

Within the debate concerning reason and rationality, instrumental incoherence was for a long time conceived of as the paradigm of irrationality. It was also conceived of as a metaphysically and ontologically innocuous source of normativity (Mackie 1977, 27–28; Dreier 1997, 93; cf. also Raz 2005, 26): if, for example, you intend to write a preface and you think that a necessary means to do so is to ignore your incoming emails, yet you have no motivation whatsoever to ignore your incoming emails, then your attitudinal coherence displays a normative failure. You are not as coherent as you ought to be.

However, with the emergence of the so-called ‘bootstrapping objection’ (Bratman 1997; Broome 2001) and the debate concerning the ‘scope’ of rational requirements (e.g. Broome 2007; 2013; Brunero 2010; Kolodny 2005; Rippon 2011; Schroeder 2004), the innocuous status of the normative significance of (instrumental) coherence became subject to debate (Broome 2005; 2008; Raz 2005; Kolodny 2005; 2007). This led to a paradigmatic shift in how to understand the relationship between rational requirements and normativity. While there now exists considerable doubt that rational requirements are normative, it is commonly agreed that one’s normative point of view is a key feature of one’s rationality. Here the question is not only if one can hold a particular normative judgement and still be rational; what is significant too is whether your normative outlook coheres appropriately with your motivation. In fact, it is now commonly agreed that rationality requires us to intend to make the world fit with our first-personal ought beliefs. Enkrasia (i.e. coherence between your normative views and your motivation) is thus seen as a rational ideal and as a source of rational requirements.

Nevertheless, many elementary questions regarding the application, content, and significance of an enkrasia-requirement remain unanswered, or subject to debate. For example, why does rationality require us to be enkratic? Can an irrational ought-belief issue requirements upon us? What is the logical form (i.e. ‘scope’) of the enkrasia-requirement? Is the enkrasia-requirement best formulated as a state- or as a process-requirement? Should we formulate the enkrasia-requirement as a synchronic or diachronic requirement? Are there normative reasons to satisfy the enkrasia requirement? Does the enkrasia-requirement constitute a standard of correct reasoning? Do ought-beliefs rationally cause intentions with or without the help of an external motivational attitude?

This special issue on ‘The Nature of the Enkratic Requirement of Rationality’ aims to answer some of these fundamental questions. The present papers take direct issue with the plausibility of an enkratic rationality, how to formulate a requirement of enkratic ra-

tionality correctly, and whether enkratic reasoning represents correct reasoning. Furthermore, the assembled papers explore the relationship between enkratic rationality and normative uncertainty, the potential conflict between local enkratic coherence and one's overall-degree of rationality, the authority of normative beliefs with regard to other fundamental principles of rationality, the possibility of rational akrasia, the 'bootstrapping objection' and its potential to thwart the view that attitudes entail normative reasons, and whether enkratic coherence really goes as far as requiring you to have an intention to A whenever you believe that you ought to A. This special issue represents an important step forward in elucidating these elementary issues pertaining to a general theory of rationality.

In closing, I would like to express my gratitude to those who contributed to the genesis of this special issue. First, and foremost, I am very grateful to Marián Zouhar, the chief editor of *Organon F*, not only for inviting me to edit this special issue, but also for advising and helping me during the editorial process. I would also like to express my gratitude to Tibor Pichler, the director of the Institute of Philosophy, for facilitating my fruitful co-operation with the Slovak Academy of Sciences and for making many things possible. Many thanks also to Lukáš Bielik for being extremely helpful during the entire editorial process.

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Last, I would like to express my pride in the fact that this collection of papers from eminent and aspiring 'Western philosophers' is published in a Central European journal. I feel that an intensive cooperation and exchange between academics and institutions in the so-called 'West' and 'Central and Eastern Europe' is already long overdue. Both sides should intensify their efforts in facilitating such cooperation in the future.

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