

## DIALOGY

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### Proper PROPER Names (2)

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ZOUHAR, M.: Having read both introductions published in the previous volume of *Organon F*, I should probably emphasize, at the very beginning of our discussion, that our respective backgrounds are completely different. Your problem, as far as I understand you, is: What entity can be the referent of a proper name? My question is quite a different one: How is it possible that the proper name "N" refers to the individual *i*? This explains the fact that the two introductory remarks were so diverse. But I think that they may serve as quite good examples of different views on the reference of proper names.

Moreover, this fact illustrates not only that we are interested in different problems but also that we are employing different notions of reference. My question tacitly implies that reference is a relation between an expression and an individual, where the individual is, in many cases, empirical in nature. Hence, my notion of reference is an empirical one; and what I am trying to explain is the fact that we commonly use referential expressions in such empirical manners. The formulation of your problem suggests that the notion of reference that you employ is logical in nature, because empirical, "profane", if you like, problems do not concern you. For there can be no logical relationship between an expression and an empirical entity. Thus, the respective notions of reference, one empirical and the other logical, which we are trying to analyze, are dramatically different.<sup>1</sup>

Now, one might wonder how a discussion between us could be at all possible, especially a fruitful discussion which might have as its outcome that our positions would have become at least slightly clearer. It seems to me rather silly to try to persuade each other that his own position is right and the other's is wrong. If we would conduct our discussion in this way, it is very likely we would get stuck in a superficial quarrel. Instead, a more promising direction would consist in analyzing both conceptions within their respective conceptual frameworks, thereby elucidating them.

From this perspective I was surprised that, at the beginning of your *Introduction*, you criticised the problems which are highly interesting for me. Your argument was developed upon the assumption that such problems are of no importance for *semantics*. I must confess that it matters little to me into what category one places his problems. The primary importance lies in the problem itself, not in its label or category. Therefore, if you feel that those question do not belong to semantics, you may subsume them under pragmatics or whatever. I am insisting only on the question. I am

curious as to how the obvious truism that people often use names for identifying empirical individuals (sometimes of which, moreover, they know almost nothing) may be accounted for. The aim of theory of reference, as I see it, is to explain this fact concerning identification of individuals. You do agree that this problem is really interesting, don't you?

JESPERSEN, B.: If you think that people, when saying "North Korea is a proletarian paradise", have succeeded in *identifying* North Korea among all other individuals, I'm afraid that I have to disagree with you. I tend to think that no specific individual has been singled out, contrary to what you consider "an obvious truism". Instead a condition is involved, namely the condition of being the only individual known under the (English syntactic) name "North Korea". This condition is what receives reference. (Of course, "North Korea", as the term occurs in "North Korea is a proletarian paradise", is susceptible to supposition *de re* only; for the property of being a proletarian paradise is attributable to individuals only and not individual determiners<sup>2</sup>) This is a metalinguistic position, I know, and I'm not too happy about it, but it's the only solution I can think of to account for the fact, for it is a fact, that speakers neither in possession of identifying knowledge of North Korea nor having ever been there may still speak about North Korea. Only it should be noted that North Korea is no specific individual here. "North Korea" is a household name, which is to say that the *word* has become common currency among people.

Consider this dialogue:

A: *What is the name of the capital of North Korea?*

B: *Pyongyang.*

A: *Ah, so you know that Pyongyang is the capital of North Korea.*

But this does not follow; A is not allowed to infer, on the basis of the above, that B masters either °*North Korea* or °*Pyongyang*.

ZOUHAR, M.: According to you, the name "North Korea" succeeds only in identifying some condition, namely the condition of being the only individual named by the expression "North Korea". This seems problematic to me. For, first, it involves the uniqueness condition, which need not be met, yet an expression may still be understood as a proper name (of a clearly determined object); in fact, most (syntactic) proper names are not unique in this sense. And, second, if there were two North Koreas - or, better, two objects with the same name - a speaker may successfully refer to one of them (and this may be recognized by his audience), and thus he identifies one of the two objects, not some condition, which is common for both names.

Anyway, your "proletarian" dialogue relies on a kind of trick. The question A asked B was about the *name* of the capital of "North Korea", i.e., about the linguistic expression. Therefore, as "Pyongyang" occurs in B's answer, the term cannot be taken *to refer* to the capital but only *to mention* the name (without any pretence of reference

on B's part). "Pyongyang" was merely mentioned, not used. Therefore, the name should appear, in B's answer, within quotation marks. However, in A's reaction to B's answer the situation was changed and A made a tricky shift, namely from mentioning to referring. Hence, your conclusion that A does not master *Pyongyang* is not justified, because, in fact, A's original question, as well as B's answer, as well, did not require or invoke any such knowledge. Speaker A was just curious whether B was familiar with some string of letters commonly taken to be the name of the capital of North Korea. In any case, the role of speaker B could be successfully played, in suitable circumstances, by a parrot, too.

JESPERSEN, B.: It is quite in order that the uniqueness condition guiding the use of, say, "North Korea" may not be met, for it is intuitively true that it is not necessarily so that a country must be known as "North Korea" in English. Indeed, before the fifties the actual world knew no country under that name.

Of course, I cannot accept your claim that a term like "North Korea", with no instruction of its use associated with it, may still count as a proper name. From a theoretical, as opposed to pre-theoretical, point of view, such a word would be a mere *flatus vocis*.

As for two individuals both bearing the name "North Korea", my immediate response is that these two identical words express two different constructions, hence refer to two different individuals. The pragmatic factor of importance in this case is that within one subgroup of speakers one of the two meanings/concepts/constructions is the primary one (or the only one, as the case may be), in another subgroup another use prevails, and in a third subgroup, in this case of English speakers, the word is permanently in need of disambiguation. ("Aristotle" is one of the standard examples.) Personal names like "John", "Pavel", "Novák", etc, thrive in subcommunities in each of which a particular construction is associated with the name, requiring disambiguation, however, when used out of area, as it were.

Yes, my "proletarian" dialogue above trades on a confusion of use and mention, that I must admit. But how would you react if I rephrased A's question as,

A: *What is the capital of North Korea? (or: Which city is the capital of North Korea?)*

Then A and B would be exclusively using and not mentioning the words "Pyongyang" and "North Korea". Even in this case I remain convinced that all A is allowed to infer about B's mastery, or lack thereof, of either term is that B knows both as what I called *household names* above. Being called "Pyongyang", where "Pyongyang" is a household name, type-theoretically equals being the first man on the Moon. Given a particular *wl*-pair, the function takes this pair to either somebody or nobody. The *existence* of Pyongyang would, on this type-theoretical assumption, consist in some individual being taken as value at some *wl*-argument couple, and its non-existence in

no-one being determined at the argument selected. Household names don't qualify as semantic proper names, but are examples of syntactic proper names.

I believe that you're right in comparing B to a parrot. You might also have compared him to a contestant in a quiz show who serves up the right words/sounds. Such a contestant might say, "I just know that the name of the capital of what is called 'North Korea' is 'Pyongyang'; I don't know anything at all about either place."

ZOUHAR, M.: Before, you qualified household names as syntactic and not semantic names. This is what I cannot completely agree with. In addition, you maintain that A didn't master <sup>o</sup>*North Korea* or <sup>o</sup>*Pyongyang*, therefore (it seems) his use of the names cannot be taken to refer (in my sense) to particular individuals. However, as I mentioned in my *Introduction* (published in the previous volume of *Organon F*), every use of a proper name, if it is used as a proper name, is to be qualified as reference. My (empirical) notion of reference permits this. If "B knows both [names, i.e., "Pyongyang" and "North Korea"] as what [you] called *household names*", it means for me that B has at his disposal expressions which both play their significant referential role. This is the role they play in B's idiolect; if this was not so, B would not have had them in his idiolect. However, this problem stems from different notions of the reference of proper names, and our following discussion should clarify them a little. Let's talk about your conception of reference.

JESPERSEN, B.: Our theories of reference are incompatible, obviously. Moreover, I don't operate with a bifurcation between reference and denotation, one of the two being the actual value of a definite description. I only include in my semantics (i) the relation between a word and the thing it stands for, its *referent*, and (ii) the relation between a word and what it expresses, its *meaning*, but *not* (iii) the relation between a function and its value, if any, in the actual world.

Your notion of reference is tailor-made for a theory of communication, but that's pure pragmatics. My theory of singular reference is this. Name *n* expresses construction <sup>o</sup>*i* of individual *i* and refers to *i*, because *i* is what is constructed by <sup>o</sup>*i*. *i* is introduced into the subject-matter of a discourse in the special way of <sup>o</sup>*i*. However, since <sup>o</sup>*i* is primitive, a mere trivialization, *i* is simply *given* in an, if you like, unadorned or unceremonious manner. No description of any sort clings to either <sup>o</sup>*i* or *i*. It is in its capacity as pure numerical individuator that *i* is introduced into discourse.

We shouldn't imagine, *contra* Kripke, that some people got together and said, "Hey, let's pair *i* off with *n*!" For one thing, this is purely pragmatic, hence irrelevant, and what's more, it is an explanation of the same stuff that myths are made of. Again, to check how *n* behaves in various contexts I don't need to know the, shall we say, history of *n*. If *n* is a proper name as I understand them, then *n* has *eo ipso* a meaning, and that meaning can be no other than a construction. I can think of only one kind of construction that could constitute the meaning of *n*; and that's trivialization.

ZOUHAR, M.: I believe that topics concerning the Kripkean view on proper names will interest us later; now I would like to stop for a moment and try to find a historical parallel that might shed some light on your view. Your conceptual framework (expression-construction-individual) reminds me of Frege's (expression-sense-referent). According to Frege, sense (*Sinn*) is a mode of presentation of a referent (*Bedeutung*). It seems to me that the same model can be found between construction and individual.

JESPERSEN, B.: A construction expressed to by a proper name constructs an individual, that's right. Indeed, the main ambition informing TIL is to explicate, in a rigorous manner, Frege's only vaguely adumbrated notion of *Sinn*. As a result of Tichý's investigations, it turns out that Frege's so-called "*gewöhnliche Bedeutungen*" - in our case, individuals - must be expelled from the realm of semantics.

The relation between a construction of some specific individual *i* and *i* itself consists in *i*'s being presented in a certain way, in having a certain "*Art des Gegebenseins*". Now I may be twisting language a bit, but I'd say that *i*'s *Sinn* is the least specific one, in that the *Sinn* merely gives *i* as a specific individual distinct from all the rest that exists. (The other constructions, apart from *variables*, all concern functions and their arguments and values.) This, of course, assumes an atomistic ontology and a substance, rather than a bundle, theory of individuals. Individuals, from the logical point of view, are "naked". Existence and self-identity are their only two essential properties, hence they are trivial, i.e., exemplified in all worlds at all times, or equivalently, are not modally and temporally dependent. Any given individual exemplifies *all* properties of individuals, but does so relative to the set of all worlds and time-points. So *i* which is, say, an elephant, in the actual world is, at the same time, a T-shirt and a mouse and a floppy disk in three different possible worlds. But not a prime number, for instance, or the hope that Christmas would last until Easter, for these are different logical types from individuals.

Now, in my *Introduction* I said that I'd try to find a third path, one that was neither descriptive nor direct, but I'd still say that what I am aiming at is, at heart, neo-Fregean in its insistence on an abstract mode of presentation of something concrete. Kripke's claim in *Naming and Necessity* that a totally ignorant speaker who utters a sentence like "Cicero was an orphan" and does so with the intention of referring to whatever the person intended to refer to from whom our ignorant friend got the name - or rather just string of letters and sounds - manages to refer to Cicero, the man, is offensive to me, as you might have suspected from the "North Korea" example. (Dummett doesn't like it either, but he falls back on description theory.)

ZOUHAR, M.: The gap between our approaches becomes deeper because of our employing different notions of individuals, in addition to different conceptions of reference; your individuals are "naked", mine are empirical. (In fact, it follows from our different notions of reference.) Therefore, I suggest marking them "individual<sub>n</sub>" and "individual<sub>e</sub>", respectively. For the sake of outlining some of the connections between

the two notions, we should, perhaps, say that individuals<sub>n</sub> are logico-semantical surrogates for individuals<sub>s</sub>.

JESPERSEN, B.: Your distinction is important - but what do you mean by "surrogate"? Are individuals<sub>n</sub> of lesser value to you?

ZOUHAR, M.: Of course not. Perhaps it was misleading of me to use the word "surrogate". Using this word I was hinting at the function which individuals<sub>n</sub> play in your formal theory, where individuals<sub>s</sub> have no access. What I mean is that the notion of individual<sub>n</sub> covers everything what is important for a formal theory regarding individuals. I think that you could agree with this characterization.

JESPERSEN, B.: Yes.

ZOUHAR, M.: However, let me mention one more point regarding the Fregean origin of your theory. I see one very important difference between your and Frege's theories. You have replaced Frege's *Bedeutung* with individual<sub>n</sub>. At the same time you accept Frege's thesis that *Sinn* (your construction) is the mode of presentation of *Bedeutung* (your individual<sub>n</sub>). But the fact that an object is (for Frege) presented with some sense means that that object has a certain property. The *Bedeutung* of "the author of *Waverley*" is Walter Scott because he wrote the novel, i.e., he has the property of being the author of *Waverley*. Individual<sub>n</sub> has only two trivial properties and, therefore, the fact that they are presented by some construction has no bearing on their non-trivial, empirical properties.

JESPERSEN, B.: First, a slightly pedantic correction. Being the author of *Waverley* is not a property, but a determination of some individual at some *wt*-couple. There is a type-theoretical difference between properties of individuals and individual concepts. The former determine sets of individuals (sometimes the empty set of individuals), the latter either exactly one individual or none at a *wt*-couple.

True, the Fregean flavour of "my" theory is that it insists on a mode of presentation of an individual we wish to talk or think about. But no condition must be fulfilled by *i* in order to be constructed by *c*. Only this way may reliance on description, either essential, hence vacuous, or empirical, hence fact-dependent, be avoided. The notion of trivialization simply wasn't available to Frege. Trivialization is technically simple but philosophically highly interesting, and it requires further investigation what can be done with trivializations.

By the way, notice that my position turns all proper names into *strongly* rigid designators, to use Kripke's term, which I suspect he wanted to reserve for gods and numbers.

ZOUHAR, M.: However, your "non-Fregean Fregeanism" is something I can hardly understand. You claim that a name expresses some construction and this construction

constructs some individual<sub>*n*</sub>. At the same time this construction is a mere (non-descriptive) trivialization. Let me now present some worries concerning your view.

1. It is strange that "no condition must be fulfilled by *i* in order to be constructed by *c*". How can the referent of a name be determined, if not through some condition? If there is no such condition, then the connection between name and referent is arbitrary, a matter of mere association. Is it acceptable within any theory of reference? I mean that if connection between them is just an association, then the whole theory of reference of proper names may go as follows: The referent of a name is that object which is assigned to the name. Hence, reference is just an assignment. Does it correspond to your notion of reference?

2. All individuals<sub>*n*</sub> have the same properties (self-identity and existence). Could you present some criterion of difference between them? Now, it is obvious that such a criterion shouldn't invoke the two properties. Doesn't it mean that, when it comes down to it, there is just one individual? You may say that they are *numerically* different; but then they must be located in different space/time positions. And therefore they have other properties by means of which we may differentiate between them, namely space/time positions. If you disagree, I think that you must accept that there is only one individual, contrary to your opinion. The consequences for the real world would be disastrous: All individuals<sub>*c*</sub> are *wt*-dependent instantiations of individuals<sub>*n*</sub>, and, therefore, there would be just one individual in the world (this kind of monism has been dead for more than a 100 years!).

3. The same applies to constructions. Every construction is a mode of presentation of one individual. If we have no means of telling individuals apart (because they have just two trivial properties) we need only one construction. For it would be possible for one construction that it present any of the individuals<sub>*n*</sub>. Is there some independent means of differentiation between various constructions? If there is not, doesn't it mean that all expressions have the same meaning?

4. How can different constructions lead to different objects in spite of the fact that all individuals<sub>*n*</sub> have the same trivial properties? In other words, how is it possible that construction *c* presents individual<sub>*n*</sub> *i* but not individual<sub>*n*</sub> *j*?

JESPERSEN, B.: Aren't you acting as a mouthpiece for Strawson when you say that numerically distinct individuals must be present at distinct space/time positions?

ZOUHAR, M.: Yes, why not? You might object that I shifted my language a bit and tried to ascribe to individuals<sub>*n*</sub> properties which belong to individuals<sub>*c*</sub>. Now, if I return to talking about individuals<sub>*n*</sub>, the question remains, because it seems natural to claim that numerically distinct individuals<sub>*n*</sub> must be accommodated in different positions within logical space.

JESPERSEN, B.: Now, there is no risk that what we take to be all individuals<sub>*n*</sub> would in fact be one great individual. The reason is that naked individuals are *defined* to be numerically distinct from each other. But I admit we have reached rockbottom here.

I'm simply assuming that I have at my disposal an infinite set of individuals,<sub>n</sub> pure numerical individuators. No criteria of individuation are needed to keep them apart, as it were. Since there is at least one construction possible for each individual, namely its own trivialization, it follows that there are just as many trivializations as there are individuals, which is infinitely many. (Notice that <sup>o</sup>*Bratislava* and <sup>o</sup>*Preßburg* are one and the same construction, not two (equivalent ones), of one and the same individual. Their difference in linguistic representation is immaterial to their logical status.)

One way that might be helpful to fix in your mind the idea of individuals,<sub>n</sub> would be this. Every single individual does and is exactly the same as every other individual; every single one is a whale or a speck of dust, the SNP Bridge or Zeus, or revels in scuba/diving among colourful reefs in the South Pacific. But not in the same world or at the same time, as I said before. These features are spread out across all worlds and all times. Consequently, no two individuals have exactly the same *wt*-story to tell. One more thing. Even if space/time positions were reinterpreted to be positions in logical space (i.e., possible worlds) and in time to make agents in logical space/time of individuals, they still wouldn't owe their distinctness to their adventures in the logical universe. You *might* individuate them this way, but you *needn't*. The backbone of their distinctness, as I said above, is that when the concept of individuals,<sub>n</sub> was introduced, they were simply defined to be distinct. And you can't prove a definition to be false. As for your Question 1, I fail to see what is so alarming about the arbitrariness, as you call it, of the name/individual relation.

However tangled and twisted the social practices of naming an individual and keeping the name afloat within a community may be, what is relevant from the viewpoint of formal semantics is just that some individual has been paired off with some term. This relation obtaining between individuals and names is as arbitrary as anything (but is this what you're trying to get at when saying that the relation is arbitrary?).

Since you keep pushing the issue of conditions to be met, then let me say this. There *is* a condition to be fulfilled, but I was reluctant to use that word, since the condition is not empirical or *a posteriori*. Individual *i* is the referent of *n* iff *n* expresses, or has as its meaning, a construction or concept of *i*. So the condition for being the referent of *n* is that you must be the individual whose trivialization is the meaning of *n*.

Such a condition, were they to formulate one, would be much harder for the direct reference theorist to put forward. *Referent* and *meaning* are distinct concepts for sure, but they necessarily coincide in *i*.

The direct semanticist *could* say, "You are the referent of *n* iff you are the meaning of *n*". But that would not be terribly illuminating, for the meaning is not a stepping-stone on the path leading to the referent. Whenever the referent is identical to the meaning of a name for this individual, it would border on circularity to say, as I imputed to the direct reference theorist, that somebody or something is the referent of *n* iff that individual is the meaning of *n*.



Let me just repeat here that I find it outright absurd how a person or an animal, flesh and bones, or some inanimate concrete object like the SNP Bridge could possibly be the *meaning* of anything. I just can't my head around it.

ZOUHAR, M.: It is true that the relationship between a name and its referent is, in a sense, arbitrary. It means that they are entities independent of each other because entities of different kinds. However, let me compare names with descriptions. The empirical referent of a description is that object which has a certain (unique) property. And this property is required by the description, because the expression describes the individual as the entity with such a property. In this sense the relationship is *not* arbitrary. I just meant this kind of nonarbitrariness.

You're right concerning the point about definition. However, your proposal seems to me very unnatural. Let me again invoke Frege's theory, to fix ideas. An expression, according to Frege, expresses a sense and refers to its referent. And a sense is a mode of presentation of a given referent. The choice of an individual as the referent of a given expression is determined by a sense. It means that what we need in order to determine a referent of a given expression is a sense expressed by it. Therefore, senses are of primary importance. However, it seems to me that your view is a little bit different. Individuals<sub>n</sub> are sources of constructions because constructions are just trivializations and one must know what is to be trivialized. It might be said that, in a sense, individuals<sub>n</sub> determine constructions. In Frege's theory it is the other way round.

Anyway, let's accept individuals<sub>n</sub> as the logical basis, that is, as a matter of definition. This procedure is correct, for individuals are naked. But I should add, to the four objections above, the following one. Individuals<sub>n</sub> are not so completely naked, their two trivial properties notwithstanding. I'm not alluding at the empirical properties mentioned in paragraph 2. One such property is being named by *n*. This is a property, not a determination of an individual, because the individual receives it after being named and identified - it is not the condition the individual must satisfy in order to be referred to. Moreover, it might seem that the notion of individual<sub>n</sub> is self-contradictory, because a naked individual must be naked, i.e., must have the property referred to by "being naked". Therefore it is not naked. And one may find other properties. Surely, not every individual<sub>n</sub> is named. Therefore we may divide them into two sets: the set of named individuals<sub>n</sub> (call it *P*) and the set of other individuals<sub>n</sub> (call it *Q*); then some individuals<sub>n</sub> have the property being member of *P* and the other have the property being member of *Q*, and every individual<sub>n</sub> has the property being a member of *P* or *Q*. The members of *P* have also the property being named by some name; the members of *Q* have the property being named by no name. Or every member of *P* has the property being named by *n*<sub>1</sub> or *n*<sub>2</sub> or... or *n*<sub>m</sub>, where *n*<sub>1</sub>,..., *n*<sub>m</sub> represent all proper names in a given language. At which point must one stop finding such properties? Theoretically speaking, perhaps every individual<sub>n</sub> might have infinitely many properties.

JESPERSEN, B.: So what you're saying is that in Frege the conceptual order is sense-individual and in my case individual-sense? I may have expressed myself infelicitously, but I don't wish to claim, or have among the consequences of what I'm claiming, that a speaker or a hearer first fixes the individual, then trivializes it and then fixes it as the referent of a proper name. It is not so that "one must know what to trivialize". What makes so-called neo-Fregeanism Fregean is its insistence that any intellectual report with an object of whatever kind must be mediated via a sense of some sort. True, "individuals<sub>n</sub> are sources of constructions", and indeed there can be *no* such thing as an improper trivialization, i.e., a trivialization that fails to construct.

Trivialization of *i* is a logical operation on *i* that must be carried out in order to render *i* susceptible to intellectual report, to make *i* mind-friendly. From the viewpoint of the language-user (or anyone merely thinking about *i*), the conceptual order remains sense-individual.

Yes, it is admittedly a bit of an approximation to say that a naked individual has only two essential properties: existence and self-identity. Properly speaking, the list is infinite. E.g., being coloured if red; being an *F* or a  $\neg F$  (where *F* is either empirical or non-empirical), being an *F* iff being an *F*. But that's not a problem, though. The definition of *naked individual* excludes all *empirical* properties (i.e., properties which are such that it requires investigation of physical reality to ascertain whether or not *i*, say, is an *F*) from any set of exclusively essential properties instantiable by an individual. Being naked does not imply being without either essential or empirical/accidental properties. All naked individuals are naked in the sense that, as they whirl through logical space, no empirical property they had at one end of this space is one they would still have at the other end. If the categories of essential and empirical properties are kept separate, I don't see how that contradiction could arise.

ZOUHAR, M.: I must agree that I misunderstood your view on individuals<sub>n</sub>. Still I must express some hesitations toward your theory. It seems to me, and to you as well, I believe, that the chief aim of semantics is to give some explanation of understanding, because understanding is tied to the meanings of expressions. However, I must confess that I see no obvious way to explain understanding. Everybody, in order to understand a given name, must, according to your theory, grasp an appropriate construction. E.g., I will understand the name "Bratislava" iff I apprehend the construction <sup>o</sup>*Bratislava*. However, in what sense might I be said to have understood the name? Grasping the construction mentioned doesn't guarantee that I understand the name "Bratislava" and not "Prague". Is it enough to say that if I know that Bratislava is different from every other individual then I understand its name? It seems to me that I don't. Grasping a construction might be a necessary condition but is in no way a sufficient condition for understanding a name. For I know of every individual that it is different from any other. And it can hardly play the role of a distinguishing mark of individuals.

JESPERSEN, B.: The criterion for understanding a name that I have propounded is exceptionally austere, arguably just as demanding (although for different reasons) as Russell's for logically proper names, his *proper* proper names.

So since you're interested in theory of communication and I in immaculately conceived semantics, the criterion that you just mentioned may very well be too strict for your purposes. More specifically, your question, it seems to me, centres on the issue how a construction and a term are "glued together", since you say that even if you had grasped °*Bratislava* there would be no guarantee that you had grasped or understood "Bratislava" rather than, say, "Prague".

I'm not convinced the deep problem is how °*Bratislava* and "Bratislava" are held together, for what breathes life into the string of letters "Bratislava" and thereby turns them into a word, a member of the vocabulary of a particular natural language, is that °*Bratislava* is its meaning. The relation between term and construction is established through the former *expressing* the latter. But what *expression*, in this sense, consists in I have no theory for. There is a gap here, I must admit. Filling the gap would, I think, essentially consist in fleshing out Tichý's scant remarks, towards the end of his book, about the isomorphism obtaining between a term and its corresponding construction. His thesis about (quasi-)isomorphism between a sentence and a propositional construction has much to be said for it, but lacks intuitive appeal when it comes to the relationship between a proper proper name and its individual trivialization. Once we're past atomic constructions, however, the thesis of isomorphism comes into its own.

Yet, as far as I'm concerned, the deep problem is what *grasping* a construction amounts to. Frege, as far as I'm concerned, never got around to spelling out how *erfassen* was to be taken. In his latest book, Pavel Materna makes some attempts to clarify how understanding the trivialization of *X* amounts, epistemically speaking, to an immediate or spontaneous recognition of *X* or *X*-objects. E.g., a child who, when asked to identify all round objects around him, never or rarely fails to pick out exactly the round things around him can be said to have grasped a concept of roundness, viz., °*Roundness*, even in the absence of any knowledge about a definition of roundness.<sup>3</sup>

In the case of °*Bratislava*, a grasp of this particular  $\iota$ -construction could be characterized as the ability to identify Bratislava whenever confronted with it intellectually. This is *not* the ability to know, whenever you're in Bratislava, that you're in Bratislava. That would be too restrictive, since any proposition about Bratislava would be comprehensible only if you were on location (cf. Russell). But the contrary is not the case, that you might be in Bratislava without knowing where you were, and still master °*Bratislava*.

Being able to recognize Bratislava as what is constructed by °*Bratislava* when physically (or "causally", according to "causal" theories) related to Bratislava is not the paradigm of grasping a  $\iota$ -trivialization. Knowledge *which* individual is constructed by °*Bratislava* is purely intellectual and may or may not manifest itself in action (contrary to Dummett's brand of neo-Fregeanism).

Whenever this sort of knowledge *is* manifested, it will typically consist in knowing, when in Bratislava, that one is in Bratislava, or making corrections like, "No, I wasn't talking about Prague, I was talking about Bratislava".

Again, the communication terrorist will find little of interest in this "intellectualistic" notion of *grasping*. Let me underline, however, that, contrary to what you said, grasping °*Bratislava* is both a necessary *and* sufficient condition for understanding the name "Bratislava": you understand a proper name iff you know which t-trivialization it expresses. Understanding a name is tantamount to understanding its meaning. (This last remark would have been banal, had it not been for the peculiar claim that it is instead tantamount to understanding its *use*, i.e., the sort of occasions when you are permitted to utter the word.)

ZOUHAR, M.: I'm afraid that this "intellectualistic" notion of grasping is rather obscure to me. What does it mean that grasping a construction need not be manifested in action? I think that no one need confine himself to such kinds of action like realizing that he is in Bratislava when he is, or something similar. However, he may act in such a way that he is able to associate with the name as an appropriate portion of his knowledge that part which is about Bratislava. Of course, this knowledge doesn't constitute the meaning of the name. Although not semantical in itself, this "intellectualistic" and epistemological level seems to me important for distinguishing between constructions and individuals<sub>n</sub> constructed by them. For it might be true that two individuals<sub>n</sub> are distinct because they are constructed by two different constructions (e.g., °*Bratislava* and °*Prague*), and therefore "Bratislava" and "Prague" refer to distinct individuals. However, one can say that two constructions are distinct because they construct two numerically distinct individuals<sub>n</sub> only on pain of a vicious circle. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, one ought to distinguish between them by employing a set of (more or less vague) pieces of knowledge which would be associated with these respective constructions. Well, you might say that you just defined them as distinct. And this I can only just accept, even though it is not satisfactory for me.

Anyway, I must confess that I am beginning to realize the need for these kinds of logical entities. I think that your theory reveals an important fact concerning the understanding of proper names, because you insist on the "intellectualistic" character of meanings (i.e., entities responsible for understanding). However, if meanings are not identical to individuals, there is no need for replacing individuals<sub>c</sub> with individuals<sub>n</sub>. On the other hand, Kripkean theories often fall into identifying meanings of names with their referents, the referents being individuals<sub>c</sub>. From this perspective, I must agree with your critique of direct reference theories, mentioned in your *Introduction*. These theories are unable to explain understanding, but as theories of *reference*, I think they are on the right way.

JESPERSEN, B.: So how would causal and descriptonal theories handle these problems?

ZOUHAR, M.: I tried to show this in my *Introduction*, where I outlined a special approach centred around the introduction of a name (by a way of mentioning it in an introductory sentence) and the type/token distinction. With this apparatus our explanation may deal with ordinary proper names and is not forced to postulate other kinds of names.

JESPERSEN, B.: I agree with your observation that when a name - or a token of a name? - is first introduced, the name is not used but mentioned. The initial baptism seems like it was conceived to serve as some sort of real-life counterpart to assignment functions from bearer to term in logical theory. But I have two problems with such "introductions" *à la* causal theory. First, they are, as you admit, pragmatic - external to semantics, which is, of course, an *a priori* matter. - But this is pure mythology! How many initial baptisms have you attended lately?? The second thing is that initial baptism may, at most, amount to no more than stating the blunt fact that "n" refers to *i*. But you obviously want more from your theory - otherwise a "naked" assignment like  $f(n) = i$  would suffice. Now, when a child is baptized in a church, this act of introduction of the name "n" for the child leans against a heavy background theory provided by the clerical institution. Do you have a counterpart in your semantical theory to match that?

ZOUHAR, M.: In my introductory remarks I was talking about introducing a name into the sociolect of some community, not into the idiolect of some particular member of this community. But the idea of introduction can be extended and applied to idiolects, too. One can say that a name was (descriptively or ostensively) introduced into the idiolect of the speaker S. Therefore S need not be a witness of an initial baptism which was connected with the introduction into a sociolect. And I think that this is not mythological.

We cannot agree regarding the scope of semantics. For me, semantics is not only *formal* semantics. (I'm afraid that we must leave this topic aside because it would require a long discussion.) You have supposed that initial baptism is something mythological. Also, the term "baptism" I dislike because of unimportant "clerical" associations. For me, baptisms are just introductions and I take the term "baptism" in a wider sense - remember the *a-b-c-d* story from my *Introduction*. I think that there is no need for any counterpart to various social and clerical institutions to capture the introduction of a name.

You have suggested that causal theory, even in its present reformulation, is not able to explain the determination of the referent of a name. I think that it is able to. The referent of a name is determined in an introductory sentence: the referent of "n" is that individual which stands in the direction of an ostension (or satisfies some descriptive singular term) *during the act of introducing "n"*. This way of putting it captures Kripke's observation that names have no descriptive content; all descriptions can do, is only fix referents, not the meanings of names. The satisfier of a description is, to use Kripke's notion, its semantic referent.

JESPERSEN, B.: Let me first comment on your previous *a-b-c-d* story. Person *d* was someone who couldn't single *c* out and who didn't know the name "*c*". Still, in the company of *a* and *b* who knew both *c* and "*c*", *d* would, you said, be in a position to refer to *c* merely by uttering the name "*c*". That I'm not so sure about. *d* is unable to construct *c*, and he cannot pair "*c*" off with a construction as its meaning. So when *d* says, "*c* is an *F*", or asks, "what would *c* say about this-and-that?", *d* doesn't know what he is saying. ("*c*" has the status of a term for a free variable ranging over individuals.) Others would, on your stipulation, namely *a* and *b* (and *c* as well, I'm sure). But *d* is unprepared for a discussion involving *c*, indeed cannot even contribute to it. The most I could grant you is that *d*, if he understood the syntactical category of "*c*" of the language spoken between *a* and *b*, could say, "whoever you call *c* is an *F*", or, "What would whoever it is you've calling '*c*' think about this-and-that?"

Talking about introduction in general would serve to disguise the tension between our approaches. But you would still have baptisms in mind when talking about introductions. And I wish to know why you keep falling back on a mythological theory of introduction. (I myself prefer to be metaphysical rather than mythological!) I would also like you to tell me *what* the authority is that people have to introduce names. The mechanisms of an assignment/interpretation function I believe to understand. But baptisms.

Allow me to make a general claim here. Historically, causal theories were cooked up "to anchor language in reality", to show how language is "hooked up with" reality. Introductions, or baptisms, now serve the purpose of showing how, in the dim and distant past, the thing and (a token for) the term were so intimately entwined that nowadays, when "*n*" goes proxy for *n*, we are *just about* causally related to the real McCoy. Such a theory may be psychologically reassuring (I know this may sound arrogant, but it's not meant to), but I think it's semantically misguided. Baptisms and subsequent chains are irrelevant.

ZOUHAR, M.: First of all, I must agree with your previous general claim, but with one minor correction. It is acceptable that chains of communication are irrelevant, but I think that baptisms, my introductions, are of some importance. For in the act of introduction of a name it happens that some, previously semantically uninteresting, expression is transformed into a name, because there was some, previously semantically uninteresting, object which was transformed into the referent of the name - introductions are the birthdays of both names and their referents. And if this is accepted, one must also accept that in such an introduction the semantics of the name is fixed, otherwise we cannot speak about *name* or *its referent*.

Second, I'm puzzled why you hesitate about ascribing *d* reference to *c* via "*c*". You claimed that *d* was unable to construct *c*. This seems strange to me. What is required for *d* that he may be able to construct *c*? According to your theory, one can obtain a construction of *c* even when one knows nothing about what is constructed. And this is so with *d*. His knowledge is minimal or, better, zero; he has in his possession

almost no one descriptive piece of information about *c* (notwithstanding the information regarding the above speech situation involving *a* and *b*). Why do you think that, contrary to your previous position, *d* should ("intellectually") possess something more to be able to construct *c*?

Third, I agree that *d* is unprepared. But I think that this point is incorporated into my explanation. His lack of preparation, however, doesn't refrain him from a successful performance of an act of reference to *c*. Once more, this is a theory of reference, not theory of meaning.

JESPERSEN, B.: Just a remark. It's plain why you cannot let theory of reference coincide with theory of meaning. But the way I look at it, it is a necessary condition for *d* to be the agent of an act of reference to *c* that *d* be able to entertain thoughts about *c*. And this is exactly what he is not. So it is also false that *d* manages to mention *c*.

That's a nice way of putting it - "introductions as birthdays". We couldn't possibly disagree that an introduction of a name fixes the referent of the name. We disagree about the nature of the introduction. As an aside, I am mystified by your phrase "previously semantically uninteresting expression". I cannot imagine that any expression would be semantically uninteresting at any point. Do you imagine our languages contain reservoirs of words awaiting their birthdays?

ZOUHAR, M.: The phrase "previously semantically uninteresting expression" might be un felicitous. I just meant that there was some string of letters devoid of any semantical characteristics - reference, denotation, meaning, etc. Perhaps I should say "a string of letters without any semantics". I think that you're right about the idea of language containing "reservoirs of words". "Names" (i.e., syntactic names) as written in a calendar are not proper names from the semantical point of view. They are only a kind of variables. Now, parents choose from this "reservoir" such a word and they want to give it to their child as his or her first name. From this point onwards (after the act of baptism), the word turns into a name.

Now, back to the communicative role of *d*. Here there is strong disagreement between us. *d* is a full-blooded participant of the particular discussion about *c* and, moreover, as Evans pointed out, he may contribute to the communication (contrary to your opinion), because "on some subsequent occasion [*d*] may use the name to offer some new thought to [the other] participants: '[*d*] was quite right to do that'."<sup>4</sup> Of course, the range of such thoughts is limited, but the lack of knowledge about other, more important facts concerning *c* doesn't rule out that he is referring to *c* - for he knows about some other facts which are, in the present situation, sufficient for successful reference. The reaction of *a* and *b* shows whether *d* was successful or not.

Secondly, let me return to your remark about mythology. I'm afraid that I am not able to understand it. The introduction of a name for some individual is a perfectly semantical business, based on the notion of fitting a description (act of ostension,...). The other, pragmatic, question is that of spreading or learning the name. This may be a little bit "mythological". Acquiring an ability to refer to an individual by a name

may be obscure because it is not clear, in advance, how elaborate the ability must be in order for a speaker to refer successfully to an individual. The ability may come in stages. *d* from the above example acquired a very brute ability which can be exercised in just a few situations. *a* and *b* surely have more refined abilities, for their successful referring does not depend on such special situations. Their command of the mane is different.

JESPERSEN, B.: One last remark about baptism. Don't forget that ostension is notoriously insufficient for fixing a specific thing in your vicinity, and that an introduction like "let the reference of '*n*' be whatever unique individual (with its clothes on) satisfies empirical condition *C*" saddles you with actualism. In my *Introduction* I argued briefly that actualist semantics is stillborn.

ZOUHAR, M.: Frankly speaking, I'm feeling quite happy to be an actualist. It is not possible for someone to fix the referent of a name, unless one knows (in some sense) which object it is. One must identify an actual individual, not a possible one, because his introduction of a name would otherwise fail. In other words, for the introduction of a name what is relevant is the actual satisfier of a pronoun or a definite description. And this satisfier becomes the referent of a given name, a rigid designator, in every possible world where the object exists.

JESPERSEN, B.: For me, *all* individuals are actual, because I assume the same universe for all worlds and times. What you call an actual individual I'd prefer to call an actual instantiation of a property of individuals - but then again I'm a Platonist and you're not. When you say "It is not possible for someone to fix the referent of a name, unless one knows (in some sense) which object it is", it sounds like something I could agree with right away. But by "fixing the reference" you mean "assigning the name", not "knowing who is being talked about", and then we're back to baptisms. Fixing the reference, to put it that way, by way of referent's actually exemplifying this or that property is an activity that belongs to the category of communication, not semantics.

ZOUHAR, M.: Your last remark can be understood as a summary of our respective positions. Perhaps with this we could finish our present discussion. Necessarily, many questions remain open. However, at the very end we should, I believe, defend our respective semantic programmes and show their relevance.

Everything I need to say is that I take my initial question - "How is it possible that some expression can serve as a proper name of some individual, i.e., can be used for successful reference to the individual?" - as correct and of some importance for our understanding of the connections between language and the world. The question concerns our use of language, particularly, one sort of expressions we often use for identification of the subject-matters of our discourses.

Which kind of phenomenon is your theory supposed to explain? Let me be more explicit. When I, as a philosopher of language, raise some question concerning



language, the question is tied to possible speech situations. When I raise a question concerning the referential role of proper names, I mean to ask how proper names can stand in some specific relation to objects in the world. What is missing, it seems to me, in the outline of your theory is a justification of its relevance for problems of philosophy of language. I can't take your position as an explanation of the *workings* of proper names (which are not artificial *proper* proper names).

JESPERSEN, B.: My position is certain to disappoint those who start out in natural language and who don't keep semantics and pragmatics, semantics and linguistics strictly separate. But if I were to apply "my theory" to various puzzles known from contemporary philosophy of language, its relevance would, I hope, become obvious. This entire machinery is there to be used for solving puzzles in a technically impeccable way complying with my intuitions as to what is really going on in, for instance, attitude contexts. E.g., from (i) "Pavel believes that Bratislava is a city", and (ii) "Bratislava is Preßburg", it does follow that (iii) "Pavel believes that Preßburg is a city". It is irrelevant under what name, if any, Pavel knows Bratislava. (iii) is nothing but a reiteration of (i). Pavel's attitude is to one and the same construction.

ZOUHAR, M.: I agree with your conclusion. The same can be derived within direct reference theory. E.g., Scott Soames proposed to keep separate attitudes toward propositions and attitudes toward sentences. The first kind of attitudes are, in the case of singular sentences, toward singular propositions which contain individuals referred to as their parts (it is the notion of singular proposition that belongs to direct reference theory). Insofar as Pavel entertains his attitude toward a proposition, your inference is correct.<sup>5</sup> It's a matter of taste which solution one prefers. I prefer this one because it is, I think, more strongly bound to actual speech situations.

But let me ask an analogous question concerning the relevance of your position for overtly metaphysical topics: I can't take your theory as presenting a relevant point of view on our ontological feelings. Why did you junk individuals? They form the most cherished domain of our discourse. Perhaps you may retort that semantics is purely *a priori* and therefore cannot be concerned with wordly empirical matters. If you say this you must justify it.

JESPERSEN, B.: I will come back to justifying it in a minute. First, however, don't think everything is lovely in the garden of direct reference theory. The kind of object that goes under the name "singular proposition" cannot possibly be the kind of object that our friend Pavel is related to. So the conclusion that TIL allows me to arrive at is not forthcoming in direct theory. I have at least two objections to their version of singular propositions.

One is that, since they represent them as nothing but ordered *n*-tuples, they merely manage to enumerate the various objects being talked about but fail to specify how they are glued together. There is not a hint of, e.g., functional application.<sup>6</sup>

The second objection is that singular propositions contain individuals as their parts, where individuals are empirical. For one thing, empirical individuals must render service as meanings. Another thing is that, in "<John, Being-Fat>", John occurs as an individual *per se*, whereas Being-Fat is a *representation* of a property (or just a set? - modal and temporal parameters are absent). The tuple contains vastly heterogeneous objects, so the type-theoretical status of the result of applying John to Being-Fat is not evident. Not so with propositional constructions: they always contain homogeneous objects, to wit, (sub-) constructions. Heterogeneity enters only when we look at what kinds of objects are constructed.

Well, come to think of it, there's a third thing that annoys me about Kaplanian singular propositions. It has become standard practice to represent, e.g., "John is not fat" (where "John" has been disambiguated), as "<NEGATION <John, Being-Fat>>". Negation, a unary operation on truth-values, suddenly turns into an operation on propositions! The machinery of TIL, by contrast, offers this formalization:  $\lambda w \lambda t [{}^{\circ} \neg [\lambda w \lambda t [{}^{\circ} \text{Fat}_{w,t} {}^{\circ} \text{John}]]_{w,t}]$ ; or equivalently, after conversion:  $\lambda w \lambda t [{}^{\circ} \neg [{}^{\circ} \text{Fat}_{w,t} {}^{\circ} \text{John}]_{w,t}]$ .

It can be read off the formulae that negation is applied to the value (i.e., a truth-value) which the proposition (i.e., a function from *wt*-pairs to truth-values) that is constructed by  $\lambda w \lambda t [{}^{\circ} \text{Fat}_{w,t} {}^{\circ} \text{John}]$  takes at the *wt*-pair of evaluation.

Now, you asked for a justification before. The justification is that words and sentences shouldn't depend on worldly or temporal matters for their meaning. You and I can talk at length about North Korea while comfortably buried in each his armchair. I realize this is "armchair intellectualism", or whatever you want to call it, and flies in the face of pragmatic accounts of proper names. Learning to pair meanings off with words - which is an essential part of learning a language - is, of course, purely *a posteriori*, but the meanings of terms are *a priori*, since they remain the same in all worlds at all times. Graphically a word may remain the same, while semantically becoming a different word. This is why etymological dictionaries are so fun to read. However, the pragmatic factor of speech act is needed in contexts containing demonstratives and mass names like "Pavel" or "Jespersen" to fix a specific individual. Otherwise we won't arrive at a closed construction.

ZOUHAR, M.: I don't want to underestimate your objections against direct reference theory. I think that some version of direct reference theory is possible that would avoid them. However, I must confess that I have no such theory. But this question remains open for me.<sup>7</sup>

Let me ask, Why do you give up trying to solve common and prosaic problems about our daily transactions performed by means of language? I mentioned earlier that it seems to me that your theory cannot deal with either natural language nor the actual world. Surely, you agree with the second point - it lies in the very background of your ideas. But what about natural language?

JESPERSEN, B.: That's right, the actual world - both the condition a possible world must fulfil to be the actual world and the very world which happens to be it - has no

role to play in either semantics or logic. But it decides *which* extensional entities, if any, are determined by various "offices" or "determiners" (intensions, that is) at which time-points. In fact, the single most important motivation for the development of intensional logic - but a historian of logic might want to disagree with me - was the need to circumvent the actual world, in that we ought not to talk about the actual values of various functions but these functions themselves. Intensions, remember, are represented as functions whose domain is the set of all *w*-couples.

I *am* interested in natural languages, but only in my sparetime. And natural language taken in abstraction from any particular natural language ever spoken is what all the machinery of intensional logic is supposed to help us account for. The task is to give a semantics for its different kinds of terms. When it comes to semantic (as opposed to syntactic) proper names, the first thing to notice is that their semantics is a puny one, since the intensional level is discarded and their meanings are just trivializations of individuals. But that's all that's needed, since, as ought to be uncontroversial, proper names have obtained membership in natural language only because we need a tool to single out any given specific individual across worlds and times and all sorts of linguistic contexts. Only proper names fill the bill. No other terms do - in particular, so-called "rigidified definite descriptions" don't. According to the methodology of Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic, a semantic analysis of a given natural term has been completed when the term has been associated with a construction as its meaning. Accordingly, a natural proper name has been fully analyzed, or understood, once it has been paired off with a construction of an individual. The rest is beyond semantics.

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#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> These notions of reference are discussed, at considerable length, by Cmorej in [1]. However, for logical notion of reference Cmorej employs the term "denotation", reserving the term "reference" for empirical notion.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. [5].

<sup>3</sup> Cf. [3], 41.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. [2], 212-213.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. [4], 219.

<sup>6</sup> This point was originally made by Tichý in [6], 78.

<sup>7</sup> The notion of singular propositions, as understood by direct reference theories, was criticized by Wettstein, as well. However, Wettstein formulated a kind of direct reference theory without this problematic notion. Cf. [7].

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## ERRÁTA

V 2. čísle VI. ročníka (1999) *Organonu F* sa vyskytujú nasledujúce chyby, za ktoré sa čitateľom ospravedlňujeme:

Na s. 165<sup>23</sup> namiesto "( [6], )" má byť "( [6], 42)", na s. 166<sup>7</sup> pred slovom "požadavka" má byť úvodzovka a na s. 166<sup>11</sup> namiesto "( [6], )" má byť "( [6], 44)".