

NIETZSCHE AND THE RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ART AND SCIENCE: A QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY

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In this paper, I argue that despite various differences in his philosophical thinking from early to late, Nietzsche's reflections on the relationship between art and science forms a thread of continuity in his thought, which sees him ultimately committed to the possibility of truth and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that although he is not committed to it throughout his writings, consideration of the continuous character of Nietzsche's thinking on the relation between art and science from an epistemic point of view helps us to make sense of the specific methodology that informs his proposal of the metaphysics of the will to power.

Keywords: Art – Science – Ascetic ideal – Knowledge – Perspectivism – Will to power

Introduction. Nietzsche's ideas on art and science permeate his entire philosophical corpus and reflect his views on the issue of philosophical methodology and the capacity of the human mind to know its world. The issue of the possible interrelation between art and science is one that continues to engage him from as early as *The Birth of Tragedy (BT)* and throughout his mature writings. In this paper I argue that despite various differences in his philosophical thinking from early to late, Nietzsche's reflections on the relationship between art and science forms a thread of continuity in his thought, which sees him ultimately committed to the possibility of truth and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that although he is not committed to it throughout his writings, consideration of the continuous character of Nietzsche's thinking on the relation between art and science from an epistemic point of view helps us to make sense of the specific methodology that informs Nietzsche's proposal of the metaphysics of the will to power.

I begin by offering an interpretation of Nietzsche's view of the relationship between art and science as a response to specifically epistemological and metaphysical issues arising from what he calls the ascetic ideal. The ascetic ideal, according to Nietzsche, seeks to emphasize self-denial in the pursuit of disinterested truth and knowledge. I argue that whilst art, for Nietzsche, recoils from this ideal, this recoil does not entail a rejection of truth and knowledge altogether. What is required, however, is a revision of what constitutes truth and knowledge and how such truth and knowledge is to be properly justified. Central to this revision is the *reciprocal* relationship that Nietzsche envisages between art and science.

I trace the inchoate emergence of Nietzsche's argument for reciprocity in *BT* before turning to examine the more explicit development of this idea in the middle and later writings from *Human, All Too Human (HH)*. In the former case, his account of the reciprocal relationship between art and science reflects his rejection of dogmatic claims to direct knowledge, which is then taken up in his later writings and articulated in terms of a regulative research programme. The ideas motivating Nietzsche's position here are his denial that knowledge is simply "given" and his suggestion that knowledge is something that must be *sought*. Moreover, he insists that this process of seeking must be subject to particular explanatory constraints. It is not the case for him that "anything goes" in the way of belief. Finally, I apply these findings to justify Nietzsche's will to power metaphysics.¹

Before proceeding it is appropriate that I comment on my use of the terms "art" and "science". I employ these terms, as Nietzsche often does, as placeholders for investigative procedures that he either rejects or endorses. "Science" in the sense that he considers problematic, represents a claim to extra-perspectival knowledge, which is tempered when disengaged from the ascetic ideal and put to work in tandem with art. I employ the term "art" to denote interpretive and perspectival modes of inquiry that embody more creative and suggestive approaches to knowing than the narrow view of science. "Philosophy" is what we get, according to Nietzsche, when the disciplines of art and science work together to offer comprehensive explanations of reality. I begin with Nietzsche's criticism of the ascetic ideal.

Nietzsche's criticism of the ascetic ideal. In *On the Genealogy of Morality (GM)* III 25 Nietzsche links together the issues of art, science and the ascetic ideal. The ascetic ideal as Nietzsche describes it here seeks disinterested and unrevisable truth for its own sake. Moreover, the ascetic ideal, to the extent that it makes such truth its goal remains embedded in the history of metaphysics that, in Nietzsche's view, seeks transcendent objects of knowledge. Thus the ascetic ideal means two things for Nietzsche in this passage. It refers to both unrevisable truth and metaphysical transcendence. Both aspects of the ascetic ideal are articulated in the desire to overcome the specifically human point of view in favour of an extra-perspectival God's Eye View. Moreover, Nietzsche argues that modern natural science, rather than being a rejection of the old metaphysical Platonic

¹ Although my thematic focus is not without predecessors, most notably, Gilles Deleuze and Eugene Fink, my interpretation differs from theirs in important respects. It will become evident as the argument progresses that, unlike Deleuze, I do not regard Nietzsche as reducing truth to a symptomology of value and power (Deleuze 1992, 102-105). Rather, I argue that the will to power is the truth that we arrive at when non-ascetic standards of justification are applied. Correlatively, I argue that the perspectival and evaluative structure of human cognition is not, as Fink suggests, an illusion projected by the activity of the will to power but rather it is a necessary condition of us coming to know reality as will to power. Fink's appeal to cosmic play, as a non-anthropomorphic artistic vision into reality, it seems to me, commits Nietzsche to the very dogmatism and unconstrained speculation that I argue he cautions us against (Fink 2003, 170-172).

system, is in fact its latest reincarnation. To the extent that modern science believes in the unconditional value of absolute truth, it is metaphysical in character (*GM* III 24; *GS* 344). According to Nietzsche, modern science manifests the ascetic ideal. He contends that this science remains embedded in an objectionable metaphysics because, although it does not literally promote belief in a transcendent other world, it attempts to escape from the human world of perspectival interests and values. It does this by considering itself to be an extra-perspectival and disinterested mode of inquiry. It is for this reason that Nietzsche argues that if science is to be saved from the ascetic ideal it “first needs a value-ideal” for “science is itself never value-creating” (*GM* III 25). It is to be noted here that the criticism of the ascetic understanding of science is not that it is somehow related to metaphysics but rather that it is a derivative of a dualist and transcendent form of metaphysics that attempts to by-pass the human point of view in its quest to arrive at truth and knowledge for its own sake. Nietzsche suggests that art is the key to overcoming the ascetic ideal and the disinterested pursuit of truth and knowledge (*GM* III 25). However, it is important to further note that Nietzsche does not suggest that art alone is the key to overcoming the ascetic ideal. Rather, he merely claims that art is more anti-ascetic than science. Art alone cannot be the key to overcoming the ascetic ideal because as an independent discipline art engages in unconstrained speculation. In *HH* 153, for example, Nietzsche writes that in moments of artistic flights of fancy one’s “intellectual character is being tested”. That Nietzsche does not consider art alone to be the key to overcoming the ascetic ideal is indicated by his praise for science in *GM*. He contends that despite its present allegiance to the ascetic ideal “there [is] so much useful work to be done.” (*GM* III 23). Moreover, in the same passage Nietzsche claims to take “delight” in the work of scientists. What delights Nietzsche about science is its commitment to method, its “quiet, cautious, mistrustful manner” (*A* 13) and its “whole *integrity* in knowledge” (*A* 59). However, if Nietzsche is to succeed in overcoming the ascetic ideal and its inflated view of science as a vehicle for extra-perspectival truth and knowledge, then he must cater for his own commitment to method from within his praise of the artistic enterprise. This entails that science must no longer be construed as a presuppositionless, valueless and extra-perspectival mode of inquiry but rather it must be construed as a decidedly human and perspectival pursuit. That is, science must be put into the service of an alternative ideal to the ascetic ideal. Moreover, if he is to avoid the artistic tendency towards unconstrained speculation Nietzsche must reject the ascetic appeal to extra-perspectival truth and knowledge without jettisoning the concepts of truth and knowledge altogether. In the next section we see that, when extricated from his ambiguous relationship to Schopenhauerian metaphysics, Nietzsche’s account of the relationship between art and science in *BT* begins to put in place the requirements for a non-ascetic account of knowledge.

Art and science in Nietzsche’s early writings. If we proceed with some caution we can detect the emergence of Nietzsche’s response to the task of overcoming the ascetic ideal whilst retaining a commitment to method and truth in his early criticism of Socrates. Socrates embodies, according to Nietzsche, the ascetic character of the scientific rational-

ist method. In *BT* he addresses what he considers to be the limits of the scientific thinking put forward by Socratic rationalism. The Socratic theoretical man, as interpreted by Nietzsche, believes that Reason can penetrate the nature of reality and formulate one true unrevisable description of this reality. The scientific man, he claims, believes that he has “direct” access to the nature of reality (*BT* 15). In contrast to such “optimism” Nietzsche claims that the nature of reality is impenetrable to scientific investigation alone. Thus he maintains that science will be confronted by its own limits at which point it will give way to art (*BT* 15). Tragic art or what Nietzsche also calls tragic knowledge supersedes Socratic science and is the product of more than one principle or faculty. In *BT*, specifically, it is the product of a synthesis of the Apolline scientific impulse to order that informs Socratic science and the Dionysiac impulse. Writing that art is “a necessary correlative of, and supplement for science” (*BT* 14), Nietzsche claims, contrary to Socratic rationalism, that art is required for us to access the nature of reality. But, how does this tragic art give us access to reality, in Nietzsche’s view, and what does he mean by reality? It is at this point that Nietzsche’s argument becomes obscured by its articulation in Schopenhauerian terms of reference.

Nietzsche describes the Dionysiac, in Schopenhauer’s phrase, as “a direct copy of the will itself” that “represents the *metaphysical in relation to all that is physical in the world*, the thing-in-itself in relation to all appearances.” (*BT* 16) Nietzsche’s appeal to Schopenhauer here renders any interpretation of the *BT* difficult, especially in the light of his retrospective claim that he ought to have developed a language of his own instead of labouring with “Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulations, things which fundamentally ran counter to both the spirit and taste of Kant and Schopenhauer” (*BT* 6 Self-Criticism). One of the difficulties that any interpretation of *BT* must face is how to reconcile Nietzsche’s use of Schopenhauerian language with his claim that he had wanted to say something different. The problem centers round the issue of whether Nietzsche is engaging in dualist metaphysics in *BT*. If he is, the reality that tragic art gives us access to must be a non-empirical thing-in-itself and the artistic mode of access to it must be unmediated and direct. If Nietzsche is committed to these views then it seems that the argument in *BT* perpetuates the epistemic and metaphysical commitments of the ascetic ideal with the single difference that it is now art rather than science that gives us access to reality.

However, there are some indications that the Dionysiac element that Nietzsche argues operates in tandem with the Apolline in the form of tragic art differs from the dualist and other-worldly metaphysics that he rejects in the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche argues in *BT* that he is interested in the art of metaphysical comfort in *this* world (*BT* 7 Self-Criticism) and in an unpublished preface to the book he explicitly states that he is adopting a one-world view (*WP* 853). His claim that the Dionysiac and the Apolline share a reciprocal relationship further suggests that, despite initial appearances, his appeal to a Dionysiac supplement to science is not an engagement in dualist metaphysics. Nietzsche writes that the fact that the Dionysiac “*appears* at all---is the effect of Apollo” (*BT* 10). Here Nietzsche indicates that the Dionysiac to which he appeals does not go beyond the empirical world because the Dionysiac is itself an appearance. His claim that the Dionysiac

is an appearance is related to his postulation of a primordial artistic intellect that is responsible for the individuated forms of the empirical world through which, by necessity, the Dionysiac appears to us. However, despite obvious interpretive difficulties, this appeal to the primordial intellect is arguably not an appeal to “another” world in the metaphysical dualist sense. This is suggested by Nietzsche’s claim that “Every appearance is also the *Ur-Eine* itself.” (*KSA*, 7, 7 [157]).² Rather, Nietzsche’s appeal to the notion of the primordial intellect, on a charitable reading, is an explanatory device intended to make two points. The first is that the empirical world of our acquaintance is not ontologically reducible to the human intellect. The second is that the human intellect participates in reality and shares its constituent character. As such, empirical reality is knowable but not constituted by the human intellect. With this reasoning in mind Nietzsche suggests that the Apolline and the Dionysiac impulses belong to both the human world and to reality itself. (*BT* 2) These claims are more explicitly articulated, as we shall see later, in the mature thesis of the will to power.

Nietzsche’s argument that the Dionysiac is an appearance also reflects an epistemic position. That is, the Dionysiac, he argues, is knowable to us only through the Apolline forms of our cognition. Accordingly, he suggests, contrary to Schopenhauer, that our knowledge of Dionysiac reality through tragic art is not direct.³ Rather, the synthesis of the Apolline and the Dionysiac impulses of tragic art allow us to access Dionysiac truth without overstepping our specific Apolline cognitive apparatus. A similar position is suggested in the unpublished essay ‘The Dionysian World View’.⁴ Here Nietzsche identifies the Apolline and the Dionysiac with Beauty and Truth respectively. (*DWW* 2) However, when explaining the synthesis of the two in tragic knowledge their status is altered. Their new status is that of a midpoint between pure truth and pure appearance. In tragic art, Nietzsche writes that ‘Apollo and Dionysos have become united – Dionysiac-tragic art is no longer ‘truth’ – Truth is now symbolized, it makes use of semblance’, adding that ‘Semblance’ is ‘a sign of truth’. (*DWW* 3) With the rejection of extra-perspectival standards of truth, Nietzsche suggests that the opposition between absolute truth and absolute illusion collapses. As understood here, absolute truth refers to extra-perspectival knowledge of reality. Absolute illusion, however, represents pure unconstrained speculation that has no cognitive relationship to reality whatsoever. Rather than understanding truth and illusion as contraries, Nietzsche claims that they may in fact be intimate cousins. By this he means that there are no absolute extra-perspectival standards of knowledge but only better or worse perspectives, what he calls in *Beyond Good and Evil* (*BGE*), “lighter and darker shades of appearance” (*BGE* 34). According to Nietzsche, tragic knowledge is the product of more than one perspective – the Dionysiac and the Apolline – in contrast to the one-eyed perspective of Socratic science that feigns extra-perspectival access to reality. In

² Nietzsche 1988.

³ For Fink 2003 p. 172 the Dionysian is primordial and tragic insight is direct.

⁴ Nietzsche, ‘The Dionysian World View’ (*DWW*) in Nietzsche 1999.

contrast to the latter, he writes that “life rests on semblance, art, deception perspectivism and error” (*BT* 5 Self-Criticism).

Despite appearances, then, Nietzsche adopts a non-Schopenhauerian account of reality and of our epistemic access to it. Science, according to Schopenhauer, must be supplemented by metaphysical knowledge of the will if we are not to mistake mind-dependent phenomena for mind-independent things-in-themselves.⁵ Art, for him, is capable of delivering this metaphysical insight. However, even as early as ‘On Schopenhauer’, an unpublished essay dated 1868, Nietzsche expresses reservations about Schopenhauer’s project.⁶ He argues that Schopenhauer’s appeal to the will as thing-in-itself is an example of dogmatic metaphysics and cannot be considered an improvement on the Socratic rationalism that he rejects in *BT*. Moreover, Schopenhauer’s appeal to artistic knowledge of things-in-themselves, Nietzsche suggests, participates in the Socratic paradigm of claiming direct and immediate knowledge. However, Nietzsche’s view of tragic knowledge suggests that his appeal to art will not involve either direct knowledge or the thing-in-itself. In ‘On Schopenhauer’ he rejects the intelligibility of these ideas. Similarly, in *BT*, Nietzsche’s appeal to the reciprocal nature of art and science is designed to allow knowledge of the world as it shows up for us without engaging in dogmatic metaphysics by appealing to either the notion of pure artistic or scientific insight. He makes this point with a rhetorical flourish when he proposes the possibility of an “artistic Socrates” (*BT* 14). Unfortunately, the clarity of Nietzsche’s proposal of the reciprocity of art and science in the book is obscured by the need to extricate his arguments from Schopenhauer’s terms of reference.

Nevertheless, despite his many retrospective reservations about his first published work, Nietzsche claims in a letter to Overbeck that his mature philosophy is already emerging in *BT*.⁷ Moreover, in *GM* III 25 where he argues that science is an expression of the ascetic ideal and art the key to its overcoming, he directs us to the Preface of *BT* for further discussion of the issue. It is, then, with some justification that we may now proceed to examine his later writings in search of a more explicit and less ambiguous argument with regard to how Nietzsche thinks that art and science can complement one another and afford us knowledge of reality. Although his concern with science in the later writings pertains to the natural sciences rather than Socratic rationalism, the object of his critical focus is still very much on the extra-perspectival presuppositions of both forms of science. The move to natural science merely marks Nietzsche’s explicit rejection of the importance of the thing-in-itself in his later writings, a rejection which is already in motion in his early thought. Without the thing-in-itself, which, for Nietzsche, constitutes a numerically distinct world from the empirical (*HH* 9; *GS* 54), there is just one empirical world that can form the object of our knowledge and scientific investigations. In the later writings he abandons the idea that science can stand on its own two feet by identifying the

⁵ Schopenhauer 1966 pp. 121-2

⁶ Included as Appendix in Janaway 1988.

⁷ Nietzsche 1982.

role of art with regulative conjectures that must ultimately be subject to the methodological constraints of scientific method if they are to give rise to knowledge. Nietzsche hints at this idea in *BT* when in contrast to Socratic rationalism he espouses the virtues of ongoing and regulative research. He speaks of why “Lessing, the most honest of theoretical men, dared to say that he took greater delight in the quest for truth than in the truth itself.” (*BT*: 15) However, for the reasons already alluded to, we need to consult Nietzsche’s later writings to fully appreciate what is being suggested here.

The reciprocal nature of art and science in Nietzsche’s later writings. In *BT*, Nietzsche takes as his aim “to look at science through the prism of the artist, but also to look at art through the prism of life.” (*BT* 2 Self-Criticism). This statement is often interpreted as Nietzsche’s early prioritization of art over science, which, in turn, has been taken to suggest that Nietzsche emphasizes artistic illusion over the possibility of scientific knowledge. However, this interpretation is complicated by Nietzsche’s statement, in an unpublished note, that “Aesthetics makes sense only as natural science: like the Apollinian and Dionysian.” (*KSA* 7 16 [6]). The suggestion of a complementary relationship between the two disciplines belies the idea that Nietzsche emphasizes one of them over the other. The suggestion of a reciprocal relationship also permeates Nietzsche’s more “mature” writings from his “middle” period to his later texts. For example, even in *HH*, which is generally attributed to Nietzsche’s transitional middle period and where he is generally thought to emphasize the possibility of scientific knowledge over the role of art, Nietzsche maintains in section 222 that “scientific man is a further development of artistic man”, and in *HH*, 251 he claims that science is regulated by art. In this passage he puts forward the view that our inquiry must be guided by our “pleasures” if we are to pursue truth. This suggests that knowledge is to be properly conceived as an interested pursuit rather than the disinterested one of the ascetic ideal. Thus we can see that Nietzsche thinks that art has a decisive role to play in the quest for knowledge. Art, he argues, is an imaginative enterprise that envisages numerous possibilities. It makes imaginative conjectures regarding the nature of things. Of particular significance is the methodological shift to which Schopenhauer’s metaphysical view of the role of art has been subject. Art now plays a role in the *search* for knowledge but is incapable of independently yielding knowledge. Thus, Nietzsche suggests that art is prone to a certain over-excitation that, although necessary to initiate inquiry, needs to be constrained if it is not to collapse into pure fiction. Science, he suggests, should play the specific role of cooling down this excitation of artistic possibilities. Art, therefore, indirectly gives rise to knowledge through the mediation of a scientific constraint. This is quite different from Schopenhauer’s appeal to immediate extra-conceptual artistic knowledge of the will.

Nietzsche’s suggestion of a reciprocal relationship between art and science is significant then for both his understanding of these two disciplines and his epistemology. Initially we witnessed Nietzsche’s view that science has misunderstood itself to be a disinterested mode of inquiry that operates independently of any particular point of view. By undermining this idea, he ultimately suggests that science itself is perspectival. Although

this view is suggested in *HH*, it is stated explicitly in his later book, *GM*, when he writes that there is no science “without presuppositions” (*GM*, III, 24). Moreover, Nietzsche suggests that once we understand that science is interpretive, we must relinquish the quest for disinterested extra-perspectival knowledge for its own sake. However, this does not entail that we must give up the quest for knowledge *per se*. Rather, it involves the recognition that extra-perspectival knowledge cannot be had and that we need to redirect our sights on an accessible and perspectival view of knowledge. This refocusing involves, in Nietzsche’s view, engaging in the quest for a more comprehensive perspective regarding the nature of things rather than a quest for extra-perspectival knowledge. A comprehensive perspective involves adopting a point of view that has explanatory power across the human and the natural sciences.⁸ Nietzsche’s argument here reflects his view that our knowledge of the world cannot be divorced from our specifically human interests. He suggests that once the interpretive character of natural science is acknowledged and the presupposition of an extra-perspectival God’s Eye view undermined then the strict division between the natural sciences and the human sciences dissolves. Thus Nietzsche writes, once again in *HH* that “Historical philosophy – can no longer be even conceived of as separate from the natural sciences” (*HH* 1). Our task in this context thus becomes that of giving explanatory unity to the multitude of perspectives. This quest for a comprehensive perspective that has explanatory power across the sciences, however, is not confined to any one text but can be found across the entire range of Nietzsche’s writings. We find it articulated in his notion of philology as the “art of reading well” in *AC*. The art of reading well, according to Nietzsche, contains “the prerequisite for a cultural tradition, for a uniform science” (*AC* 59). Appealing to the notion of a uniform science or comprehensive perspective that incorporates both the human and the natural sciences, he puts pay to the idea that the justification of our epistemic claims is determined by an extra-perspectival “confrontation” with the world. His envisaged reciprocal relationship between art and science sets up the quest for such non-confrontational yet comprehensive knowledge.

It is the task of philosophy specifically, according to Nietzsche, to bring together the methodologies of art and science to formulate comprehensive explanatory perspectives. Science alone cannot achieve this as its remit is purely descriptive and explanation, for Nietzsche, goes beyond the descriptive to incorporate the inventive (*BGE* 14). In *BGE* he describes philosophy as an “experiment” which incorporates “the certainty of standards, the conscious use of a unified method” (*BGE* 210) Philosophical inquiry entails, for him, a non-dogmatic regulative procedure that selectively focusses on the world through the optics of our human interests or points of view and *seeks* to unify the perspectives of the natural and human sciences under one overarching comprehensive perspective. He writes: “A philosophy not as dogma, but as a provisional regulative of research.” (*KSA* 11 26 [432]). From this we can see that, for Nietzsche, philosophy is motivated by an artistic ideal of simplicity and unity that guides our inquiry of the world. However, rather than

⁸ See Anderson 1994.

giving us pure unconstrained speculation, the ideal through which we view the world is the instrument through which we acquire knowledge. In Nietzsche's view, our interested engagement with the world is instrumental in discovering the truth about the world. Thus, he writes, that "Wonder at the disagreement between our desires and the course of the world has led to our learning to know the course of the world" (*WP* 333). According to Nietzsche, the extent to which the artistic interests of philosophy in its quest for unity and comprehensive explanation meet with resistance reveals the nature of the "is". However, as indicated, this resistance does not take the form of an extra-perspectival confrontation, but rather it involves testing a belief in the context of our other beliefs (*WP* 530; *HH* 19). For Nietzsche's perspectivism precludes the possibility of accessing the world directly, that is, independently of some theory or point of view. Rather, he suggests that we rigorously – scientifically – test our beliefs with other beliefs (*GS* 319) in order to constrain any wayward interests or ideals that the artist philosopher seeks. Our beliefs and artistic conjectures can attain epistemic status, then, to the extent that they cohere with and support our whole system of justified beliefs. There are no privileged or basic beliefs but rather a mutual reinforcement of beliefs. Thus we are denied any extra-human vantage-point from which we can survey the nature of reality. In so doing, our perspectives and interests are necessary conditions of a non-ascetic conception of knowledge. This is arguably the principal point of Nietzsche's desire to bring together the disciplines of art and science. By so combining the two disciplines Nietzsche severs what he deems valuable in science – its methodical caution – from the clutches of the ascetic ideal by putting science to work in the service of a comprehensive explanation of reality and the human being's place within it. As indicated earlier, this view is evident in both Nietzsche's middle and late period. He thus suggests in middle period text, *The Gay Science* (*GS*), that the "artistic energies and the practical wisdom of life will join with scientific thinking to form a higher organic system" (*GS* 113).

Although the epistemic commitments entailed by Nietzsche's appeal to the reciprocal relationship between art and science do not by themselves entail a commitment to any particular view of the world, these epistemic commitments nonetheless help us to make sense of the logic informing his much maligned will to power thesis. The will to power thesis is often interpreted as a piece of metaphysical indulgence on Nietzsche's part that reflects his own values or how he would like the world to be but which he ultimately does not propose in earnest.⁹ However, by applying the logic of Nietzsche's artistic-scientific methodology, we can see that his proposal of the will to power thesis stems from this very logic. Moreover, whilst Nietzsche does not propose the will to power thesis in the middle period texts such as *HH* or *GS*, the path to the logic informing the justification of the will to power thesis is nonetheless prefigured in those books in their respective proposals of the reciprocal relationship between art and science and the notion of a comprehensive perspective that includes the perspectives of the natural and the human sciences. I want to conclude with an illustration of how this is so.

⁹ Clark and Dudrick 2012 Part Two.

The will to power thesis emerges from Nietzsche's effort to offer a comprehensive perspective that has explanatory scope across the natural and the human sciences. With regard to the natural sciences, the will to power emerges in the context of his appeal to the Boscovichian concept of force as a rejection of mechanical atomism (*BGE* 12). However, despite his agreement with both Boscovich's criticism of the mechanistic model of causality by contact and his view that unextended physical points are the ultimate constituents of matter, Nietzsche conjectures that Boscovich's concept of force needs to be supplemented by an "inner will", which Nietzsche calls the will to power (*WP* 619). Nietzsche's reasoning is that an inner will is necessary if force is to be understood to be genuinely causally efficacious and not reduced to a functional element in a mathematical formula (*WP* 564, 664). The latter approach affords us only mathematical descriptions rather than explanations of real causal influence (*WP* 624; 628). However, the will to power can be ultimately justified only if it has explanatory scope in the human sciences as well as the natural sciences. Nietzsche's artistic-scientific methodology demands that we be frugal with our explanatory principles (*BGE* 13). To this demand, Nietzsche responds that the comprehensive explanatory scope of the will to power thesis can be seen in the fact that the inner will that he ascribes to force can be understood analogously with our own qualitative experience (*WP* 619; 621)¹⁰ and in the ability of the will to power thesis to give a non-atomistic account of the self (*BGE* 12). Nietzsche argues that the self should properly be understood as a hierarchically structured bundle of power-wills where the relation between 'commanding' and 'obeying' wills accounts for the unity of the self. In rejection of the mechanistic quantitative view of the world and in his proposal of the will to power as an explanation of reality in relational and qualitative terms, Nietzsche proposes an understanding of the world "with the same level of reality that our emotion has – as a kind of instinctual life in which all the organic functions – are synthetically linked to one another" (*BGE*, 36). However, Nietzsche's appeal to an inner will is initially a regulative explanatory proposal that is subjected to justificatory constraints. In offering explanations, then, artistic conjecture is equally always constrained by scientific rigour. That is, the conjecture of an "inner will" that informs Nietzsche's proposal of the will to power thesis should only be accepted as justified to the extent that it both explains the world more satisfactorily than previous attempts and has explanatory power across the sciences. Accordingly, the will to power thesis, as a consequence of the type of constrained regulative investigation that typifies, for Nietzsche, the synthesis of art and science, is designed to capture the nature of reality and the human being's place within that reality in both epistemic and metaphysical terms. However, in the true spirit of regulative research principles, Nietzsche allows that the will to power is revisable and subject to correction (*BGE* 22). The possibility of revision and correction is not, for him, an objection to the thesis. Rather, it is the inventive – artistic – character of the very conjecture of the will to power as an explana-

¹⁰ It is clear from *TI* "Errors" 5 that it is not analogy that he rejects but "the *most usual* explanations".

tory thesis that can lead to the possibility of genuine discovery and progress in our knowledge. ‘Inventing’, according to Nietzsche, is a necessary prelude to ‘finding’ (BGE 12).

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