In this I will undertake the attempt to outline Wittgenstein’s account of subjectivity by focusing on the central notion of expression, emerging from the rejection of the false alternative between Cartesianism and Behaviorism. Although allowing us to rethink the relationships between inner and outer and self and other, the notion of expression does not seem to provide a plausible explanation of first-person authority. My main point will be that by differentiating the term knowledge (utilizing Polanyi’s and Shoemaker’s accounts), we can expand Wittgenstein’s model in a way helps us understand self-knowledge and first person authority.

Throughout the changing landscape of Wittgenstein’s thinking there are basic continuities, such as a stable disapproval of any idea of a substantiated, Cartesian self. This, of course, can by no means be subscribed to Wittgenstein alone, since already by the time of Tractatus Nietzsche and Freud convincingly had argued against this picture of the self. So what is the genuine achievement of Wittgenstein’s re-thinking of subjectivity and how can his ideas help us understand self-knowledge and first person authority? Answering these questions by giving an account of Wittgenstein’s ideas is the main aim of this paper.

Arguably there is no full-fledged theory of subjectivity in Wittgenstein’s work. The case is even more complicated because discussing subjectivity in Wittgenstein involves many issues: the relation between inner and outer, language and mind, self and other. Due to this fact, I will limit the reach of this article and proceed by giving an account of his critique of the twin extremes of behaviorism and Cartesianism, concluding that Wittgenstein points to some problematic assumptions these approaches seem to share. After spelling out Wittgenstein’s arguments I will hold that it is an essential trait of his philosophy of mind to overcome these alternatives and that one of the most important dimensions of Wittgenstein’s account of subjectivity is anti-objectivism, manifested in his notion of expression. I will point at various difficulties of this account and suggest a way of overcoming them that may help us understand his account of self-knowledge and first-person authority.

1. Reaching beyond Cartesianism

Even though this matter probably needs no introduction, let me quickly rephrase some characteristically Cartesian thoughts. The central idea of Cartesianism is a dualism, holding that material and mental substances are distinct entities.1 Since mental phenomena occur inside

1 For Descartes, material substances are composed of pure extension in space, while mental substances are unextended, existing in a very specific place in the human brain: in the tiny organ called
the subject, they are consequently accessible to the first person alone. The access to the mind by introspection is somehow privileged as immediate and infallible, whereas from the third person perspective one has to content with making assumptions about the other’s inner states on the basis of outward behavior and utterances of the other. Although it is clear that Wittgenstein is hostile to this account, it is important to note that Wittgenstein does not altogether reject it. There remains an asymmetry:

...there is something inner here which can be inferred only inconclusively from the outer. It is a picture and it is obvious what justifies this picture. The apparent certainty of the first person, the uncertainty of the third ((LW, §951). ²

This does not mean that one is always able to directly perceive the content of another mind. His examples solely attempt to illustrate that the Cartesian model is oversimplified. On the other hand, even if my perception only touches the outer, bodily dimension of the other this does not lead to a conclusion that the mind or inner dimension is fundamentally different from the outer, and that this inner dimension (if available) is only accessible to me through some process of reasoning or deduction. Treating the matter of privileged access Wittgenstein questions his Cartesian interlocutor:

If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me (PI, p. 233)³

You look at a face and say ‘I wonder what’s going on behind that face?’ But you don’t have to think that way. And if someone talks to me quite obviously holding nothing back then I am not even tempted to think that way (LW, §978).

Wittgenstein intends to show that the kind of uncertainty we usually connect to the under-privileged access of the third person perspective seems out of place in many ordinary situations.⁴ Importantly, Wittgenstein does not overemphasize this: he readily admits that in some cases a person’s inner states remain opaque form the third person perspective (where I feel that I simply cannot figure a person out) (PI, p. 223).

‘But you can’t recognize pain with certainty just from externals.’ – The only way of recognizing it is by externals, and the uncertainty is constitutional. It is not a shortcoming (RPP II, §657). ⁵

As this passage clearly shows, Wittgenstein admits a sort of fallibility, but importantly he does not think of it as a deficit – it is far more a constitutional part of the third person perspective (LW, § 967). A fundamental uncertainty is a necessity for the possibility of

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experiencing others and self: let us imagine having the same type of access to the thoughts of others as they do themselves. In this case we would be able to say that we have a direct access to inner processes of others, but at the same time we could no longer be sure whose inner processes, feelings, etc. are at stake. Therefore, a subject is given to himself in an essentially distinct way from how other subjects are given to him. My thoughts are not hidden from an other, they “are just open to him in a different way than they are to me” (LW II, pp. 34–35). In the second case another kind of fallibility is at stake (LW, § 877). On this basis Wittgenstein is able to contest the Cartesian claim that from a third person perspective there is no perceptual access to the mental phenomena of others.

In general I do not surmise fear in him – I see it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside; rather it is as if the human face were in a way translucent and that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in its own (RPP II, §170).

Wittgenstein’s point is that there is evidence to believe that in a lot of situations it is meaningful to hold that one perceives the feelings and fears of another (LW II, p. 62) and thereby does away with the strong Cartesian notion of privacy. Accordingly, it is possible to achieve certainty as to the inner states of others, but with the obvious difference that the others’ states do not become mine (LW, § 963). My access is of another kind, but not necessarily a more accurate one. This has important consequences for the conceptualization of the internal and external dimensions of the subject and body compared to the Cartesian view. There is no sharp divide between the external behavior of a subject and its inner states. The bodily behavior does not somehow accompany inner processes, but is in itself penetrated by a dimension of subjectivity.

But what if I said that by facial expression of shame I meant what you mean by ‘the facial expression + the feeling’, unless I explicitly distinguish between genuine and simulated facial expressions? It is, I think, misleading to describe the genuine expression as a sum of the expression and something else, though it is just as misleading [ . . . ] if we say that the genuine expression is a particular behavior and nothing besides.

This point is condensed in the sentence, which has been interpreted as a behaviorist view: “If one sees the behavior of a living thing, one sees its soul” (PI, § 357).

1.1. Self-Knowledge and Authority

This re-thinking of privacy and the inner/outer schism loosens the authority claim of the first person, but does not solve the problems of certainty. Wittgenstein still holds that a third person can doubt whether I am in pain, while I cannot be in such doubt (PI, § 246). Does this mean that Wittgenstein alludes to a sort of Cartesianism after all? This is far from being the case, and one satisfactory way of showing this is through an explication of knowledge. In a common sensual way we think of the first person as having the last authority on the contents of his mind. In such situations we might apply sentences like: I know what I am feeling, thinking, etc., and thereby cannot make mistakes about my inner state. Wittgenstein’s solution is not a

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thorough negation of this, but a subtle attempt to be more complex and accurate. He does not question the authority of the first person, but \textit{whether the first-person perspective on inner states adequately can be discussed in terms of knowledge}. As Wittgenstein puts it somewhat polemically: “It is correct to say ‘I know what you are thinking’, and wrong to say ‘I know what I am thinking’” (PI, p. 222). I can meaningfully state from the third person perspective that I know someone is in pain, but I cannot correctly state that I know I am in pain. Knowing of my pain does strictly speaking not qualify as knowledge (LW II, p. 92).

It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps that I am in pain? (PI, § 246).

Wittgenstein opposes the use of the term knowledge because knowing of a fact involves some kind of a gap or distance between the observed and the observer. In the case of inner states like pain I do not gain knowledge of my pain by observing it, but I simply have it, meaning that I simply undergo this particular state. There is no introspection involved in this sense – I don’t gain knowledge at all by deducing on the fundament of observation. One does not have an inner state and simultaneously and introspectively gains awareness of it. So the relation of the self to itself cannot be adequately put in terms of observation, but expression. When I say that I am in pain, it is not knowledge, because I do not do so on the basis of observing my behavior. As Wittgenstein states: “… the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it” (PI, § 244). This gets quite clear when we think of children learning to say ‘I am in pain’ instead of crying. When seeing the child’s pain behavior, we teach them to say ‘I am in pain’ and thereby teach them a new pain-behavior. This brings out the difference between behavior and pain utterance. Whenever I utter that ‘I am in pain’ I do not describe or report on the basis of observed behavior, I do not know I am in pain – simply I express pain. Even my relation to others is not (at least not fully) depicted in terms of observation.\footnote{Søren Overgaard: “The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein’s Phenomenological Perspective” \textit{Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, Volume 5, Number 1, March 2006 , pp. 53-73(21) 2004, p.56.} Of course, this is often the case, but there is still a more fundamental relation to other beings than observation. It is of course a possibility but a secondary form of relating that presupposes a primary attitude (cf. LW II, p. 38). “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul [eine Einstellung zur Seele]. I am not of the Opinion (Meinung) that he has a soul” (PI, p.178). As Wittgenstein states, it is mistaken to say that I “am of the opinion” or know that other people have souls, while he insists that the attitude towards others is an attitude towards souls (LW II, p. 38). Contrasting opinion and attitude, Wittgenstein holds that we react to the behavior of a person in a specific way. We find a similar remark in the Nachlass elaborating on the difference between \textit{Einstellung} and \textit{Meinung}. Instead of “attitude toward the soul” one could also say “attitude toward a human”. The attitude is primal to the opinion (Isn’t belief in God an attitude?). “An opinion can be wrong. But what would an error [Irrtum] look like here?” (LW II, p.38). Our relation to others does not start by observing certain movements of a body and then interpreting this observation as meaningful. Having an attitude towards a soul does not mean being in some kind of a psychological state - it is simply a condition in which a certain behavior can be perceived as the behavior of a human being. So there is a primal relation between the attitude of a person and the object of his attitude in the sense in which the attitude is constitutive of the object (Winch 1987, p. 148). I am not of the opinion that a human is alive and rock is not – it is an attitude which I am not free to choose or abandon, and which shows itself in the manner I handle the object. Our knowledge of the
other is not fully based on knowledge - more fundamentally we have an instinctive attitude towards them – intersubjectivity is more basic than knowledge. It comes before opinion (knowledge) and therefore the argument of the skeptic (that I cannot know the minds of others) is not pointed at the right level.

When I say ‘he is in pain’ I am not just observing and describing his behavior, but also express an attitude toward this person, which is an “attitude towards a soul”. In these utterances we attribute an ‘inner’ to a person, we view his action as those of a human being which expresses inner states, which become intelligible for us against a wider background of experiences. Speaking of the inner (attributing an inner) stands for a different attitude “towards a human being” and expresses and embodies the particular nature of our relating to a person.

2. Beyond Behaviorism

Even though Wittgenstein explicitly and repeatedly rejected the charge of behaviorism in the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI, § 305-308), the argument has been put forward that his critique in pursuing the problems arising from Cartesian concepts in reality drives him into something that looks like a behaviorist position. Behaviorism of course is not a precise term but covers a large area and entails contrasting views. So I will concentrate on two claims: a psychological and a logical behaviorist claim. According to the prior, behavior can be adequately explained without making reference to non-behavioral (‘inner’, mental) events. As far as the logical claim goes, mental terms should no longer be misleadingly deployed in describing behavior. When attributing pain for example to someone, we really do not mean that the person concerned is in the internal state of pain. Instead, attributing mental states is nothing else than attributing a certain behavior, or disposition to behavior. On the subject of self-knowledge Ryle’s famous formulation shows the behaviorist rejection of the privileged access: “John Doe’s ways of finding out about John Doe are the same as John Doe’s ways of finding out about Richard Doe.”

2.1. No denial of inner processes

Admittedly, Wittgenstein’s view - that seeing a bodily behavior of a living being is seeing its soul – is fairly close to a kind of behaviorism. It can easily be understood as stating that physical behavior is all there is and denying the existence of some mental process behind the behavior. Actually Wittgenstein is quite explicit about this in two sections of *Philosophical Investigations* which more or less directly deal with behaviorism. He asks straightforwardly: “Why should I deny that there is an inner process?” (PI, § 306). Denying inner processes would mean one also has to deny the occurrence of remembering, which Wittgenstein rejects. “And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them” (PI, § 308). Consider this passage on thinking:

The word ‘thinking’ is used in a certain way very differently from, for example, ‘to be in pain’, ‘to be sad’, etc.: we don’t say ‘I think’ as the expression of a mental state. At most we say ‘I’m thinking’. ‘Leave me alone, I’m thinking about . . . ’ And of course one doesn’t mean

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by this: ‘Leave me alone, I am now behaving in such and such a way.’ Therefore ‘thinking’ is not behavior (RPP II, §12).

Wittgenstein acknowledges inner states and their fundamental difference to behavior. Again the term expression is of great help here. My pain utterances are not simply descriptions of behavior. Behavior is more than physical movements we make assumptions about and Wittgenstein repeatedly emphasizes that human behavior is full of ‘mental significance’ (Z, § 220–221,12 PI, § 284). It is expressive. According to the behaviorist picture, to be able to determine whether I am in pain I would have to refer to some criteria. But the point of the notion of expression was to get rid of the idea that my access to my own subjectivity can be put in terms of knowledge and is based on any kind of criteria.

3. Opposing the common root – beyond objectivism

Wittgenstein attempts to articulate subjectivity without falling into the pitfalls of the twin extremes of Cartesianism or behaviorism, exposing them as false alternatives.13 Compared to the Cartesian picture, behaviorism establishes a closer link between pain and pain behavior, but takes this too far by stating that pain utterances simply are descriptions of behavior.

At this point, it appears that there is a peculiar conformity between Cartesianism and behaviorism: they both seem to think that the mind must be, in the first-person case as well as from a third-person perspective, an ‘object’ of knowledge and observation, whether external observation or some kind of introspection. And it is precisely this that Wittgenstein wants to deny:

One wishes to say: In order to be able to say that I have toothache I don’t observe my behavior, say in the mirror. And this is correct, but it doesn’t follow that you describe an observation of any other kind (Wittgenstein 1968, p. 319; cf. 1980b, §177). Here is the picture: He sees it [viz. ‘that which is in him’] immediately, I only mediately. But that’s not the way it is. He doesn’t see something and describe it to us (LW II, p. 92).

For Wittgenstein both the Cartesian and behaviorist conceptions seem to share a common fundamental assumption: that language functions in a way that words have meaning by standing for something. After the shortcomings of Tractatus he determinedly emphasizes that it is a mistake to think “that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts…” (PI, § 304). Assuming this exclusive use of language we tend to apply the formula ‘object and name’ to describe subjective life (which, according to the “beetle in a box” example, is highly problematic). This forces us in both cases to a kind of objectivist stand towards mental occurrences: we tend either to view subjective life as mere internal occurrences having to do with inner ‘private’ objects, or as external objects in the form of behavior patterns.14

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14 The only difference seems to be that the observation concerns internal or external things. Behaviorism just denies the justification of introspection as a means of collecting data. So they can be fully comprehended (negativity claim). A self is a different thing form rock, but nevertheless an object like other objects. Fraser Cowley: A Critique of British Empiricism, New York: Macmillan, 1968, p. 177.
The dissatisfaction with this objective concept of subjectivity is a continuous feature of Wittgenstein’s thought. Already in *Tractatus* Wittgenstein expresses a clear anti-objectivistic approach to subjectivity when he states: the ‘I’ is not an object. In *Philosophical Investigations* this becomes more precise: a mental state is not an object, not a thing – but nor is it “nothing” (PI, § 304). Consider the famous ‘beetle in the box’ argument: it shows that sensation words have justified use in language games, but they do not refer to or name any private ‘something’. The opposite claim (that inner states are not nothings either) ensures not falling into the behaviorist position: they are not nothings – meaning that there is something beyond the publicly observable behavior. Subjectivity is thus not hidden or accessible only to itself, but it is in the world without being an object among others that we adequately can describe by describing behavior. Maintaining the difference between first- and third-person perspectives on subjectivity, and that first-person “givenness” cannot be reduced to some third-person “givenness”, does not force us to state that subjectivity is inherently private: instead they are perspectives on one living human being, as an embodied subjectivity.

4. Authority and the Varieties of Knowing

Wittgenstein’s anti-objective account goes beyond Cartesian introspection and behaviorism, but there is however something that remains unsatisfying about this account. The central notion of expression puts him into the position to be able to leave behind these two alternatives, but it simultaneously does away with the notion of knowledge. Does this lead to a sort of expressivism and does this imply that we must give up the notion of the first-person authority? Then the price of giving up these alternatives might just have been too high. John McDowell and Richard Moran argue in this way, stating that expressivism cannot be ascribed to Wittgenstein and that such a strategy is a ‘cop-out’. McDowell ascribes to Wittgenstein a wish to duck the difficulties by assimilating avowals “to other modes of expression, so as to distance them from assertions, and that strikes me as a cop-out.” When expressivism claims that the reference to oneself is illusory because statements (like ‘I am in pain’) are not descriptions, but expressions of pain like crying or wincing. Thus they cannot be manifestations of self-knowledge, since they do not describe. In this way expressivism prevents the question of knowledge and authority from even arising. In this I tend to agree with Moran that expressivism cannot figure as an account of self-knowledge and authority, but is a rejection of these ideas.

Rockney Jacobsen and more recently David Finkelstein have put forward an argument, which tries to link assertion and expression, saying that they do not exclude each other. An avowal of a mental state is both an expression and a truth-evaluable assertion about myself. According to this account, the first-person authority of a self-ascription and expression comes down to this: I ascribe an inner state to myself with first-person authority if I express it by ascribing it to me. When I learn about an unconscious mental state (for ex. from my therapist) I will possess knowledge of the particular inner state, but I would not be able to express it by ascribing it to myself.

But I think that even this account is vulnerable to a simple question: how would I be able

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to determine whether I just ascribe an inner state to myself or express it too? How would I be able to determine whether I speak with genuine first-person authority or not? One obvious answer can be put like this: I express, I speak with authority if I do not consult behavioral evidence about myself when I make a self-ascription. But here the argument turns out to be circular: in order to be able to determine whether I speak with genuine first-person authority or not I consulted evidence, I referred to some criteria in order to know about my expression. Thus we would have to contradict the very premise of this account: that I do not have to consult criteria and evidence when speaking about myself with genuine first-person authority. In this way we would be back where we started: my self-awareness would presuppose that I am somehow given to myself as an object.

In my view the solution is rather to reconsider the varieties of self-knowledge. I will proceed and elucidate this matter by elaborating on Polanyi’s concept of the structure of knowledge. In order to achieve knowledge of something, two dialectically related forms of awareness are needed: subsidiary and focal, or attending from and attending to. What does this mean? My ability to recognize a person depends on my awareness of a number of details about this person, which serve as pointers and which I integrate into a comprehensive entity. But my awareness of these pointers and my awareness of the entity are entirely different: I have a subsidiary awareness of the pointers and focal awareness of the person: I attend not to the clues, but deduce from them. If I direct focal attention to these clues I would not be able to determine what they jointly mean. How does this relate to self-knowledge and authority? I am aware of myself when I act, when my focal awareness is pointed at the world. In this I am aware not of myself, but from myself. So my knowledge of myself is subsidiary, but this also means that it is an awareness that is privileged. But this does not preclude that another can know us better in the focal sense. Therefore my authority concerns merely my subsidiary knowledge – trying to gain full focal knowledge of myself will indubitably fail. With the notion of the subsidiary knowledge we have a possibility of privileged self-knowledge, without the self being given to himself as an object. The schism between subsidiary and focal knowledge has certain affinities to two categories of the use of the ‘I’ which Wittgenstein works with in the Blue Book. There he differentiates between a subject use (expression) and an object use (based on assumption, observation), thus roughly between expression and description.

The last point I want to make is that not only do I speak with authority about my mental states when I express them, but that in a way this subject use of the ‘I’ is more fundamental than the object use and presupposes it. Connecting the term expression to Shoemaker’s account of self-knowledge we can say that an expression entails reference without identification. Shoemaker follows Wittgenstein in stating that the idea that the subject is not given to itself as an object has led to the conclusion that it is not referring to anything. As with Wittgenstein, Shoemaker stresses that self-awareness does not entail any sort of perception of oneself, yet this does not necessarily lead to the assumption that inner states such as pain simply occur and that the ‘I’ is only a pseudo–subject, like ‘it’ in ‘it rains’. These two

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possibilities (akin to Wittgenstein’s ‘something’ and ‘nothing’) appear as the sole view only if one holds onto the concept of knowledge based on the model of sense-perception of objects, or as Wittgenstein would say: because one thinks that language only functions one way. In sentences such as ‘I am in pain’ I am aware of two sorts of things, without my being given to myself as an object: that the attribute ‘feel pain’ is instantiated and that it is instantiated in me.\textsuperscript{21} According to Shoemaker, in the expressive subject use (I feel pain) we refer to a person, but we do not identify the person as an object referred to, which means that this sentence is infallible, immune to misidentification since it refers without identifying.\textsuperscript{22} Self-ascriptions in the objective use presuppose the expressive subject use: objective self-reference is only possible if it connects to infallible expressions.

5. Concluding remarks

In this article I tried to outline Wittgenstein’s account of subjectivity by focusing on the central notion of expression. I think it is a key term to understand how his account differs from both Cartesian and behaviorist models. Wittgenstein’s later writings allow us to rethink the relationships between inner and outer and self and other, without reducing them to each other. The notion of expression, emerging from the rejection of the false alternative between Cartesianism and behaviorism, seemed to harbor major shortcomings, especially in explaining first-person authority. I tried to show that differentiating the term knowledge (utilizing Polanyi’s and Shoemaker’s accounts) is a good way of expanding Wittgenstein’s model without seriously contradicting it.

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\textsuperscript{21} op.cit., p. 563-564.
\textsuperscript{22} op. cit., p. 67.