

Preface

All articles of this special issue of *Organon F* deal with various aspects of the phenomenon of emotions. The papers were selected from the conference *Emotions and Intentionality* that took place in April 2008 in Prague. The rise of attention devoted to the topic of emotions is quite visible in the entire domain of the philosophy of mind, but the aim of the conference was more elaborated than just to contribute yet another volume to the thriving field of study. It was a topic driven conference. We focused our attention to an intricate relationship between emotions as felt, often viscerally experienced states, and the fact that emotions apparently have content and are directed at various objects or events. It is this tension of phenomenality and intentionality that most papers covered from various points of view. Yet defining a single perspective of all papers is almost impossible. The only unifying theme is an effort to understand emotions in all their complexity, without simplifications that often dominate various influential schools of thought. From a purely formal side, it is not an accident that several papers attempt to come to terms with a recent influential theory of Jesse Prinz (articulated especially in his 2004 book *Gut Reactions*). In this respect, several authors clarify the notion of appropriateness of emotions that can only be explicated if emotions have an intentional character, aim to propositional attitudes. Still, a wider area of topics is covered and the papers will be of interest to many people outside of the specialized area of emotion research.

An excellent example of how classics can contribute to contemporary debates is provided by the first paper. Angela Chew comes with a detailed analysis of Aristotle's theory of emotions and compares his approach to that of Anscombe, finding some intriguing parallels. She is especially concerned with the workings of emotions within a larger Aristotelian framework of desires, human rationality and its social setting.

A broader issue of possible relations between rationality and emotions is investigated by Sophie Rietti. She introduces three different strategies of situating emotions into the conception of rationality, assesses their viability and their scope of application. While these three positions are often portrayed as mutually exclusive, Rietti demonstrates that a more suitable way of understanding the rationality in emotions consists in a combination of all views. Her eclecticism, however, is not based on unfounded pluralism. Instead, she shows that taking a specific reading of rationality of emotions often involves a reduction of the emo-

tion phenomena to one of its members, while ignoring the rest. The inclusion is therefore necessary for saving the very phenomenon in its real-life complexity.

The paper of Eoa-Maria Düringer is a direct confrontation with one of the main thesis of the above-mentioned Prinz's book. First, she untangles his arguments about the role of representation in mental states generally, then deals with an objection that she thinks Prinz's account can handle and finally proposes an argument of her own that undermines Prinz's overall schema. Düringer agrees with a causal representative character of mental states of the kind Prinz defends, but divorces bodily changes from his picture by arguing that visceral changes are not part of the representative schema, but rather play role in preparing an organism's response for the emotional stimulus.

Sunny Yang also explores some of the topics, introduced by Jesse Prinz. However, her explorations touch a more metaphysical issue of how to account for values that Prinz's account presupposes as objects of representations. While his account relies of the schema of formal objects, Yang argues that response dependence theory is more suitable for accounting for their existence. Her paper therefore goes significantly beyond a pure philosophy of mind and offers arguments that might serve as foundations for the moral philosophy.

Finally, Chloë FitzGerald explores some underlying assumptions in standard solutions to conflicts between emotions and beliefs. In series of well-chosen examples she shows untenability of the claim that rationality of beliefs has to take over emotions when conflict between the two arises. The assumed supremacy of rationality is in contradiction not only with the enjoyment we get from some emotionally charged situations, but also with moral development that can be highly valuable. By working with fairly commonsense examples, FitzGerald once again proves that one-sided debates oversimplify the domain and commit us to explanations that could be harmful not only for understanding the issue itself, but also for moral progress we should aspire for.

In concluding this introduction, the guest editor would like to thank all conference participants for excellent contributions and discussions, contributors to this volume for their excellent work, his colleagues and staff at Vila Lanna for making the conference so enjoyable and editorial board of the Journal for making this issue possible. Needless to say, our gratitude also goes to the Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences. Without their junior research grant KJB900090802 the conference would not take place and these original and highly-thoughtful articles would not appear in *Organon F*.

Juraj Hvorecký