

**THE TOTEMIC FUNCTION OF THE CONTEMPORARY
POLISH POST-NOBLE MILIEU¹**

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Following the Essex School's discourse theory's insights on the failed status of both subject and social order this paper analyses the role of noble legacy-oriented fantasies in totemic status positioning in contemporary Poland. Secondly, this study is concerned with the role of totemic effervescence in the constitution and maintaining the collective identity coherence of Polish aristocratic milieu. Here application of the psychoanalytic approach is particularly handy in demonstrating that "pure" performativity is not sufficient to explain social ontology consistence of this group. It should be rather supplemented by the affective component produced in social rituals that provide a substantial ground for their collective identity building strategies.

Keywords: Polish nobility – Essex School – Totemic Function – Affect

In contrast to common assumptions that the European nobility has become an obsolete social strata, there has been a growing evidence showing that today in certain European countries (Schijf et al 2004; de Saint Martin 1993; Dronkers 2003; Smoczyński, Zarycki 2012; Rogowska-Augustynowicz 2008) nobility continues to remain its social relevance. Although ascriptive features in modern societies are decisively less significant than in feudal era, also noble families as it is the case in post-communist countries lost their traditional agricultural means of production, nonetheless modernization seemingly has not undermined the nobility's social structure consistency. Namely, this milieu (especially its aristocratic fraction) continues to reproduce itself through upholding certain familial practices featuring, among others aspects, matrimonial homogamy, maintaining extended kin relationships, developing genealogical memory among members of kin, practicing primordial socialization of the offspring within the confines of the extended family. This study aims to develop inquiries on the contemporary Polish nobility drawing on empirical data collected during a three year Polish National Science Center funded project (2013 – 2015). Within a narrow perspective it will focus on the conditions of the reproduction of a noble milieu by employing Durkheimian perspective of totemism

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(Durkheim [1915] 2001) informed by the selected currents of Lacanian psychoanalysis and the poststructuralist Essex School discourse theory (e.g., Laclau 2005). Added value of this approach lies in employing a psychoanalytic perspective on the incompleteness of social identities that exceeds the sociological insights on the noble reproduction understood as processes based on rich social and cultural capital alone (cf. Bourdieu 2007). On the other hand, it allows to re-interpret a Durkheimian category of totemic figure as an affectively invested signifier within a Lacanian perspective, what stresses the role of fantasies in providing mythical explanation for the noble identity building. As Durkheim reminds us, although the religious forms of totemism have weakened with the increasing social differentiation, nonetheless, this process does not apply to the functional efficiency of the totem – with the demise of the sacred forms new totemic figures re-appear. Bearing in mind this functionalist perspective, the paper will be concerned mainly with transforming certain signifiers related to a noble milieu into totemic figures that were used to re-create the collective identity of this group, and secondly were employed in maintaining social distance between noble “semi-sacred” identity and non-noble “profane” environment. Precisely, the re-definition of noble signifiers as totemic symbols of the Durkheimian “non-personal social energies”, enables us to perceive signifiers as the locus of the phantasmatic investment, which are used in contemporary status games in Polish society.

At the very outset it should be clarified that this paper does not engage into an anthropological discussion informed by the inquiry on the origin and evolution of the totemic clans (Goldenweiser 1910), instead it is concerned mainly with the analytical level of the Durkheimian model, in particular, its elaboration on the role of the totemic symbols for the re-creation of social formations. While acknowledging criticism that has been raised against Durkheim’s concept (especially on the historical evolution of the primitive society), nonetheless, as Kuper (2005) noted recently, Durkheimian insights on totemism continue to maintain much relevance for the contemporary social theory. Not only classic anthropologist as Mauss, Radcliff-Brown or Levi-Strauss drew on this model, his elaborations have recently inspired Collins’s (2004) theory of social rituals or Beckert’s (2010) inquiry on totemic dynamics in the process of changing value of material consumption goods. This paper, precisely, in order to highlight the relevance of totemic concept for studying a contemporary Polish noble milieu will mainly draw on Beckert’s analysis. According to his reinterpretation, one of new “secularized” forms of totemism is the practice of conspicuous consumption. Certain goods create a space in which “social energies” of consumers are inscribed, elevating them to the position of “totemic worship” (Beckert 2010, 8). Beckert delimited positional performance and imaginative performance of totemic objects (e.g., goods), these two perspectives allow us to grasp an insight on totemic properties of a noble milieu that is “based on ascribing qualities to it that transcend its materiality”. This symbolic transformative agency has a force to locate certain social actors within different status hierarchies or provide them with phantasmatic content, which is used in collective identity building strategies.

Clearly, this paper while employing the revised Durkheimian perspective on the function of totemic figures for studying the contemporary society does not exhaust the possible

explanation on the reproduction of noble communities. It is neither argued that modern nobility provides an ideal example that might be uniquely interpreted within the totem studies perspective. Any totemic figure – as emphasized by Durkheim (Durkheim [1915] 2001) is contingent by its very nature, or as Levis-Strauss (Levi-Strauss 1963, 60) asserted totem is an “arbitrary sign”, and its process of constitution and recreation is not governed by any pre-determined rational necessity. What is necessary, as Durkheim stated, are the impersonal moral forces of given community that are embodied in the contingent totemic objects. This was also Beckert’s (2010) argument, according to whom goods act as totemic figures expressing the intangible social forces. These social forces are the real object of appreciation of consumers, and not the material form of certain object that has been picked up randomly as the totem. We have to remember that according to Durkheim (Durkheim 2001, 140): “Totemism is not a religion of certain animals but of a kind of anonymous and impersonal force that is founded in each of these beings though identical with none. None possesses it entirely and all share in it. This force is so independent of particular subjects embodying it that it both pre-exist and survives them. Individuals die, generations pass away and are replaced by others, but this force remains ever present, living and unchanged. It animates generations today, just as it animated those of the past, and will animate those to come. [...] It is the god worshipped by every totemic cult. Only it is an impersonal god, without a name, without a history, immanent in the world, diffused throughout a multitude of things.”

We need, however, to stress an important limitation to this theory. Although on the analytical level there is no any metaphysical necessity, which would privilege certain objects in functioning as totemic figures, nonetheless all social fields are semi pre-determined by relations of power (also symbolic relations of power). Failure to acknowledge the dimension of power relations as Turner (1990) noted was one of the most crucial flaws of the Durkheimian sociology. The dimension of symbolic relations of power is relevant for studying the nobility in Poland whose social recognition is historically structured – among other factors – by its mythical imagery resonating with the broader Polish social strata. Namely, the Polish nobility particularistic culture as a result of its intertwining with the intelligentsia strata has become universalized to such an extent that it has – as Estreicher (1931) in mid 1920s called it – become a Polish culture. Secondly, we cannot argue that noble legacy produces a meaning that is necessarily associated with social prestige. The signifiers as Butler (Butler 1993, 191) noted are sites of misrepresentation and different hegemonic constellations may impact the shift of signifiers’ meanings. For instance a survey conducted in mid 1970s communist Poland (the noble legacy was commonly criticized in the public domain at that time), showed that nobility besides being traditionally linked to “ancient dignity” signifiers was also overwhelmingly perceived by the respondents as “anarchic” (Szacka 1976). Thus, “dignity” signifiers lose ability to influence public, at the same time “anarchic” signifiers may begin to resonate with the universal cognitive structures, and previous imagery of the nobility maintains the relevance only for the minority groups. Having noted this radical instability of signifiers as carriers of meaning, Laclau (2005) emphasized that signifiers do not represent the logic of psychotic uni-

verse, which allows the emergence of any possibly meaning, instead, as he stated, signifiers are embedded within existing structures of power and are constrained by sedimented symbolic fields. Thus, an examination of the Polish nobility legacy requires to acknowledge the pre-suppositional infrastructure of deep seated signifiers existing in the social field, that might be transformed into totemic figures. From the empirical point of view there is only limited set of signifiers, which may constitute the efficient resonance with the sensitiveness and lived experiences of the Polish public; one set of these signifiers relates to the noble legacy. However, the question of the totemic position of nobility for the rest of society, and how the nobility relates to itself with regard to its own position in Polish society exceeds the scope of this paper and it calls for a further detailed inquiry.

The positional and imaginary performance of contemporary nobility. For Beckert the product's attractiveness for consumers, and its market value, is determined socially, through fulfilling for example consumers status aspirations and situating them in certain desirable social hierarchies, more importantly, it affirms their presence within the desired niches in which it is proper to drive certain types of cars, dress in certain ways, eat in certain restaurants, etc. This social recognition associated with goods functions according to the totemic logic: "Goods bestow identities and signal membership in a social group in the same way that the totem constitutes the identity of the clan member" (Beckert 2010, 11). These consumer goods are becoming spaces of inscription of impersonal forces that as totemic objects identify subjects as for example "a member of the wealthy class," "a man of good taste", etc.

The similar positional performance of the nobility, which may elevate other social actors has been recognized in the interview data. A Polish noble milieu may act as a totemic object for those actors who approaching this milieu seek for a redefinition of their symbolic status position. This applies to such relatively trivial matters as the efforts undertaken by non-noble individuals to get involved in socializing meetings organized by noble families (these events create a space to show up in a "good society"), other examples might be related to matrimonial games initiated by particular non-noble individuals in order to be incorporated into a noble milieu. Besides positional performance which assumes its visibility within a broader public scene Beckert lists also an imaginative performance that acquires its validity for individuals who privately credit certain "symbolic meaning" to an object, although it does not mean that this private performance is not underpinned by societal knowledge nor that this imaginative knowledge cannot be shared with others. Based on Durkheim's observation that the value of the totemic emblem is "added symbolically" to represent the non-material "moral strength of the clan", Beckert pointed out that goods have the ability to trigger phantasmatic experiences detached from the actual position of the consumers in time and space. Particular material objects are accidentally picked up and then phantasmatically invested, as Durkheim (Durkheim 2001, 241) claimed there are no objects that have to be the exclusive carriers of collective forces: "the most trivial, the most ordinary object can play this role". For a clan member a raven or a snake totem represent a generalized state of being of the clan, for the consumer, as in Beckert's (Beckert's 2010, 12) example, an expensive and old wine has the ability to

transcend the experience of space and time: “The wine has the evocative force of connecting the person who consumes it to a distant time and to the events that were going on then.”

The interview data provide various examples of the efficient role of the noble legacy oriented phantasies in the process of self-reproduction of the analyzed milieu. Similarly like members of the German Prussian nobility who lost all their properties after the Red Army expelled them from their properties after 1945 and today they represent “the community of memory” (Seelig 2015), Polish nobility also heavily draws on symbolic resources in order to maintain their collective identity: they wear rings with the grained coat of arms, they collect portraits of ancestors, some post-noble families cherish the memories about their lost palaces in the former borderlands of the First Republic of Poland, which had been lost during the Bolshevik Revolution (1917 – 1920). These both material and imaginary objects are usually important only in a symbolic sense, and within the subject’s phantasmatic perspective they may act as totemic objects which represent the glorious past of a given family and through this re-create the modern noble collective subjectivity. In problematizing this issue that will exceed the sociological approach as handy interpretative framework comes psychoanalysis, which shows certain affinities between Durkheimian perspective on social integrative function of totemic figures and the Lacanian tradition accentuating the role of fantasy in concealing the fact of the incompleteness of social identities. For Lacanian psychoanalysis subjects are not subjects of cogito but subjects of lack (Lacan 2004, 8; Fink 1995, 36-37). Lacan in *Encore* stated that the very ability in taking part in the intersubjective network is mediated by the phantasy (Lacan 1998, 95), and only within the phantasmatic perspective collective identities might assume imaginary stability. Following this perspective, we can grasp how analyzed noble milieu’s re-creation practices, although in most cases not supported by inherited economic assets and not consolidated by the stable class structure, nonetheless maintain a substantial degree of consistency through mediation of an extensive system of symbols (e.g., immaterial genealogical memories). This understanding might be developed once totemic symbols are redefined as signifiers, which allows to clarify the relationship between the phantasy and narrative (signifiers). It is Laclau (Laclau 2005, 7) who following Hjelmslev (1975), and further Lacan’s (1993) semiotic elaborations stated that signifiers are empty (they lack signified), instead of fixed positive content (signified) they provide a phantasmatic explanation of desirable social fullness of the subject of lack.² Further, as Lacanian tradition assumes, phantasies do not stabilize subject and this innate instability shifts subject into the order of signifier (order of narrative constructs) (Stavrakakis 1999). In other words, the subject that cannot find a positive content in a phantasmatic ego strives to constitute itself in the order of signifiers, however, the latter also does not allow to find a stable identification (Stavrakakis 1999, 19), what triggers the constant search for the lost mythical fullness through con-

² Signified as Stavrakakis (Stavrakakis 1999,25-26) following Lacan (1993) claims is the very result of illusion produced by the signifiers, it represents a necessarily phantasmatic component for the horizon of intelligibility of the intersubjective reality. This is the very lack of signified, which triggers the sliding process of phantasies and process of identification makes possible.

structuring new incomplete identifications which as certain discursive constructs of subjectivities are invested with phantasmatic content (Žižek 1997).³ In this sense the Lacanian perspective links us with Durkheimian insights about the necessity to postulate the social existence as an ideal project whilst confronted with the failed state of the empirical social arrangements: “A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time creating the ideal” (Durkheim 2001, 317). This state of failure constitutes the need of totemic symbolism, which also aims at an ontological coherence of a social community: “For what defines the sacred is that is superimposed on the real, and the real answers to the same definition [...]. It is an ideal world” (Durkheim 2001, 317).

What is ideal, it is ultimately a society as such – which, according to Durkheim – is not any specified empirical fact, that might be tested, but it is a sort of delusion, desire for “the good, the beautiful, the ideal” (ibid, 315).

Following this conceptual perspective, the phantasmatic content of totemic practices of a Polish noble milieu might be thus understood as a response of social agents towards the impossibility of making up their stable subjectivity (Lacan 1993, 39; Žižek 2000, 119-120), these strategies aim to conceal the lack crossing an imaginary project of post-noble collective identity. This is the reason why signifiers related to a noble legacy may act as organizing metaphors (Hansen, Sørensen 2005, 96) of social meaning, which evoke phantasmatic associations of “old dignity”, “high civilization standards” etc. that aim at cementing a noble milieu and gain efficiency in e.g., positional performance strategies. The added value of employing Lacanian approach in studying a Polish noble milieu allows to overcome the common derogatory idea of fantasies understood commonly as an illusion, or as a Marxist false consciousness, instead this approach helps to see fantasy as a productive agency, which provides the necessary ground for the identity reconstruction (Laclau 1990).

Totem and affectivity. The question remains which circumstances activate a totemic agency? For Durkheimian (Durkheimian 2001, 317) argument it is obvious that totemism would be impossible without “collective emotions” of the clan members, hence the invisible “collective moral force” is being inscribed into totemic objects during affectivity driven clan rituals. The interview data show how daily activity of members of a noble milieu is periodically interrupted with their socializing rituals (mainly weddings, funerals, birthdays, family reunions, balls). These rituals are functionally complementary to clan festivals (dancing, singing, story-telling), during which collective emotions are induced that integrate the community by removing its members from the common time-space to a familial time-space. Also for the Lacanian approach fantasies are related to the affective economy of the corporal subject, which according to the logic of sublimation invests signifiers and by this provides social actors with the sense of reality perceived as a coherent whole (Žižek 1997; Laclau 2005). While combining these two perspectives we should understand the sacred status of the totem as a result of the investment of the particular signifier with the affective force, which – to use the terminology of psychoanalysis – has

³ More on this problem I wrote somewhere else (Smoczyński 2011a, 2011b, 2012).

the ability to shift a “partial object” (e.g., particular signifier related to “nobility” or totemic object, such as a kangaroo, or a raven) to the level of mythic “object of fullness” that represents a “collective moral force” (Laclau 2005).⁴ A signifier supplemented with the affective surplus becomes a “hypostasis of the clan”. Only affectively charged totem becomes a mirror of the “collective moral forces”, and through this operation a community bound is being reaffirmed. We see that the transformation mechanism of the partial object into object of wholeness relates to the sources of mythical, that was neatly described by Durkheim (Durkheim 2001, 174) as following: “[I]n religious thought the part is equal to the whole; it has the same powers and efficacy. A fragment of a relic has the same virtues as the whole relic.” But what transfers a particular totem or relic into a sacred object? According to Durkheim (Durkheim 2001, 317) it is an excitement of the community, this feeling transforms an object into a figure that represents the whole. Durkheimian “additional layer” of excitement in terms of sublimation dynamics precisely assumes the logic of Lacanian *objet petit a* which should be understood as a missing transcendental signified in the intersubjective network or in other words, *objet petit a* is a remnant of the primordial separation that brings about split of the mythical wholeness of the mother/child dyad. *Objet petit a* thus represents the state of libidinal longing for the fullness evoked by the state of failed subjectivity separated from the unmediated reality of the primordial unity (see Laclau 2005; Lacan 1993, 96). We see therefore that a noble milieu is not merely recreated upon arbitrarily picked up signifiers related to a noble legacy. In order to achieve a comprehensive collective identity the affective investment in totemic figures is required which transforms collective identities. This affective investment, according to Laclau (Laclau 2005, 111) represents precisely the impossible social fullness, a phantasmatic modus of being, something which has no independent consistency of its own.

Obviously not every signifier might be turned into an affectively charged totemic figure, some signifiers do not serve as a facile means of an affective investment. For instance descendants of a Polish petty gentry milieu currently are not able to use their noble legacy effectively during social reproduction processes (after this group’s traditional social structures had been decomposed in 19th century). Perhaps the reliable social rituals need to be upheld within the non-interrupted succession of historical social networks, once broken they stop act as the collective effervescence channels. The question on failed/ interrupted totemic rituals calls for a more detailed analysis.

The relative stability of noble-oriented signifiers. The unequal potential of nobility related signifiers to act effectively in totemic practices reminds us the difference between a symbolic quality of religious signs and consumer goods that was noted by Beckert. According to him (Beckert 2010, 18) the religious symbols “remain stable”, they “do not exchange their sacred objects continuously. This is contrary to the dynamics of symbolic values in the economy; in capitalist economies, it is even a constitutive element in repro-

⁴ I have written on this issue extensively somewhere else (Smoczynski 2010). I am drawing here on these previous deliberations.

duction, because the alteration in symbolic value attributions is a source of growth". The similar logic of resistance towards the quick change of value Beckert (Beckert 2010, 21-22) noticed in certain categories of professionals who are engaged in creative activities, which "provide an illusory access to the sacred (creating beauty, finding the truth, creating the new) that satisfies the needs that other actors project onto objects. This would explain also why these groups are often snobbish, cynical or morally opposed to consumerism." The similar semi-sacred stability might be perhaps attached to symbols related to the nobility, whose symbolic vitality remains surprisingly uninterrupted over changing generations. Of course, as it was mentioned earlier, the nobility itself does not represent sacredness, however signifiers related to the nobility are in certain segments of the society invested as sacred objects with fantasies of an ancient era, a superior race, mythological knights, semi-sacred ancient heroes etc. This appealing potential of the nobility was noticed among others by Tönnies (Tönnies [1887] 1957, 57): "[T]he belief in the natural dignity and authority of an eminent house as a noble or aristocratic one lives on even after the roots of such belief wither away: It is the respect for old age and noble lineage that connects the chief of the clan in fact or fiction directly (by lineal descent) with the common ancestor of the whole clan and seems to guarantee him the divine origin, and consequently, quite readily divine authority."

What protects the specific distinction of the semi-sacred generalized "moral force" embodied by the totemic object from non-totemic ones? Beckert (Beckert 2010, 19) following seminal analysis of Simmel (2004) on appropriation and devaluation of money suggests that this is the exclusivity, which shields goods from devaluation: "goods lose value once they become popular and are consumed by lower social classes, or are diffused into the mainstream, beyond the margins of a defined group". Of course, all goods sooner or later lose their exclusivity through the act of consumption, which as Beckert asserts may lead to disillusionment, once the object has been purchased the consumer is disappointed as good becomes popular. This is precisely what makes the difference between the attainable consumption goods and the unattainable totemic objects. It is clearly, not suggested that the sacred objects cannot be materially obtained, some totemic objects as several plants or animals were in fact consumed by the members of certain clans. The very essence, which is unattainable relates to the clan's moral strength that the totemic object merely represents. Therefore, this the moment to emphasize once more the analytical distinction between totemic objects and totemic social practices. This paper stands following Durkheimian line of argument informed by Lacanian psychoanalysis that these are signifiers affectively charged that turn contingent an object into a totemic object. In other words, as Beckert (Beckert 2010, 20) continues, the possession of sacred totemic objects: "serves only to remind the member of the community of the values the community stands for and his or her membership in the community". The totemic logic of sacredness also necessarily involves an antagonistic struggle with the profane, or in other words, the construction of a totemic identity requires "a constitutive exclusion" (Laclau 1996) of these identities which are antithesis of its sacredness. This is precisely an exclusion, which guarantees the unattainability of the sacred object, and this status requires

numerous restriction practices. Keeping in line with the Laclauian perspective we may note that construction of a sacred identity, which might be understood as another name of an imagined social fullness requires the antagonistic tension. In other words, the constitution of noble identity calls for an identification of the non-noble “other”. Finke (Finke 1995, 84) showed that a phantasmatic agency of the subject operates in the binary mechanism of “the same” and “the other”, this opposition is determined by identification but also by rivalry (ibid, 85), hence the construction of a noble collective identity calls for the recognition of double movement of the affective investment – of “we” (e.g., kinship similarity) which is accompanied by the affective investment of “they” (e.g., a plebeian difference). One of the fundamental manifestations of noble social distance towards non-noble communities is a practice of a noble matrimonial homogamy, which reduces the risk of blurring the distinction between a noble milieu and non-noble groups. The practice of mixed marriages decisively undermines the noble reproduction process, what – along other economic and social factors – had happened to the majority of the Polish petty gentry, which after leaving its “noble neighborhoods” in the 19th and early 20th century had lost its noble collective identity. The interview data offer a significant amount of declarations among respondents who perceived a matrimonial homogamy as the most effective practice allowing to reproduce the structure of aristocratic families. According to respondents the noble offspring, typically as a result of the collapse of a noble matrimonial homogamy, ceases to participate in “meetings, weddings, holiday trips, and balls” organized by the kin network. Consequently, the young generation loses a living relationship with its kin milieu, when the primordial socialization does not run well, youth does not grasp the sense of the “noble cultural code” and gradually becomes incorporated in the non-noble social fields (see also Smoczynski, Zarycki 2012). However, the strategy of maintaining a distance towards non-noble social groups assumes its arguably paradigmatic form in the variety of practices of the confrontation with the *boor* (a plebeian figure) who embodies the very lack of “moral strength” that is required for sacred objects to function as totem. We may say that the very ability to keep a distance from the *boor* creates a symbolic importance of the nobility, what again reminds Simmel’s notion that the value of commodity remains as long as the object is not available: “the moment of enjoyment itself, when the separation of subject and object is effaced, consumes the value. Value is only reinstated as contrast, as an object separated from the subject” (Simmel 2004, 66 in Beckert 2010, 19). The gap between the sacred (nobility) and profane (plebs) must be unbridgeable, so rules of belonging to the noble milieu must deny the principle of a market exchange: a membership in this milieu cannot be bought, one has to be “well born”, or married into the given family. Particularly, aristocratic circles employ a social distance strategy towards different categories of non-noble social groups, which, according to the aristocratic respondents do not share with them a common “cultural code”. In order to maintain this distance they practice various strategies of separation of time and space, which establishes the boundary between a private and professional time and – respectively – between a professional and private space. The former space-time is open for the members of the family to play out intimate inter-family relations, where interactions are limited essentially

to the interplay with the cousins, within the latter space-time various “external practices” take place. This symbolic opposition implicitly dating back to the feudal era, defines a classic division between aristocratic values (e.g., maturity, self-restraint, value-oriented approach) and attitudes attributed to subordinated classes described usually as a lack of self-control, and instrumental oriented approach. On the other hand, this division that had been reproduced over generations in Poland which shapes currently certain behaviors of the noble milieu, embodies a historical guise of the more profound opposition that have re-emerged in different societies from ancient times, namely, the allegedly superior type of civilization confronted with the inferior savagery.

Conclusion. This paper argued that signifiers related to noble legacy may act as organizing metaphors of social meaning, which evoke phantasmatic associations that cement a noble milieu and gain efficiency in e.g., positional performance strategies. The phantasmatic agency was not defined as a Marxist false consciousness, but interpreted within the Lacanian perspective, as a productive agency, which confronted with the failed status of subjectivity and social order provides the necessary ground for the reconstruction of social identities. Furthermore, this paper following Laclau elaborated that the semi-sacred status of the nobility is a result of the affective investment in particular signifiers, which had the ability to shift a “partial object” to the level of a mythic “object of fullness” that represents a “collective moral force”. Signifiers supplemented with the affective surplus became a “hypostasis of the noble kinship”, and as such acted as a mirror of the kin’s “collective moral forces”, and through this operation a community bound was reaffirmed.

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