with the inference rule was known. This is a
bad picture of what seems to be happening in akasria: it is extremely hard
to make sense of an agent who knowingly goes against inference rules.
(Remember the view of inference as act, not action.) Weak will/akrasia is
hard enough to understand without this complication.

Let us look at what is in effect a generic statement, to the effect that A
normally does what he thinks he ought to do. This statement is not much
help for a really solid prediction, but there is some help in it. What it is
good for is what we might think of as an explanation post factum. Many
explanation theorists who insist that prediction and explanation come
apart, hold that much explanation is post factum.

Let us move closer in on the enkratic case. Imagine first a self-
prediction along the same lines as the prediction above. The self-prediction
would normally take the same form as the above, the only difference being
that it is in the first person. All the same points seem to apply.

It is natural to think, as I do, that such a self-prediction and a piece of
practical reasoning can involve the exact same propositional contents.
There are general grounds for believing this to be the case, it is the case in
instrumental practical reasoning, and it would connect the various types of
reasoning in a simple picture.

To be sure, the difference between the predictive case and the practical
reasoning case is that practical reasoning has an intention as a conclusion,
i.e. it ends in relating to a propositional content the way we do when we
relate practically, in intending or in action. That is, at least for the mo-
ment, agreed territory. What I take to have pointed to is the following.

If we are to see the predictive case and the practical reasoning case as in-
volving the same propositional content, as it is natural to do on general
grounds, then it is also natural to see the practical case given by Broome as
incomplete. These issues about prediction seem to provide substance as to
whether the premiss that is definitely not explicit is present in some sense
or not. A claim to the effect that there is a missing premiss has real sub-
stance if its presence or absence really matters to the solidity of the predic-
tions we can make.

Against this background we can consider various approaches to incom-
plete reasoning. Broome’s version of the enkratic reasoning person can be
seen as following Grice’s second way of dealing with incomplete reasoning,
with an exception for the ‘up to us-ness’. (I shall ignore that last part of it for now.) This way is not to be recommended on general grounds. It treats the enkratic requirement as if it were an inference rule, and makes what in this case is weak will into a case where we knowingly do not follow an inference rule. More generally, the approach faces the problem of finding some ‘independent’ way of “grounding” the presence or absence of the suppressed premiss. This makes it difficult for us to distinguish the case where we have a causal transition from the premiss(es) to the conclusion from the case where this transition is via reasoning, albeit enthymemetic. We need the distinction, even if it is hard to classify actual cases by it.

If we go for Grice’s third option, as I do, we hold that there are two arguments, one actual but incomplete, and one ideal but complete. The premisses of the ideal one are in some sense before the mind of the reasoning person, but not directly present in the sense of in so far as they as they are not being attended to. We provide some substance to presence or absence of the ideal argument by looking at a parallel piece of predictive reasoning about a formally identical situation. Here we find resources that can ground the ascription of the missing premiss, and provide some substance to the presence or absence of the premiss. The substance resides in how solid a prediction we can make. If the predictions are solid, we have some ground for saying that the suppressed premiss is present in some sense. We have, possibly, further ground when the premiss is something approaching an analytical truth, to the effect that you ought to do what you ought to do.

Note that we have reached this conclusion about the enkratic case without taking a stand on the motivation in, motivation out principle. It was reached on general grounds by thinking of the case as a case of incomplete reasoning, and just on the assumption that the reasoning is a formally correct piece of reasoning. A further step is required to make the case for the claim that the attitude to the premiss that is present in some sense and occurs in the ideal argument is a motivationally held premiss. I shall finally argue in further support of this step.

7. The missing premiss

By focusing on the change from one modal verb in the premiss to another modal verb in the conclusion, I have argued that in order to see the enkratic reasoning as reasoning we should see it as incomplete reason-
ing. There are various ways of approaching the issue; I suggest opting for Grice’s preferred way of dealing with incomplete reasoning.

On Grice’s approach there are various general explanations why certain premisses are not attended to; typically they are entirely obvious and not worth mentioning. Bearing that in mind, let us return to our starting points. Here is Broome again (as quoted above):

Being rational, you are supposed to do enkratic reasoning. Therefore you are disposed to reason your way from your belief to an intention to take a break.

What I have been insisting on is that it is indeed possible also on my view to accept the first of these sentences, and also the second as long as we conceive of the actual reasoning in question as incomplete or as enthymematic.

The premiss, I think, is (in some sense) present when enkratic reasoning being performed is the premiss that I, in relation to doing F, shall do what I ought. Grice-type mechanisms for explaining why many things go unmentioned can be seen as carrying over to this case as well if it is a characteristic trait of rational persons that they normally do what they recognize they ought. This latter point about a generic trait might be understood in many ways, but understood rightly it might be approaching a true generic statement about the sort of rational beings humans are.

I admit to a certain type of haziness around the presence of such premisses to which this approach appeals. If we were to delve further into these presences or absences, we would meet up with some tricky issues in self-knowledge, the extent to which our own mental states are transparent to us, and the relationship between the contents of our minds and what we attend to.

At this point it might be useful to remind ourselves of typical cases of weak will. They seem to be exactly the kind of case where the true generic statement underlying the ascription of rationality has an exception. It is not true that you can be described as engaging in the full ideal argument, even if you accept the premiss that you ought to do F, in a case of weak will where you weak-willedly do something else. (You do not intend to do what you ought to do when you are Akritic.) What is the case is precisely that you do not form the intention of doing F as a rational person would. And in so far as you do not, the likely explanation is not that there is an error of reasoning, but that the premiss needed in the ideal argument to make a
conclusion out of the intention to do F, is not true of you. There is then, in your case, no valid argument to the conclusion that you do F. Weak will and akrasia reside in the weakening of a premiss a rational person ought to hold on to, not in erratic reasoning.

Broome is possibly in the neighbourhood of having us see weak will as an error of reasoning. My objection is that weak will (Akrasia) does not have the recognizable features of slips and errors of reasoning, which again are connected with the inferences being acts. Weak will is a different type of rationality failure. The error of Akrasia is that the true generic statement about rational beings as humans is matched by a momentary failure; it is not true at the moment of weak willed action that the agent forms the intention to do what he ought.

7.1. Support for Wallace’s principle

Let us then again address the question of whether the attitude to the missing premiss should be motivational or not. I say it should be motivational. Here is an argument in support of that. If the premisses leading up to a conclusion are the same in two arguments, both in propositional content and attitude towards that content, then the conclusions should be the same. The cases of prediction and practical reasoning proper can have the same content but different attitudes towards the conclusions: belief in the predictive case, intending in the practical case. This difference in the conclusions must be explained by some difference in the premisses. Since the contents are the same, there has to be a difference in attitude to one premiss if the difference in conclusion is to be explained. Since there clearly are only belief attitudes towards the premisses in the predictive case, there has to be a motivational attitude to a premiss in the practical case to reach a practical conclusion. This follows as long as we accept the need to provide full accounts of validity in semantic relations, and note the difference in conclusion in the predictive case and the practical case. So here we have an argument for the ‘motivation out motivation in’.

8. General conclusion

We now have a more complete picture of enkratic reasoning as normal practical reasoning, and practical reasoning simply as generalized instrumental practical reasoning. The enkratic reasoning may typically be incom-
plete reasoning. The missing premiss then has to be present to the mind in some sense in an ideal argument. It is quite natural that such a premiss is not present to consciousness or attended to if the premiss would express something general about the nature of a rational person; that is also to be expected from Gricean principles of economy etc. We can also, when we see this, provide a precise argument for the view that the ‘extra’ premiss has to be held motivationally. Only in that way can we account for the difference between the practical case and the predictive case.

The picture of enkratic reasoning is, then, in a certain sense, very simple, but the picture of the mind, its rationality and the rational person is not. When accounting for enkratic reasoning, we touch on deep features of the mind and its activity in the lives of our sort of rational beings. The fact that we do enkratic reasoning shows that we typically engage in doing what we ought to do. A substantive account of what it is to be a rational being is needed to accommodate this, which, it seems to me, is both right and very interesting.

If intentional actions are to be understood as ways of being related to propositions, then rationality obviously extends to them as well. If all intentional actions are ways of moving our bodies, they are also minded movements. Facts about the bigger picture, and the limitations in our access to the contents of our own minds beyond what we attend to, all come to light by thinking through the issues around Enkrosis. Enkrosis seems simple, but the problems are deep, and to get things right we need to get the big picture right.

The view here defended shows, I believe, that Enkrosis is a direct reflection of the deeper fact that rationality consists in responsivity to the reasons there are, and that intentionally doing things might be among the responses required by the reasons there are. That, however, I cannot argue here (see Gjelsvik 2007).[^6]

[^6]: An early version of this paper was presented at workshop on John Broome’s work in Geneva. I thank Andrew Reisner, Julian Fink, Pascal Engel and, in particular, John Broome for comments and help. I also thank an audience in Oslo to whom I presented my forthcoming work on the topic of inference, in particular Dagfinn Føllesdal, Øystein Linnebo and Jon Litland. Finally, I am very grateful for the comments of an anonymous reviewer for *Organon F*.\[74\]
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