SARTRE ON THE AUTHENTICITY, REQUIRED IF MY CHOICES ARE TO BE TRULY MINE

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My making choices and acting on those choices in a way that might count as my being free would seem to require that those choices are truly my choices. Furthermore, for my choices to be truly mine, it would seem that these choices must reflect my true self. So it seems that choosing and acting freely depends in a robust sense on such choosing and acting being authentic. Yet the concept of authenticity seems problematic. What or where is that true self which would be the basis for authentic choosing, acting and living? Perhaps there is no such true self. This problem is central to the philosophies of both Sartre and Foucault. For the philosophers freedom authenticity or selfhood were central. The paper aims to show that, in spite of Foucault’s criticism, Sartre does not fall back on the idea of a true or deep self that is given to us. Sartre can appeal to the idea of authenticity without holding on such a dubious construct as a given, true self. Therefore the exploration of bad faith, good faith and authenticity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where the problem is posed but left unresolved, is necessary. Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, where a more concrete problem – the problem of authentically identifying oneself with a group of human beings – actually opens up a way how to overcome the problem of authenticity.

Keywords: Sartre – Freedom – Bad faith – Authenticity – Group identification

My making choices and acting on those choices in a way that might count as my being free would seem to require that those choices are truly my choices. Furthermore, for my choices to be truly mine, it would seem that these choices must reflect my true self. So it seems that choosing and acting freely in a robust sense depends on such choosing and acting being authentic. Yet the concept of authenticity seems problematic. What or where is this true self which would be the basis for authentic choosing, acting and living? Perhaps there is no such true self. This is a problem that is central to the philosophies of both Sartre and Foucault. For both philosophers, freedom was the central concept. And for both philosophers, authenticity or selfhood was central.

Consider, now, Foucault’s important criticism of Sartre on these issues: “I think that from the theoretical point of view, Sartre avoids the idea of the self as something which is given to us. But through the moral notion of authenticity, he turns back to the idea that we have to be ourselves—to be our true selves. I think that the only acceptable practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight to the practice of creativity—and not of authenticity. From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that
there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art. In his analyses of Baudelaire, Flaubert, etc., it is interesting to see that Sartre refers the work of creation to a certain relation to oneself—the author to himself—which has the form of authenticity or inauthenticity. I would like to say exactly the contrary: we should not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity.  

My plan in this paper is to show that contrary to Foucault’s criticism, Sartre does not fall back on the idea of a true or deep self that is given to us. Sartre can appeal to the idea of authenticity without depending on such a dubious construct as a given, true self. I do this by means of an exploration of bad faith, good faith and authenticity in Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* where the problem is posed but left unresolved. I then turn to Sartre’s *Anti-Semite and Jew*, where a more concrete problem – the problem of authentically identifying with a group of human beings – actually opens up a strategy to overcoming the problem of authenticity.

I. Sartre’s concept of bad faith gives us an original and quite fruitful account of human self-deception. For Sartre, what makes it possible and tempting for us to deceive ourselves is that we are always free to be other than what we are and this freedom can be a source of comfort and anxiety and hence an enormous burden. Complicating our lives is the fact that we are not entirely free or free with respect to all matters since there are aspects of our existence that are given and immutable. Human beings have thus a double character of freedom and givenness or, in Sartre’s terminology, transcendence-facticity.

Let me begin by defining transcendence and facticity. Our transcendence (synonymous here with freedom) consists in the human capacity to negate or to question the way things are (ourselves included), to envision the way things are not but might be and to act on that knowledge. It is the capacity to discern possibilities that accounts for our freedom. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes this feature as being-ahead-of-itself (*Sich-vorweg-sein*). Heidegger writes: “Dasein is always ‘beyond itself’ not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is not, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself.” Sartre captures this idea with his phrase that we are what we are not.

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2 A question arises as to whether our freedom underlies not all but only certain types of self-deception. For example, one might think that deceiving oneself about a friend’s illness or commission of a crime has nothing to do with one’s capacity to freely will and act. I believe that Sartre would want to argue that even such an instance of self-deception occurs in response to a choice about how to act in the world and that all self-deception is, in the end, linked to our freedom and capacity for action. Space limitations do not permit examination of that argument here.

3 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992), 99 – 100. *L'être et le néant, essai d'ontologie phénoménologique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), 93. References to the English and French version of this work will be cited with page numbers, as “BN” and “EN” respectively.

and we are not what we are. In other words, unlike things such as rocks and inkwells which are fully identical with themselves, human beings are non-self-coincident. We are not (only) what we are, i.e. the sum-total of our past and present attributes but we are (also) what we are not (yet), i.e. the sum-total of our future possibilities.

As to facticity: Human beings are not, as might be divine entities, transcendent through and through. They have bodies and certain “factual” attributes that are fixed and not within their capacity to control fully. This is our “facticity,” a term Sartre adopts once again from Heidegger. Heidegger uses “facticity” narrowly to refer to our thrownness, i.e. the fact that we find ourselves existing without having chosen to do so.\(^5\) It is Sartre’s achievement to have broadened Heidegger’s use of the term. For Sartre, our facticity refers not just to the fact that we have been thrown into this world, but also to how we have been thrown, as middle-class, male, white, of medium height—i.e., to all those things about us that we have not chosen or can no longer choose against.\(^6\)

One finds in Sartre at least three salient types of factical attributes. One such type of attribute of human beings is their past. I am always, in part, what I and my situation have been. I can no longer change what has led up to the present, regardless of whether my past activities were chosen by me or not. A second factical feature is a person’s body. We are not fully transcendent but are embodied or, as Sartre says, “an inert presence as a passive object among other objects.”\(^7\) While we may, up to a point, change certain things about our bodies, our bodies still constrain our future choices. Third, there is the way that others view us or, what Sartre calls, our being-for-others. For Sartre, the way others regard us is not altogether separate from us, but constitutes, in part, who we are. While we have some limited influence on the way others view us, our being-for-others continues to constrain our future course of action. So, according to Sartre, human beings are composed of two aspects: on the one hand, their freedom to surpass what is, and, on the other hand, the factical constraints on their freedom which derive from their past, their bodies and their image in the eyes of others.\(^8\)

Now, bad faith is a form of self-deception essentially built on this double property of facticity-transcendence. Sartre’s account of it is best appreciated by means of his three very vivid examples. They are: one, the woman out on a first date who shields from herself her beau’s sexual interests and her need to respond to them; two, the café waiter who so fully identifies with his job that he effectively denies his full humanity and; three, the homosexual who denies that his past homosexual acts to which he admits define his present sexual identity. All three are examples of bad faith which Sartre explicates in this

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\(^5\) See *Sein und Zeit*, 135; *Being and Time*, 174.

\(^6\) Cf. BN 127 ff.; EN 117ff.

\(^7\) BN 100; EN 94.

\(^8\) Evidence for regarding the past, the body and being-for-others as the three essential forms of facticity can be found at BN 100; EN 94. Unlike many commentators, I regard facticity as an overarching concept which encompasses the body and being-for-others and all that which lies beyond choice and constrains choice.
way: “The basic concept which is thus engendered utilizes the double property of the human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcendence. These two aspects of human reality are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination. But bad faith does not wish either to coordinate them or to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity…” 9

Let me put the point in a way similar to a central distinction and thesis developed by the ancient Stoic philosopher, Epictetus. Our freedom or transcendence is about what is up to us. Our facticity refers to what is beyond our control. And the cardinal mistake – for Epictetus, the main source of human unhappiness; for Sartre, the phenomenon of bad faith – is to conflate the one with the other, either by regarding what is transcendent as factical or what is factical as transcendent. 10 It is worth noting that bad faith as described by Sartre is not an uncommon occurrence. How often do we deny or overlook the fact we are not truly trapped by circumstances but are indeed much more free than we are inclined to believe and more responsible for our lives than we might like to admit? And how often do we deny or fail to appreciate that many of the unpleasant things in our lives are simply beyond our control? In formulating the concept of bad faith as the conflation of the transcendental and the factual, Sartre has, I believe, discovered a widespread, deeply-rooted and troubling phenomenon.

Now to the last and most problematic concept: “good faith.” Sartre argues that good faith is not really possible because it always ends up falling back into bad faith. This makes bad faith seem absolutely unavoidable. Here is how he arrives at that position. In his third example, we have a man who denies that he is truly a homosexual despite consistent homosexual acts in the past to which he admits. Sartre then considers a friend of the homosexual, “the champion of sincerity” as Sartre calls him, who urges the homosexual to admit that he is what he has been. Sartre maintains that the homosexual is in bad faith because the relevance of his factical attributes, i.e. his past behavior, to his present sexual identity. But Sartre goes on to argue that the champion of sincerity is no less guilty of bad faith since he demands that the homosexual identify wholly with his factical past to the exclusion of his transcendent capacity to be other than what he has been. More generally, Sartre’s point is that any attempt to escape bad faith by owning up to what one is falls back into bad faith by failing to acknowledge what one is not (yet) but might be. In other words, sincerity and good faith fail to honor the non-self-coincident nature of human beings, i.e., that they are not what they are and are what they are not. This alleged inescapability of bad faith makes it very difficult to understand how human beings might ever attain anything approaching authentic existence – a possibility which, as Sartre reminds us, he does not deny and which he describes in a short, enigmatic footnote as a kind of

9 BN 98; EN 92.
“self-recovery (reprise) of being which was previously corrupted.”\textsuperscript{11}

Now, it seems to me that Sartre is mistaken in claiming that sincerity and good faith always fall back into bad faith. To say that we are not self-coincident is one thing. This means that we should not be identified solely in terms of our actual attributes, but also in terms of our possible ones. Yet this does not entail that we must conflate one with the other. It seems to me that as long as a person avoids denying or misrecognizing either her factical attributes or her ability to discern and act on possibilities, this person can, at least in principle, stay out of bad faith. One need only get straight and properly distinguish between, to use Epictetus’s terms, what is up to us and what is not up to us by means of an honest appraisal of the available evidence.\textsuperscript{12} So, when Sartre suggests in the passage quoted above that facticity and transcendence “are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination,” he is right and he is wrong when he later seems to retract it. I am not saying that it is easy to escape bad faith but only that however difficult in practice, it is not impossible in theory. Yet, is this matter so simple or might Sartre not be on to something in seeing in non-self-coincidence a persistent challenge to an honest and authentic life? We shall return to this question below.

\textbf{II.} We can turn now to the issue of group identity. By “group identification,” I mean the act of regarding one’s identity, one’s sense of who one is and what one is about, in terms of belonging to some group, whether the group is united by gender, sexual preference, race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, or profession. A group might even be defined by a common hobby, ideology or a common ancestry. By “group identity,” I mean the category that results from the act of group identification. Now, Sartre writes of group identity in the context of bad faith in at least two places, obliquely in \textit{Being and Nothingness} and directly in \textit{Anti-Semite and Jew}. Let us examine both cases with particular attention to the question whether identifying oneself in terms of group belonging bears a special relation to bad faith.

One might surmise that the relevant case in \textit{Being and Nothingness} is that of the homosexual. For my purposes, it is not. The homosexual may be in bad faith but not because he engages in group identification. He repudiates it. It is the waiter who group identifies, namely, as a Parisian garçon de café. Here is Sartre’s delightfully cinematic description: “His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes forward toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally, there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope

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\item \textsuperscript{11} That footnote (BN 116; EN 107) says that while “bad faith re-apprehends good faith … that does not mean that we cannot radically escape bad faith. But this supposes a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted. This self-recovery we shall call authenticity …”
\item \textsuperscript{12} For another commentator who makes this kind of criticism of Sartre, see Ronald Santoni, \textit{Bad Faith, Good Faith and Authenticity} (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
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walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he
perpetually re-establishes by a light movement of the arm and hand.\textsuperscript{13}

Clear this man takes his status as a café waiter seriously. He identifies himself as a
waiter. But why is this man in bad faith? Sartre says the following: “All his behavior
seems to us a game … His gestures and his voice seem to be mechanisms … He is play-
ing at being a waiter … The waiter in the café plays with his condition in order to realize
it … The obligation is not different from that imposed on all tradesmen. Their condition is
wholly one of ceremony. The public demands of them that they realize it as a ceremony;
there is the dance of the grocer, the tailor … A grocer who dreams is offensive to the
buyer, because such a grocer is not wholly a grocer. Etiquette demands that he limit him-
self to his function as a grocer …”\textsuperscript{14}

Sartre explains that if he were to play at being waiter in this manner, he would be ac-
ting as if it were not he who bestows value and obligation on his waiterly functions, as
“from the very fact that I sustain this role in existence I did not transcend it on every side,
as if I did not constitute myself as one beyond my condition.”\textsuperscript{15}

The waiter example is certainly more compelling in mid-century Europe than in late-
capitalist America where job affiliations are so much more transient and replaceable. But
we can easily bring the point closer to home. Imagine a young professor, who perhaps a
little unsure of himself, slips into the habit of endeavoring to dress like a professor, speak
and move like a professor, eat, drink and sleep as a professor might be expected to. The
point is that the waiter or the young academic is trying to realize his group identity as if it
were his very essence. To use Sartre’s language, he is trying to flatten himself into a
thing. But consciousness and human reality are not thing-like; human beings are individu-
ally distinct from one another and irrevocably free. Any attempt to understand oneself,
wholly or perhaps even partly, in terms of a group identity would constitute, so Sartre
suggests, a denial of one’s transcendence and an act of bad faith.

An obvious question arises here. Is it not possible to identify as a waiter or a profes-
sor without falling into type of bad faith? Is there any way in which one’s profession, for
example, might be a valid, non-self-deceptive and honest source of one’s sense of self?
Once again, I would think so. It seems to me that, contrary to Sartre, I can affirm my iden-
tity as a philosophy professor by affirming my past choices and activities and my present
attachments to work, colleagues and lifestyle. At the same time I do acknowledge that I
am and have always been more than a philosophy professor and that my life need in no
way, nor can it, follow a script written for a generic person with my profession. That is, I
always exceed my professional role. As for Sartre’s waiter, it may be that he is in bad
faith but it seems to me that he need not be in bad faith. He might have become a creative,
nonconformist waiter willing to accept aspects of waiterhood as his own but unwilling to
let himself be circumscribed by it. So, it would seem that just as bad faith in general is

\textsuperscript{13} BN 101; EN 95.
\textsuperscript{14} BN 101f.; EN 95, translation emended.
\textsuperscript{15} BN 103; EN 96.
avoidable, as I argued against Sartre before, so is the connection between group identifi-
cation and bad faith.

But am I short-circuiting Sartre’s argument here? Consider that to the extent that I
gain my sense of self from belonging to a profession or group, I am aligning myself with
or committing myself to certain habits, pleasures, values and objectives. And in doing so I
am foreclosing other options and thus limiting the full range of free acts I might under-
take. In other words, to identify oneself with a group is to say, in effect, “here I stand.” It
is to trade a piece of one’s transcendence for a piece of commitment to some mode of
being. This trade-off shows that the relation between transcendence and facticity is a zero-
sum game: the more of one, the less of the other. Bad faith is not simply the problem of
conflating one’s factual attributes with one’s transcendent attributes and vice versa, but it
is the problem that adopting an attribute as factual, as a “here I stand” position, means
taking something away from one’s transcendence. Yet, not adopting any “here I stand”
attributes would mean not being or doing anything at all. It would mean giving up one’s
very existence as a creature with values, projects, and goals. So, Sartre would seem to be
right after all. The tension between facticity and transcendence is inescapable and so is
bad faith, if bad faith is taken to mean not only a silent conflation of one with the other,
but also an unrecognized encroachment into either one’s commitments or one’s freedom
by the other side.

What we have seen so far is that bad faith is inescapable whenever we identify with
or commit to attributes beyond what is factically given. But we have not yet seen whether
bad faith is any more implicated in group identification than non-group identification, e.g.
identifying oneself under some non-group description such as “courageous” or “nature-
loving.” To come closer to answer this question let us turn now to Sartre’s 1946 work
Anti-Semite and Jew.

Sartre spends much of his time in this book talking about the psychology and meta-
physics of the anti-Semite. But there the point is straightforward: the anti-Semite exempli-
fies bad faith in that he is afraid of “his own consciousness, of his liberty, of his instincts,
of his responsibilities, of solitariness, of change, of society and of the world” and attempt
to fend off his fear by turning himself and Jews into things, into “pitiless stone.” More
interesting for our purposes is his depiction of the predicament of the Jew, in particular,
the modern, European Jew who while completely secularized is not completely accepted
by those around him.

The Jew, like other human beings of course, has the double characteristic of facti-

16 Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew (New York: Schocken, 1965), 53f. Réflexions sur la ques-
tion juive (Paris; Gallimard, 1954), 62f. References to respective versions of this work will be cited, with
pages numbers, as “ASJ” and “RQJ” respectively.

17 For Sartre, the Jew in mid-20th century France is not only thoroughly secular, he is essentially
without any other distinguishing characteristics aside from being an object of anti-Semitism. Thus Sartre
writes that it is “the anti-Semite who creates the Jew” (ASJ 143; RQJ 173) and “the sole tie that binds
Jews is the hostility and disdain of the societies which surround them” (ASJ 91; RQJ 111). This is
probably overstated.
city-transcendence. Sartre’s characterization of the Jew’s Jewishness also appeals to this double characteristic by drawing attention to the Jew’s naturally dark and curly beard (factual attribute) which he might let grow in the tradition of his community (transcendent attribute). Sartre writes that the Jew finds himself in a situation (at this time), where most others are very aware of his Jewishness. But now this question: How can or should the Jew respond to the situation into which he is thrown? As Sartre puts the question: “[D]oes he or does he not consent to be the person whose role they [anti-Semites] make him play? And if he consents, to what extent? If he refuses, will he refuse all kinship with other Jews?”18 Sartre’s answer is that the Jew finds himself in a dilemma. On the one hand, he cannot effectively “choose not to be a Jew”19 for at least two reasons. First, society will not let him do so but will continue to see him as a Jew trying to renounce his ethnic parentage. Second, to deny his situation would be, Sartre says, both “inauthentic”20 and in “bad faith.”21 On the other hand, if the Jew admits that he is one of “those” Jews, “he has allowed himself to be persuaded by the anti-Semites; he is the first victim of their propaganda.”22 Such self-castigating Jews, as Sartre describes them “… weary of the struggle against their implacable Jewishness, fail to see that authenticity … is not to be achieved merely by the admission that they are Jews … [and are made so] by the looks, the violence, the disdain of others, by having qualities and a fate attached to them ….”23 In short, if the Jew denies his Jewishness, he denies his being-for-others and thus his facticity. If he admits to being a Jew, he denies his ability to be other than how he is perceived and thus denies his transcendence. Either way, he is inauthentic and in bad faith. So what is a Jew to do? Clearly, a question that, with variations, is all too familiar to members of other oppressed groups.

Sartre has some suggestions. In fact, unlike Being and Nothingness, Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew gives some real substance to the idea of authenticity. Sartre says that: “Man may be defined as a being having freedom within the limits of a situation [and] … authenticity … consists in having a true and lucid consciousness of the situation, in assuming the responsibilities and risks that it involves, in claiming (revendiquer) it in pride or humiliation, sometimes in horror and hate.”24 He goes on to say that the authentic Jew must “live to the full his condition as Jew … [and] assert his claim in the face of the disdain shown toward him.”25 Authenticity

18 ASJ 89; RQJ 108, translation amended.
19 Ibid.
20 ASJ 91.
21 ASJ 99.
22 ASJ 94; RQJ 114f.
23 ASJ 108; RQJ 131.
24 ASJ 90; RQJ 109. Thre translator of Anti-Semite and Jew renders the word “revendiquer” as “accept” rather than, as I do, “claim.” The difference seems important to me. “Accept” is too passive. Sartre’s idea of authenticity is more assertive, active and even such as to involve a good measure of self-creation or self-invention.
25 ASJ 91; RQJ 110f.
“manifests itself in revolt.”\textsuperscript{26} And, finally, he argues: “Jewish authenticity consists in choosing oneself as Jew, that is, in realizing one’s Jewish condition. The authentic Jew abandons the myth of the universal man; he knows and wills himself into history as a historic and damned creature … [T]he authentic Jew makes himself a Jew, in the face of all and against all … He is what he makes himself.”\textsuperscript{27}

It is time now to take stock. There are really two sets of question on the table. First, how can we avoid bad faith and achieve authenticity? Second, what is the nature of the group identity, is it thoroughly infected with bad faith and how can it be dealt with authentically?

As to the first question, \textit{Anti-Semite and Jew} develops the idea of “self-recovery” in the puzzling footnote from \textit{Being and Nothingness}. Notice the key terms: situation, recover, claim, revolt, choosing what one is, making oneself what one is, recognizing oneself as a historical creature, and living one’s condition to the fullest. What Sartre is suggesting is that authenticity consists neither in living as if one were fully transcendent nor in becoming resigned to one’s factical attributes. Rather it means frankly assessing and recognizing what one’s “situation” is and seeing one’s freedom as connected to one’s concrete factical situation, not as floating in a void of absolute possibility. One’s opportunities for free action issue from the concrete situation and are most fully realized in defiantly reclaiming one’s situation and making it truly one’s own. The factical is, at first, what is given, inherited beyond control and because it is beyond control, it is in a sense alien. To act authentically would mean to make one’s alien factical attributes (whether one’s body, one’s past, one’s religion or skin color or nationality) one’s own by steering them in a direction that one has found appropriate and meaningful. Interestingly enough, Sartre’s conception of authenticity is reminiscent of one of the way in which Heidegger describes authenticity in \textit{Being and Time}. Where Sartre talks of “reprise” and “revendication,” i.e. a kind of taking back or laying claim to what is really one’s own, Heidegger talks of the importance of “Wiederholung,” i.e. a repetition or retrieval or re-fetching of one’s past.\textsuperscript{28}

Let us now bring this whole analysis to bear on the specific issue of group identification. For Sartre, identifying with a group might go awry and end in bad faith in one of two ways. First, it can involve a denial of one’s transcendence insofar as one acts as if one’s group identity exhausts one’s sense of self and one’s motivation for one’s activities or insofar as one lets oneself be definitively pinned down by the image of the group in the eyes of others. Alternatively, it can involve a denial of one’s facticity insofar as one does not own up to one’s situation or to the fact that others see one as part of the group with the alleged characteristics of that group. Group identification is authentic for Sartre inso-

\textsuperscript{26} ASJ 108; RQJ 131.
\textsuperscript{27} ASJ 136f.; RQJ 166f.
far as it owns up to one’s situation and reclaims and reshapes, defiantly, the meaning of what has been factically given.29

This is as far as Sartre goes on the question. In facticity-transcendence, I think that we find a useful framework for the question of the authenticity or inauthenticity of group identity. Yet, once we look further at group identities, we soon find a number of complex questions left unanswered by the texts we have considered. I believe that Sartre’s basic framework can be fruitfully applied to such questions. Let me state three such questions here.

1) Some identities are inherited and cannot be easily given up (e.g. being black or white, male or female). Others are voluntary and/or more easily left behind. How exactly does or should this make a difference? Is one or the other more binding?

2) Some group identities might have no real positive content aside from the one given to them by misguided outsiders (as Sartre thinks is the case with secular Jews). How does this make a difference to evaluating the authenticity of maintaining group identity?

3) Sartre has little to say in the texts examined about how group identity might be a means of bonding with and maintaining solidarity with others.30 Is this a legitimate incentive and goal for group identity? Is it necessarily authentic or can it slip into bad faith?

III. I hope to have shown in this paper that authenticity is not a hopeless notion. We can make sense of it without falling victim to the dubious notion of a pre-given self. Sartre’s account of reclaiming oneself through one’s situation so as to do justice to the balance and tension between our facticity and transcendence can make sense of a notion of authenticity which would seem to be pre-supposed by any robust conception of what it is to choose effectively and act freely.

In fact, for Sartre as well as Foucault, something like authenticity is what gives freedom such value in the first place.

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29 Note that Sartre also characterizes black authenticity, like Jewish authenticity, in terms of reclaiming oneself by means of one’s situation. See Sartre’s “Orphée Noir” in Léopold Sédar Senghor, Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), ix – xlv, especially xiv.

30 See, however, Sartre’s later work such as his Notebooks for an Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 479, and Critique of Dialectical Reason (London: Verso, 1982), Book II, chapter 1, “The Fused Group.”


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