Young Philosophy 2023

Conference Proceedings

Edited by Dominik Kulcsár and Jozef Sábo



Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, v.v.i.

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CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

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Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, v. v. i.
Bratislava
2023

Young Philosophy 2023: Conference Proceedeings
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Publisher:

Bratislava, Slovakia

First edition: published in 2023

Publisher's Address:
Klemensova 19
811 09 Bratislava
Slovakia

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Language corrections: by the authors.

Cover design and layout:
Katalin Nun Stewart, Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, v. v. i.

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ISBN 978-80-89766-06-2
EAN 9788089766062

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Dear Readers,

This volume of Young Philosophy Conference Proceedings presents texts from papers that were delivered at the XVIII annual international conference for Ph.D. students and young researchers. The conference took place on May 18th and 19th, 2023, at the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, v. v. i. This year was in a certain sense a special one, because for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic, the Young Philosophy conference was held in attendance.

We would like to thank both the director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, v. v. i. Associate Professor Richard Sťahel, PhD., and to our keynote speaker, Dan Swain, Ph.D., from the Department of Humanities, at Czech University of Life Sciences in Prague, Czech Republic., for their support of this event. Dan Swain's lecture on "Band-Aids, Blockages, and Beyond: Reflections on Applied Philosophy" introduced the conference participants to Mary Midgley's thought-provoking work and sparked a stimulating discussion. Furthermore, our thanks go also to the organizing team of Young Philosophy 2023: Dominik Kulcsár, Katarína Podušelová, Jozef Sábo, Michal Kalnický, and Marcel Šedo.

The conference program was divided into four sections – Continental Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, and History of Philosophy. It featured thirty-two presenters of international variety, including the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Germany, Nigeria, Brazil, and Slovakia. For this volume, we have selected the most representative papers from the conference, and its aim is two-fold. First, for those who were unable to attend, it offers a small glimpse into the variety of engaging topics, which we explored. Second, our hope for this volume is, that it will inspire more people to participate in future Young Philosophy conferences, whether they be first-timers or veterans.

In this foreword, we offer you a brief sneak peek of each paper. Marianna Abrahamyan's paper discusses the evolution of semiotic analysis in film, debating its linguistic status and ideological encoding. Saskia Janina Neumann offers a rebuttal to Edmund Gettier's challenges to the traditional definition of knowledge, invoking William G. Lycan's distinctions. Jan Thümmel analyzes interpretations of Schelling's philosophy within German idealism, noting the influence of the interpreters' philosophical biases. Silvia

Caisová outlines the philosophical development of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz's work. Dominik Novosád investigates Seneca's treatment of shame in the Stoic educational context. Adéla Neubauerová delves into Arnold Schönberg's significant influence on early 20th-century art and music theory. Markus E. Hodec contrasts Greek terms to explore the concept of the "new" in European intellectual history. Malwina A. Tkacz examines the COVID-19 pandemic as an existential phenomenon, through the philosophies of Soren Kierkegaard and Albert Camus. Michal Kalnický focuses on the creative dimension of anxiety in the responsive phenomenology of Bernhard Waldenfels. Rita Figus-Illinyi investigates the interdisciplinary concept of resilience. Lastly, Rômulo Eisinger Guimarães discusses the Enlightenment from a Kantian perspective, emphasizing the role of communicability and public discourse.

We trust that the articles in these proceedings will provide ample "*food for thought*."

Bon appétit,

Dominik Kulcsár and Jozef Sábo

PART I: ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Film Language Through the Lens of Philosophy of Film

MARIANNA ABRAHAMYAN, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

ABRAHAMYAN, M.: Film Language through the Lens of Philosophy of Film
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 3 – 10

The aim of this paper is to introduce the key features of the film theory and the philosophy of film, with the special attention to the question of whether film can be approached like a language. The focus is being put on the difference between the continental and the analytic perspectives on film and its relation to language. It reflects the contradiction between the continental point of view which is demonstrated through the lens of Christian Metz and the analytic perspective which is held by the author Berys Gaut. The last part of the text shows what makes the contrast between the individual perspectives.

Keywords: film theory – the philosophy of film – film language – film semiotics

Introduction

This paper focuses on the philosophy of film and the difference between continental and analytic film theory in relation to the problem of film language. Our interest lies in defining what is film theory, how it is related to film philosophy, and how the question of whether the film can be approached like a language, is related into those two fields. The connection between film and language will be analysed from the perspective of Christian Metz who stands here for the continental tradition and Berys Gaut, whose point of view is connected to the analytic tradition. The final part of this paper will deal with the question, what makes the contrast between the perspectives of these two authors? To answer this question, we will derive from the Eco's (2005) understanding of the symbol, which expresses either a hidden or a conventional (socially established) content (Eco 1994; Švantner – Abrahamyan 2022).

I. Analytical vs. Continental Film Theory

Prado (2003) argues that difference between analytical and continental film theory can best be understood in methodology: authors writing within the framework of analytical philosophy mostly solve clearly defined philosophical problems by reducing them to individual parts and then analysing the relationships between them, whereas authors belonging to the sphere of continental philosophy rather focuses on broadly posed questions, which are solved in the form of synthesis (by analysing individual problems within larger units) (2003, 10). Although the term "analytic" relates to a method and "continental" to Europe, there are many theorists whose approach to film meets a combination of both (Eldridge 2019, 237). Nevertheless, authors of continental tradition generally tend to lean towards concepts and terms derived from structuralism while those of analytic tradition are more likely to be pluralists (Eldridge 2019, 237). The diversity within these two approaches reflects the contradiction between authors of analytic perspective who argue that film philosophy works as an "illustrative methodology", and authors of continental tradition who claim that film should be considered a "philosophical process" (Colman 2014, 3).

II. The Philosophy of Film and the Film Theory

The origins of film date back to March 1895, when the Lumiere brothers completed the first film camera called the Cinematographe and projected the film showing the employees of the Lumiere photographic factory (Balázs 1952; Kovarik 2016). The new invention has sparked the interest of the academic community to look at the film from a scientific point of view, and led to the first film study written by Hugo Münsterberg, who was a philosophy professor at Harvard University, and whose work *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (1916)*, which focused on the philosophical and psychological characterization of film as an art form, is considered to be the first classic of film theory (Smith – Wartenberg 2006, 1).

Since philosophy is a field that is unlike empirical research in the first place concerned with the "logic" or conceptual structures of the issues we deal with, then the philosophical understanding of film is oriented to analysing the conceptual structures related to the area of cinema (Carroll – Choi 2006, 1). Smuts defines the philosophy of film as "the discussion of philosophical problems related to film, its nature, effects, and value" (2009, 409). To understand the film philosophy better, we need to take a glance at film theory

because the former was determined by the latter by the fact that it served both as a generator of ideas and a material for criticism (Gaut 1997, 146).

According to Gaut, the philosophy of film consists of many different themes and perspectives that can be generally divided into three stages of discussion: 1) the nature of the film medium; the connection of film and reality; film depiction of time and space; imagination connected to film watching; the question of film language; the concept of authorship and film interpretation; 2) audience response to individual films and film genres; 3) in-depth interpretation of particular films (1997, 145 – 146).

All of these themes represented an object of interest for the film theory that is generally associated with two different time periods, according to which it is divided into classical and contemporary, the former dating back to the period before 1970s and the epoch characterized for the rise of semiotic and psychoanalytic theories of film (Branigan – Buckland 2013, 86). Initially, film theory mainly focused on the film's visual content – the image – which changed as the sound component entered the film in the period from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s (depending on the country) (Fischer 1999, 78). Film theory thus falls within the realm of research, which is not necessarily focused on specific films or techniques, but precisely on the „cinematic capabilities" (Andrew 1976, 4). Since one of the main interests of classical film theorists was to prove that film falls under the category of art and thus features an art form (Smith – Wartenberg 2006, 1), many authors (Eisenstein, Balazs, Pudovkin, and others) have argued that from the aesthetic point of view, the most remarkable aspect of the film medium lies in its ability to manipulate reality (Carroll 1988, 7).

There are many themes common to the authors[1] of the classical film theory. Carroll, claims that most of the works of classical film theorists are united by the effort to answer similar questions such as: a) What can be considered as the main feature of a film? b) Which aspects of a film may be defined as crucial in determining its value? c) How the various components of a film such as composition, editing or sound affect the final film product? (1988, 12 – 14).

Although the authors of the contemporary film theory, which emerged after the 1960, continued to address comparable questions as the thinkers before them, they approached film with a certain shift – as a system of social and symbolic meanings (Rushton – Bettinson 2010, 11). Classical film theory was replaced with an important trend called film semiotics. Theorists[2] have focused

[1] Such as Rudolf Arnheim, Sergei Eisenstein or André Bazin.
[2] Among the theorists of film semiotics can be mentioned authors such as Umberto Eco, Christian Metz, Gianfranco Bettetini, Pier Paolo Pasolini, Stephen Heath or Peter Wollen.

on the question of the structure of the film code and outlined the hypothesis that there are homologies between language and film (Nöth 1990, 463). Many authors of this approach agree that it is insufficient to analyse film by focusing on its "syntax", and emphasize the necessity of concentration on the level of the semiotics of the text, which is why the main areas of interest in film semiotics include both the "grammar of film" and the study of film sign and communication (Nöth 1990, 463).

Branigan – Buckland (2013, xxiii) divide theories related to the connection between film and language into four classes: a) semiotic theories (Sergei Eisenstein, Christian Metz, Umberto Eco), which deal with the visual language and address how meaning is created through the symbolic character of the image; b) theories of communication (Francesco Cassetti) that consider film as a medium of interaction between the authors and the audience; c) cognitive film theory which focuses on cognitive research and the unconscious sphere of the human-spectator; d) intersubjective approaches that focus on the cultural environment of a community and viewer's way to derive meaning in the film (David Bordwell, Robert Stam and many others).

III. Film language? Continental (Metz) vs. Analytical (Gaut) Philosophy of Film

In semiotics, the study of film as a language has been advocated through the idea that they function similarly: while languages such as English or French fall under the category of a "language system", film can only be thought of as a type of language (Monaco 2000, 157). In the essay from 1964 *Cinema: Language or Language System?* Metz was concerned with the question of relationship between film and language.[3] To answer it he used Saussure's distinction between *langue* (an abstract language system independent of its use by speakers) and *parole* (a concrete use of language, speech) (Saussure 1959). According to Metz, in the language of cinema, it is only a plot which is endowed with the literal meaning (1974, 172). He argues that the image is always a speech because in the film it relates to the individual (one and more) sentences in a spoken, not written form, while the sequence binds to the discourse (Metz 1991, 65 – 68). And since Metz considers cinema as a one-way communication process, which contains not much true signs[4] with the stable and conventional

[3] The English version is available in *Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinem* (Metz 1991).
[4] The sign is understood in terms of Saussure`s definition in *Course in General Lingustics* where the *"signified"* stands for a *concept* and the *"signifier"* for a *sound-image* (Saussure 1959, 67).

meanings, he emphasizes different core of the semiological function of signs (1991, 75): "an image is not the indication of something other than itself, but the pseudopresence of the thing it contains" (Metz 1991, 76). This claim is related to Metz`s view that connotation and denotation in the cinema are undifferentiated (1991, 82). The explanation for this argument builds upon a claim, that from a semiological perspective film is dissimilar to photography (Metz 1991, 82): In photography, our involvement can influence only the connotative aspect (for example through lighting or camera angle), since photography doesn`t have a technique to significate "house" from a view of denotation in other way than to "show a house". In contrast, the semiotics of denotation is something practicable and inevitable for the cinema: "it is the denotation itself that is constructed, organized and to some extent codified" (Metz 1974, 172).

This is why he claims that the cinema speaks in neologisms (Metz 1991, 69). Hence, the system of signs is working in the cinema only partially, which makes it different from a language system (Metz 1991, 75). Metz explains that it is because the cinema talks in sentences[5] that cannot be, unlike verbal language, divided into words. Also, as he considers a shot as the smallest unit of a film, we cannot make a reduction of it (Metz 1991, 88).

Gaut provides an analytical perspective on the matter of why the linguistic paradigm for understanding films should not be taken into consideration (1997, 151). Gaut explains that languages have a vocabulary with a finite number of lexical units that are arranged into statements through the syntax, while their relation to objects are based on convention. On this basis, an infinite number of sentences can be formed with the words combined via syntactic rules (Gaut 1997, 151). He argues that while the number of words in language are not infinite, there is no limit of the amount of the photographs that can be taken. The author finds the photographs to be the main components of almost all films and claims that their relation to the world is causal, not conventional (Gaut 1997, 151). Besides, he adds that there cannot be found any parallel of the photograph to the lexical unit or to the sentence, because the smallest unit of the photograph cannot be reached, and neither we can derive from it what nouns or adjectives it contains (the apple and its colour are presented together, not through the different parts of the photograph). With this said we even cannot link film shots with the grammar, because they do not match the words (Gaut 1997, 151). "And what would the photographic 'words' be that correspond

[5] Metz says that even a telephone sign doesn`t refer simply to its object, because its meaning is "telephone HERE" (1991, 88).

with 'is' and 'not'?" (Gaut 2010, 53). Gaut claims, that the sentences in film are understandable because words denote objects through the conventional relations between them. Therefore, one can understand even new sentences because he recognizes them with familiar words that are grammatically combined in a way, we are accustomed to (2010, 52, 54). According to Gaut, even pictures cannot be linked to language because of so called "natural generativity", which he explains as follows: to recognize a picture of an object, we undergo the cognitive process which is the same as we go through when recognizing the object itself (2010, 60).

IV. Conclusion

This paper focused on the key features of the film theory and the philosophy of film to show the distinction between the continental and analytic ways of thinking in the matter of film language and the question of its possibility. These two perspectives were analysed from the point of view of two authors – Christian Metz and Berys Gaut – who contributed to the legacy of film philosophy. According to what was said above, the difference between Metz and Gaut lies in their conception of how does meaning making work in film. The diversification of the authors` views can be expressed through Eco`s approach to the symbol which expresses either a hidden or a conventional (socially established) content. For Metz the speech of plot in film is symbolized through the images that indicate the pseudopresence of the thing it contains. These images are included inside a shot, which he considers as the smallest unit of a film. The content which a shot expresses through the sentences is hidden because of the absence of words and because its meaning is related to neologisms with its unique occurrence. In this way we can say that to understand film language in Metz's perspective is therefore a process of revealing the hidden parts of the symbol. On the other hand, Gaut's approach lies in the idea that the sentences in film are understandable because words denote objects through the conventional relations between them. A symbol (word) here thus expresses a conventional content.

The point is, that even though Metz and Gaut provide different perspectives on the idea of film as a language, their distinction lies in their understanding of a way a symbol indicates meaning.

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How to Solve a Gettier Case

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NEUMANN, S. J.: How to Solve a Gettier Case
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 11 – 15

True, justified belief cannot be seen as sufficient conditions for knowledge anymore since the Philosopher Edmund Gettier most famously gave two counterexamples to this definition of knowledge. In my opinion, however, Gettier neglected an important distinction. This distinction is highlighted in Lycan (2008, 26). It is the distinction between the semantic referent and the speaker referent. By using this distinction, I will argue that Gettier does not succeed in refuting the knowledge definition as his cases lack the belief condition.

Keywords: Gettier cases – epistemology – philosophy of language – speaker referent – semantic referent

Introduction

In this paper, I will show that Gettier does not refute the knowledge definition of knowledge being true justified belief as he has not considered the distinction between speaker and semantic referent, represented by Lycan in this paper. With help of this distinction, I will show that the Gettier cases simply lack the belief condition and since they do so, do not refute the knowledge definition of true justified belief being knowledge.

I will firstly introduce the original two Gettier cases. Secondly, I will introduce the distinction between speaker and semantic referent. Thirdly, I will show how this distinction leads to Gettier neglecting the belief condition for knowledge.

I. Gettier Cases

Gettier (1963) introduces two cases to show that true justified belief is not knowledge. I will introduce them in the following.

Case one is about the two job applicants Smith and Jones. Smith has asked the president of the company at which both men applied at who of the two

would get the job. The president has assured Smith that it will be Jones. Moreover, Smith has counted the coins in Jones pocket and counted ten coins in Jones` pocket. Smith does not know anything about the number of coins in his pocket. Smith has strong evidence for the conjunctive proposition:

d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Based on proposition d) Smith also beliefs the following proposition:

e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

If Smith sees the entailment from proposition d) to e), he is justified to belief e). Of course, he also beliefs e) to be true and e) is also true. The person who will get the job has ten coins in their pocket. Yet, to Smith`s surprise, it is not Jones who gets the job, but him, Smith. Unknown to Smith himself, Smith had ten coins in his pocket. Thus, proposition e) remains true and Smith still has a justified belief about the identity of the successful applicant. Even though all conditions for knowledge hold, intuitively, we tend to deny that Smith had knowledge in this case.

In the second case, Smith has strong evidence for the proposition:

f) Jones owns a Ford.

Smith also has a friend called Brown. He does not know the current whereabouts of Brown, but forms the following three propositions nevertheless:

g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.

h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.

i) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by proposition f). If Smith realizes the entailment from f) and accepts g), h) and i) based on f), Smith has correctly inferred from a proposition he has strong evidence for. Thus, he is justified in believing all of the three propositions g), h) and i). Yet, as a matter of fact, Brown is in Barcelona and Jones currently does not own a Ford. In this case, according to Gettier, Smith does not know that proposition h) is true, but proposition h) is true and Smith has a justified belief about h) (1963, 123).

Both of Gettier`s cases show us that true, justified belief are not sufficient conditions for knowledge as we would not claim that Smith has knowledge in either of the cases. Yet, in my opinion, Gettier fails in refuting the knowledge definition. What is important is not the mere belief but also what the belief one has refers to. If the belief one has does not refer to the entity which makes the sentence itself true, we are devoid of a belief which corresponds to the situation. If we do not have a corresponding belief, we do not have knowledge as

knowledge cannot be knowledge without belief. In order to show that we are devoid of a belief in the Gettier cases, I will introduce the distinction between speaker and semantic referent in the following.

II. Speaker and Semantic Referent

Let me introduce you to the distinction of semantic and speaker referent in order to explain why I came to the conclusion that Gettier fails to refute the knowledge definition. According to Lycan, a semantic referent is whatever object (if any) in fact uniquely satisfies the given description (2008, 23). A speaker referent is the object (if any) to which the speaker who used the description intended to call the attention of their audience. A speaker referent is the object that the utterer means to be talking about[1] (Lycan 2008, 25).

Let us consider the following example in order to understand the given distinctions better before we apply them to the two Gettier cases. Let us say I am at a shopping mall and tell my brother that the man who is holding the telephone is a famous comedian. The person I am referring to is indeed a famous comedian, but he is actually just holding his ear making it look like there was a telephone in his hand for some reason (maybe, his ear hurts due to an ear infection). Next to him is a man who holds a telephone in his hand. If a semantic referent is whatever in fact uniquely satisfies the given description, the semantic referent is not the person I am referring to (the famous comedian) as he is not holding a phone, but the person standing next to him who is holding the phone. The person I wanted to draw the attention to, however, is the famous comedian who is making it look like he is holding a phone by holding his ear. In this case, the famous person is the speaker referent but not the semantic referent.

While I have beliefs about the speaker referent, like "He is a famous comedian", "He is holding a phone" and maybe also, "I want to tell my brother about him", I do not have beliefs about the semantic referent. At least not by having the proposition: "The man who is holding the phone is a famous comedian" while referring to a famous comedian who is not actually holding a phone, I am devoid of a belief about the person who is holding a phone. If I do not have a belief about the person holding a phone in his hand, I also do not know anything about him. Knowledge cannot be knowledge without belief. This is the reasoning I also want to apply to the Gettier cases.

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[1] Lycan also mentions the so-called actual referent (2008, 26). Due to the length of this paper, I will leave this kind of referent aside. Especially, because Lycan also mentions that the actual referent might be the same as the semantic referent.

III. The Belief Condition

In the following, I will show that the distinction between speaker and semantic referent shows that Smith does not have a relevant belief in either of the two Gettier cases.

In case one, Smith is lacking the relevant belief for proposition e). Smith`s speaker referent is Jones. Jones, however, does not make proposition e) true as Jones is not the person who gets the job. Jones merely has ten coins in his pocket. Moreover, Smith does not have any relevant belief about the semantic referent. The semantic referent is Smith himself as he is picked out by the description "The man who gets the job" and "has ten coins in his pocket". Yet Smith does not have any belief about him getting the job or him having ten coins in his pocket. Therefore, I claim that Smith is devoid of the relevant belief for proposition e). Smith has a justified belief about his speaker referent, but not the one relevant for the truth of proposition e) as this would be having a belief about the semantic referent. If there is no belief present, there cannot be any knowledge and knowledge can remain true justified belief under the first Gettier case.

The second Gettier case can be treated similarly to the first Gettier case. In the case of Smith forming a belief about Jones and Brown, we again have a divide between speaker and semantic referent. The speaker referent of Smith is the Ford owning Jones and the not in Barcelona (Brest-Litovsk, Boston) located Brown as Smith does not believe that Brown is in any of those cities but randomly selects them. However, the semantic referents in these sentences are the non-Ford-owning Jones and the in these cities located Brown. So again, Smith does not form a relevant belief. The belief he forms is false. The belief he would have formed had he referred to the semantic referent is true. Thus, Smith's belief is either false and thus not knowledge or Smith's belief would be true if he had had it but he did not. Therefore, the second Gettier case also does not refute the knowledge definition as it does not fulfill the belief condition.

IV. Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown that with the use of the distinction between speaker and semantic referent, the original Gettier cases do not refute the definition of true justified belief being knowledge. In both cases, this would only apply if Smith were to refer to the semantic referent, but he does not and thus lacks the belief condition.

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PART II: CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

The Difference within the New: νέος and καινός

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HODEC, MARKUS E.: The Difference within the New: νέος and καινός YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 16 – 24

The first step towards a philosophy that deals with the phenomenon of the new in a specific way is to work out the contents of the ancient Greek words νέος and καινός. The parallels as well as the differences between νέος and καινός provide an initial overview of how to address the new. Building on this, the article gives a brief overview of the philosophical work on the phenomenon of the new. In the context of the conference in question, phenomenological aspects in particular are discussed. In their association, phenomenology and dialectics develop a comprehensive philosopheme for dealing with the new, which is referred to in a few examples in the present article. The comprehensive philosophical treatment of the phenomenon of the new is called kainology.

Keywords: the new – νέος – καινός – kainology – phenomenology

Introduction

This lecture is based on my dissertation thesis "The Phenomenon of the New. An Essay on the Meta-Problem of Philosophy."[1] The investigation, which is metaphilosophical in its questioning, tries to clarify how in the so-called "workshops of the new" attempts are made to think something new in decisive stages and finally to think in a new way. A central result of the development of thinking is obvious from the beginning: working on the phenomenon of the new does not consist in defining it definitively, but in showing that it is necessary to constantly rethink it, whereby the way of thinking itself changes, indeed must change in order to correspond to its

[1] The revised dissertation will be published (in German language) in 2024: (Hodec, 2024).

content. In this sense, a phenomenology of the new can only ever be an attempt, and always only one attempt. The elusive characteristics of the new are what makes it accessible as an outstanding phenomenon. The new is new in experience. Any access to aspects of the new lets it age and fade away, because the new is only as experienced phenomenon.

The aim of this short presentation of a phenomenology of the new is to give a few insights and to present possibilities of how this phenomenon sui generis can be treated at all. The new is an extremely fragile thing that eludes when approached and evaporates when touched. The new is even reversed into the old when it is held on and loses all its phenomenality. And yet it is this holding on that is usually the way to approach the new in the academic discourse. It is measured, trimmed, made comparable – a circumstance that Edmund Husserl already pointed out in the Crisis-Book. What is important is that the new can only show itself as a phenomenon.

I. νέος – καινός

Before doing any practical work on the phenomenon, it is important to give a brief introduction to the concept of the new as it is used here. Because the new does not emerge clearly as a philosophical concept.

The ancient Greek neos (νέος) means a temporal new in the sense of the new, young, fresh. In addition, the ancient Greek language has a second word for the new, namely kainos (καινός). Kainos differs from neos in aspects that are highly relevant for a phenomenology of the new. Neos puts his emphasis on the young, youthful, also youthful outrageous or bad and means by that people and living beings in general. It is what has not been existing for long. It does not stand in contrast to the old in terms of content, but can be of the same kind. Old and new form a continuity. Neos means a temporal category.

Kainos, on the other hand, speaks of the new as newly invented and unprecedented as well as unexpected. Kainos is brought forth, as an act, or brings forth, as an act. It renews as it is the first time it has been seen or used. The kainos-new has not yet been there and is unusual and strange. Basically, it can be said that kainos relates to things, states or occurrences that – although they may be young in terms of their age – are not new in the temporal sense, i. e. less old, but have never been here before. It is what did not exist before. It is in contrast to the old in terms of content and has a different nature, it does not only replace the old in terms of time. Old and new do not form a continuity. Kainos means a qualitative category.

This difference is particularly evident in those sources that use both words side by side. The most evident example is found in the Platonic Apology of Socrates: "It says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts the youth [neos]; and who does not believe in the gods of the state, but has other new [kainos] divinities of his own" (Plato Ap. 24b-c).[2] Youth appears in the original Greek as neos, while the other and new gods, the daimonic, is described as kainos. In Aeschylus, too, both words are found side by side and differ in their meaning: "[B]ut I care less than nothing for Zeus. Let him do just as he likes; let him be king for his short time: he won't be king of the gods for long. But look, here comes the footman of Zeus, that fetch-and-carry messenger of the new king. Certainly he has come here with news for us" (Aeschylus 2013, 152). In Prometheus Bound, the neos of the young god Zeus is accompanied by the evaluation of the young and therefor unworthy. A father of the gods as young as Zeus could not remain in this position for long. The kainos, however, is what we do not know yet; it is the news that are to arrive. We will not know what it is until the messenger arrives. Also, another passage from Plato's Phaedo should be quoted. There is no mention of neos, but when Socrates wishes the same to happen, kainos is being denied: "Well, Socrates, do you wish to leave any directions with us about your children or anything else – anything we can do to serve you? | What I always say, Crito, he replied, nothing new" (Plato Phd. 115b).

The new that is relevant to this lecture, the kainos-new, forms the center of consideration. It traverses a long path in European intellectual history. To prevent incompleteness, brief reference is made to two epoch-making topics. First, to the emergence of the Christian religion with a second, i. e. a New Testament, and further to the discovery of the new as a philosophical subject since the Renaissance.

II. New Testament and Renaissance

Christianity exhibits a profound need for an idea of the new. Moreover, this new thing should not only be new, but always be a good thing. The old, feared and paternal laws of Judaism are to be left behind, to let the Son rise to power, to exchange the fear of the law for the love for the incarnate young God, to establish a New Testament. The word "new" is of course also used in the Old Testament. At the literal beginning of history, in Genesis, God creates something new – but it had to be proven afterwards if the new was also good.

[2] All quotes of Plato refer to: (Plato - Jowett, 1931).

"And God said, "Let there be light," and there was light. And God saw that the light was good" (Gen. 1:3).[3] Obviously, this was not immediately obvious – it required a testing of the new. In the New Testament, however, the examination is no longer carried out. The good is already included in the new. For example, in Ephesians: "to put off your old self, which belongs to your former manner of life and is corrupt through deceitful desires, and to be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and to put on the new self, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness" (Eph. 4:22 – 24). Or elsewhere in Paul: "Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold, the new has come" (2Cor. 5:17). Christianity thus claims that the old has been discarded and the Son, the young, is brought to power. Hence, a classic example of the temporal continuity of the neos-new. On the other hand, however, Christianity has worked on something new in the specific meaning of kainos: namely on the so-called eschatology. Significantly, this kainos-new was taken and further processed from the prophecy of the Old Testament. What is new about kainos in all Abrahamic religions is the end of time, the apocalypse. Generally speaking, everything that is new in terms of quality and type is pushed to the end of history. In the Revelation of John, for example, Jesus says succinctly: "And he who was seated on the throne said, "Behold, I am making all things new"" (Rev. 21:5). Since then, in theology (and not only there), these last things that are supposed to appear have been intensively investigated.

It was not until over a thousand years later that the new, i. e. the neos-new and the kainos-new, descends to present earth. Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa prepare the way for the new, before it is finally raised to the status of a philosophical topos by the scientific efforts of Copernicus, Kepler, Galilei and many others. The word "new" is mentioned even in the titles of the works. Cutting lenses reached out to be one mediator of the new in both very small and very large objects. And in art, Dürer demands that the work of art has to pour out something new.[4] The new as such becomes desirable, regardless of law, custom or sheer possibility. From the point of view of the history of philosophy and science, the new remained a little criticized phenomenon at least up to the 19th century. Only with Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche did a serious critique of the new begin.

[3] Quotes of the Bible refer to the ESV: (*English Standard Version Bible*, 2016).
[4] „Dann ein guter Maler ist inwendig voller Figur, und obs möglich wär, dass er ewiglich lebte, so hätt er aus den inneren Ideen, davon Plato schreibt, allweg etwas Neues durch die Werk auszugiessen" (Dürer 1920, 308).

Criticism sets in just in the century in which the new, that is to say the kainos-new, was radicalized. Charles Baudelaire innovates by giving the ugly a place in aesthetics. The young Hegelians, above all the diverging extremes Karl Marx and Søren Kierkegaard, renew Hegelian philosophy with the intention of overcoming philosophy as a whole. And the ways in which things work in fully developing industrial societies are only partially decrypted yet in their socially rejuvenating effect. As an epoch of the new, knowing and wanting to be new, it is the modern age that determines the form and content of thinking about the new. Modernity is also – what is rarely noticed – the epoch of Edmund Husserl and phenomenology.

III. The New within Phenomenology

Husserl's innumerable claim, expressed across different creative phases, was to bring something new into philosophy. He was concerned with the insight of giving consciousness itself an own absolute essence, which "is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion" (Husserl 1982, 65). There he tried to stake out the field of a new science, of phenomenology. This is interesting for a phenomenology of the new, because the very new, which is generally measured in the history of science by the consequence of genius, creativity and innovation, is shifted into a consciousness-related and transcendental area. For his new project, Husserl borrows from the formerly new philosophy of early modern rationalism, above all from Descartes. Descartes not only provides the concept of the "phenomenon," but also a self-experiment of the epoché. "Thus, in truth, there begins with Descartes a completely new manner of philosophizing which seeks its ultimate foundation in the subjective" (Husserl 1970, 81). But Husserl, as it is well known, does not hold back with his criticism. More precisely, Descartes is attested a total failure when Husserl claims that "everything new in what Descartes actually brought to light was in a certain sense superficial, in spite of its originality and widespread effects. In addition, it loses its value by Descartes's own interpretation of it" (Husserl 1970, 79). What was new at that time was the total reaching out into the world that had not existed before: "What is new, unprecedented, is the conceiving of this idea of a rational infinite totality of being with a rational science systematically mastering it" (Husserl 1970, 22). But, as paradoxical as it may sound, the totality of Cartesian rationalism does not go far enough for Husserl. He is not so much interested in what is outrageously new in modern science, but in what is kainos-new, which he quite obviously does not find in an adequate position of attention in modern science. If something

conspicuously new happens, according to Husserl, "we nevertheless immediately ask why and look around us into the spatiotemporal circumstances" (Husserl 1970, 31). The contemporary scientific process is retroactively eliminating the kainos-new.

Husserl wants a new beginning of philosophy as a strict science. This wanting of the new can hardly be overestimated for a phenomenology of the new. A new philosophy in form and content is called for when he writes:

> Thus world-enigmas now enter the stage, of a sort previously never imagined, and they bring about a completely new manner of philosophizing, the "epistemological" philosophy, that of the "theory of reason." Soon they also give rise to systematic philosophies with completely novel goals and methods (Husserl 1970, 68).

For Heidegger, on the other hand, the new always remains a neos-new. For him, new means young, not proven, irreverent towards the ancestors. He sees in the new – and this criticism must be taken very seriously – primarily a confused and immodest desire to delight in a cultural establishment "that clamors daily for a fresh supply of latest novelties, and daily chases after excitement" (Heidegger 1968, 159). The kainos-new, the revaluing and, because it is still unknown, the so far value-free, has no place in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The human desire that stimulates the new, curiosity, is fundamentally rejected: "When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty" (Heidegger 1962, 216).

IV. The New as a Phenomenon

Inadvertently, Heidegger's oscillation between conservatism and reactionary verve turns into an accurate reference to a phenomenology of the new, to a *kainology*.[5] The leap that Heidegger disdainfully locates in the area of misunderstanding is an essential necessity for the program of kainology. It is not just about understanding, or as Heidegger puts it, "to come into a Being towards." Rather, it is about the act of the kainos-new, the essential determination, neither to be ontologized nor to be tamed into manageability in terms of time and existence. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger places the weight of the new in the neos-new. Conversely, this means devaluing, negating and

[5] After what has been analyzed so far, we can shorten "phenomenology of the new" to "kainology."

defaming everything that is new in the sense of kainos due to its mostly young age and its provocation towards the existing. That is probably Heidegger's great misunderstanding of his interpretation of Nietzsche: Heidegger only understood Zarathustra's leaping on one leg and therefore only one-dimensionally. The phenomenon of the new can only be explored in the full scope of the two-legged leap in terms of consciousness and transcendentality. It demands contingency. This contingency of the act is Nietzsche's leap, which Heidegger missed, Husserl anticipated and that finally found its way via detours into Adorno's philosophy. Husserl's premonition is shown explicitly in the formulation of his project in the Crisis:

> Together with the new task and its universal apodictic ground, the *practical* possibility of a new philosophy will prove itself: through its execution. But it will also become apparent that all the philosophy of the past, though unbeknown to itself, was inwardly oriented toward this new sense of philosophy (Husserl 1970, 18).

Action is the practical possibility of a new philosophy, and in this sense, it was always geared towards practice. This not only renews philosophy, but the new comes into consciousness as a thing and thus becomes philosophically treatable. In addition, it points to the fact that is essential for kainology: the new, no matter how often it is mentioned throughout the history of philosophy, hardly comes into focus. The new usually remains an appendix, be it in ancient Greece, in the Italian metropolises at the dawning of modernity, or in the production of goods since industrialism. It is used to make something heavier and lovelier (for the better or for the worse), or simply to dress it up sibylically.

The new that phenomenology has brought into philosophy is an important component, but only really effective if it is met with a sociohistorical corrective. As this corrective, Adorno's interpretation of the Hegelian dialectics, as negative dialectics, proves effective and helpful. Besides, Adorno unites both a profound knowledge of inner-phenomenological differences, as well as a kainological understanding of Nietzsche's contingent leap. Husserl provides the medium and Adorno the possibility of extracting content. The reciprocal reference of a transcendental phenomenology in all its act-focussing together with Hegel's dialectics, bent by Adorno, are the pivotal points of kainology. A kainology that stands apart from historiographical collections of materialized inventions, hymns to the genius or moralizing mock debates of ethics councils in self-proclaimed

"innovative" companies, which always end in the increase of productivity. Kainology means experimenting with dialectical phenomenology in order to revalue the new. Above all, Adorno's negative dialectics add two core pieces to the kainological turn to the new. On the one hand, its turning away from the principle of the excluded middle. In other words, turning away from the demand for totality that formally and logically excludes everything that is different and that pushes any differences into contradiction to the status quo. But exactly those areas are targeted by kainology. And secondly, it is about the dynamization of the subject-object-relation, which can only be briefly mentioned here because of their great depths in terms of philosophy of consciousness and epistemology. But even where this relation comes to sight flat and clumsy, the dead ends of the idealistic subject as well as of the positivistic object are obvious: this leads to a rigid historiography of the neos-new, the other to a romanticism that is always threatened by ideological interference.

How does the new become a phenomenon for us as humans? Kainology takes Husserl's references to the first-person-perspective and the shift of focus from facts to essence and brings them into interaction with Adorno's dialectically included middle and its entanglement of subject and object. This interaction is the act of kainology. And it is the approach that leaves the new in its act-character unadulterated and therefor makes it researchable. Following this procedure, the new in the strict sense can only appear as a phenomenon.

The new is the essentially other that I perceive, which does not match with the existing and known, and thus brings into motion both my ego and the thing itself.

If we encounter a kainos-new and if we manage to align our will to endure its otherness, only then do we have the chance to speak about the phenomenon of the new. Because without the phenomenality of its act, the new will remain hidden.

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Tvorivý rozmer úzkosti a responzivity

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KALNICKÝ, M.: Creative Trait of Anxiety and Responsivity
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 25 – 34

The article focuses on tracing a creative dimension that can be found present in varions interpretations of anxiety as well as in responsive phenomenology of Bernhard Waldenfels. They share numerous characteristic elements and both offer a resolution of the pathic state through the act of a creative response. The differences can be found in what we respond to and why. This can represent an alternative way of looking at Waldenfels' *pathos – response* schema by pointing out their shared essential principles.

Keywords: anxiety – pathos – responsivity – creativity – alien – existentialism – psychology

Téma úzkosti neraz zahŕňa fenomén cudzieho. Ten je podľa Bernharda Waldenfelsa úzko prepojený s responzivitou – schopnosťou či neschopnosťou adekvátne reagovať na cudzie nároky, ktorá sa priamo premieta do ontológie subjektu. Waldenfelsova responzívna fenomenológia, ktorá má svoj vlastný terminologický aparát, je predovšetkým syntézou niekoľkých fenomenologických prístupov[1] a psychoanalýzy, a preto je pre jej širšie a efektívnejšie využitie vhodné zamerať sa na jej kľúčové pojmy a poukázaním na ich presahy s príbuznými fenoménmi sa ju pokúsiť sprehľadniť či obohatiť. Jedným z takýchto fenoménov je úzkosť, ktorá predstavuje etablovaný pojem vo filozofii, zároveň je však tento fenomén typický svojím komplexným a ťažko prístupným charakterom, ktorému chýba ustálená definícia a vie naďalej byť inšpiratívnym predmetom fenomenologickej analýzy.

[1] Výrazný vplyv na Waldenfelsov responzívny koncept mala predovšetkým francúzska fenomenológia (najmä Emmanuel Levinas a Maurice Merleau-Ponty), ale aj Martin Heidegger. Viac k východiskám tohto konceptu napr. (Waldenfels 1998).

Najprv si v krátkosti pripomeňme základnú schému Waldenfelsovej responzívnej fenomenológie, vystavanej okolo radikalizovanej formy inakosti, ktorou je cudzie – neuchopiteľný hyperfenomén rodiaci sa v našej skúsenosti, paralyzujúci našu intencionalitu tým, že prichádza s nárokom na našu odpoveď. Cudzie prichádza z ne-miesta (*Nicht-Ort, non-place*) a prekračuje hranice usporiadania subjektu. Je to ten známy prah, ktorý spája tým, že oddeľuje. Tu je možné badať paradox skúsenosti cudzieho, o ktorom sa Husserl v *Karteziánskych meditáciách* zmieňuje – teda náhla prístupnosť toho, čo je pôvodne neprístupné (Husserl 1993, 110). Princíp odpovedania Waldenfels ilustruje schémou *pátos – étos*.[2] Pojmom *pátos* je označený trpný stav ochromeného subjektu, ktorý sa jedine cez odpoveď môže zregenerovať, a tá je tu v levinasovskom zmysle etická, keďže ide o nutné vyhovenie nároku cudzieho. Etický rozmer responzivity však môžeme vzhľadom na tému tohto textu obmedziť v prospech zamerania sa na patické štádium skúsenosti cudzieho. Waldenfels tiež upozorňuje, že nie je správne vnímať *pátos* ako podružný fenonmén, ktorý vstupuje do hry ako tretí činiteľ, nemôžeme ho mať tak, ako by sme mali emóciu. Je to skôr tak, že sme pátosu odovzdaní. Nie je to len jedna zo súčastí skúsenosti ako takej, ale predstavuje jej esenciálne jadro. Poukazuje tiež na rozdiel medzi patickým a patetickým (Waldenfels 2014, 260). Prvé je spontánnou reakciou vylučujúcou zámernosť, druhé je uvedomelé narábanie s trpnou modalitou. Príkladom tu môže byť plač či smiech, vo svojej patickej podobe sa vyskytujú pri spontánnych, neovládaných a často eruptívnych reakciách, v patetickej ide o účelové vytvorenie (alebo aspoň akcentovanie) predmetnej expresivity.

Prečo a ako však v tejto súvislosti hovoriť o úzkosti? Prvý dôvod je ten, že má vo filozofii bohatú históriu a stále aktuálnu relevanciu (úžas a úzkosť sú dve príbuzné patické modality, ktoré boli v antickom období v rôznych kontextoch často tematizované, až po éru filozofickej hypermodernity, charakteristickej ambivalenciou slobody a excesom úzkosti). Dlhá tradícia tejto témy potom súvisí aj s rôznorodosťou výkladu, je teda vhodné ju pred jej aplikovaním špecifikovať. Je to vhodné aj preto, že sa často vyskytuje v iných spoločenských vedách, najmä v psychológii a v neposlednom rade ju môžeme nájsť v mimovedeckom prostredí masmédií a na úrovni všednej komunikácie. Ďalším dôvodom je, že sa pri väčšine jej popisov výrazne prekrýva s Waldenfelsovou responzívnou schémou, špecificky jej *pátosom.* Ako bolo vyššie spomenuté, odhaľovanie prekryvov vie rozšíriť a zefektívniť metodológiu a poukázať tak na nové

[2] K princípom responzívnej fenomenológie napr. (Waldenfels 1998), (Waldenfels 2013) alebo (Waldenfels 2018).

potenciálne aplikácie. Tretím dôvodom je fakt, že úzkosť, podobne ako responzivita, zahŕňa kreatívnu dimenziu – tá tvorí podstatnú časť ich fenomenologického uchopenia.

Úzkosť je charakteristický tematický motív pre existencializmus a v takmer rovnakej miere pre psychoanalýzu. S fenomenológiou zdieľa existencializmus zameranie sa na individuálnu skúsenosť jednotlivca a generovanie významov z nej. Freudova psychoanalýza zase tvorí väčší inšpiračný zdroj responzívnej fenomenológie, ako by sa mohlo spočiatku zdať. Ako teda uchopiť fenomén, ktorý je tak diverzifikovaný, zjednodušovaný i nadužívaný, zároveň vo svojej podstate veľmi komplexný a ťažko prístupný? Jednou z možností je začať poukázaním na rozdiel medzi strachom a úzkosťou. Ambíciou však nie je poskytnúť historický prierez pojmom úzkosti, iba poukázať na niektoré body, ktoré sú relevantné pre ich jeho začlenenie do uvažovania o responzivite v rámci responzívnej fenomenológie.

Môžeme povedať, že existujú dve myšlienkové tradície, v ktorých je vzťah strachu a úzkosti kľúčový. Dá sa o nich uvažovať ako o existencialistickej a psychologickej. Prvá narába s úzkosťou ako fenoménom výrazne charakterizujúcim človeka. Uveďme tu troch najvýraznejších predstaviteľov: Kierkegaarda, Heideggera a Sartra. Kierkegaard vnímal úzkosť ako súhru „úniku od" a „priťahovania k" ničote a akcentoval jej ontologicky významnú úlohu v sebaidentifikácii. Človek nachádza vnútorný mier až po nastolení vyrovnaného vzťahu k externej dominujúcej sile, ak pochopí vlastné nevyhnutné ukotvenie v nej. Pre Heideggera je úzkosť základnou existenciálnou modalitou, otvárajúcou prístup k autenticite cez bytie k smrti, ťažoby skúsenosti odhaľovania *Dasein*[3]. Pre Sartra úzkosť otvára pojem absolútnej slobody[4], ktorý je pre človeka esenciálny. Každý z nich však definuje strach ako niečo, čo prichádza z vonkajšieho sveta, zatiaľ čo úzkosť sa týka vzťahu k nám samým v situácii ohrozenia. Zjednodušene povedané – primárna je tu úzkosť – preciťovanie neurčitosti či skôr bytostnej nemožnosti určiteľnosti. Strach je však vždy z niečoho určitého a prichádza popri už existujúcej platforme permanentnej, človeka charakterizujúcej neistoty – úzkosti.

Ako druhú myšlienkovú líniu môžeme vnímať tú, ktorá operuje s opačným princípom, kde je primárny práve strach, nie úzkosť. Tá sa tu môže, ale nemusí vyskytnúť a je chápaná ako nesúlad medzi organizmom a jeho osvetím, akýsi šok z toho, že subjekt nevie adekvátne reagovať na externé výzvy a vychádza z

[3] Viac k úzkosti a *Dasein* v (Heidegger 1967, 180)
[4] Sartre akcentoval a ďalej rozvíjal Kierkegaardovu myšlienku prepojenia osobnej slobody a úzkosti. Napr. (Kierkegaard 1980, 61)

predchádzajúcej opakovanej skúsenosti strachu, ktorý je konkrétny. Pre tento smer, ktorý sme označili ako psychologický, je strach automatickou emóciou ovplyvňujúcou vedomie smerom k bezpečnosti a úzkosť – reakcia na predchádzajúci strach – modeluje možnosť budúceho nebezpečenstva. Fenomenológ Stefano Micali, venujúci sa fenomenológii úzkosti v tejto súvislosti poukazuje na Kurta Goldsteina, ktorý reprezentuje akúsi fúziu týchto dvoch prístupov. S existencialistami zdiela perspektívu, v ktorej je na skúsenostnej úrovni úzkosť spúšťaná uvedomovaním si vzťahu seba smerom k ničote, a zároveň nesúhlasí s tým, že by úzkosť nepotrebovala konkrétny dôvod. To Goldstein označoval ako nadbytočný mysticizmus, neraz prítomnú v dielach existencialistických autorov. Pôvod úzkosti je jednoducho v špecifickej nezhode medzi subjektom a jeho životným svetom (Micali 2022, 6).

Podobný princíp je badateľný pri Waldenfelsovom koncepte *pátosu*. Skúsenosť cudzieho je, prinajmenšom v latentnej podobe, súčasťou každej skúsenosti ako takej, zároveň je elementom sebaidentifikácie (tým, kým sme sa stávame v procese odpovedania). Na druhej strane však jednoznačne potrebujeme rozpoznateľný dôvod začínajúci v podobe zmyslového vnemu, asociácie, spomienky či sna, aby hyperfenomén cudzieho v našej skúsenosti vôbec vznikol. Goldstein tiež hovorí o úzkosti ako o niečom, čo prichádza z nemiesta a zasahuje nás od chrbta (Goldstein 1995, 230), keďže ho nečakáme a ani ho nevieme uchopiť, čo je v podstate totožné s Waldenfelsovou definíciou cudzieho ako hyperfenoménu[5]. Ten „neznamená len, že to, čo sa ukazuje ako to či ono, .. je vždy čosi viac a čosi iné, ako to, čo sa ukazuje. Je to skôr ono ‚sa', .. ktoré sa nevyčerpáva v tom, ‚čo' sa ukazuje" (Waldenfels 1998, 259).

Vo filozofickom diskurze sa obvykle predpokladá, že strach je mierený na konkrétne a prítomné ohrozenie, jasne ohraničiteľné v aktuálnom horizonte skúsenosti. Úzkosť naopak nemá žiaden objekt a prichádza bez konkrétnej príčiny a je vztiahnutá k nepopísateľnej ničote. Typickou je pre ňu tiež prepletenosť fantázie a očakávania – v podstate ide o simulakrum, ktoré pri silných formách úzkosti už realitu, ktorú by simulovalo a deformovalo, ani nepotrebuje. Podľa Lacana je úzkosť predovšetkým vnímaním túžby druhého (Lacan 2014, 16). Túžba je tu vždy s úzkosťou prepletená. Úzkosť je priamo súvisiaca s faktom, že nevieme, akým objektom pre túžbu druhého sme. Je to idea vo svojej podstate totožná s Waldenfelsovou, kde nepoznateľnosť tejto túžby má

[5] Špecifikám hyperfenomenality venoval Waldenfels knihu *Hyperphänomene. Modi hyperbolischer Erfahrung* (Waldenfels 2012).

rovnakú funkciu ako nesplniteľný nárok cudzieho, čo vyvoláva destabilizáciu, zbavuje nás pôvodnej predstavy o nás samých, na ktorú sme boli napojení.

Medzi črty spoločné pre úzkosť aj responzivitu by sme mohli zaradiť autopoietickosť, keďže obe produkujú a reprodukujú vlastné elementy a ich vzťahy, čím prispievajú automatizácii zvýznamňovania. To sa deje aj na telesnej úrovni – jej telesná manifestácia úzkosti generuje ďalší stres a zhoršuje úzkostné stavy. Ďalšou spoločnou črtou je špecifická časovosť vo forme priebežného odsunu konca, ilúzie večnosti cez predurčenú a nevyhnutnú nemennosť, stálosť. V tejto charakteristickej časovosti sú v minulosť a budúcnosť neoddeliteľne premiešané v aktuálnosti traumy. Zjednodušene povedané, Freud vnímal úzkosť predovšetkým ako traumu z invazívnej minulosti, Sartre ako exces slobody v podobe možností smerom k budúcnosti. Zdá sa, že je tu spoločná a rozhodujúca rola produktívnej imaginácie, ktorá vytvára scenár, kedy sa to najhoršie, čo sa môže stať, určite stane a už teraz sa k tomu schyľuje. Pre traumu je teda typické stieranie rozdielov medzi imagináciou, anticipáciou a ich arbitrárny až chaotický vzťah. Micali hovorí, že úzkosť je komplexný viacvektorový fenomén, je reflexom a zároveň odpoveďou na možnosť, alebo nemožnosť. V úzkosti je však vždy obsiahnutý presvedčivý pocit neodvratnosti blížiacej sa karastrofy, ktorý sa však vyhýba racionálnemu zdôvodňovaniu na základe skúsenosti (Micali 2022, 179). Práve toto zdôvodnenie by stelesňovalo nástroj stabilizácie subjektu, premieňalo by neznáme na známe, cudzie na vlastné. Takáto opora v konkrétnosti by taktiež nutne rušila hyperfenomenalitu cudzieho, ktorá má v definícii svoju neuchopiteľnosť. Priradením zmyslu by sme sa dostali do súradníc fenomenológie s tradičným chápaním intencionality, kde je fenomén vnímaný „ako niečo“. Situácie, v ktorých je rozhodované za nás, ktoré sú formované očakávaniami a rozhodnutiami iných, sú ontologicky významné – rozhodujú o vzťahu subjektu k vlastnému bytiu. Podporujú tendenciu k pasivite – pre úzkosť aj predresponzívny *pátos* je charakteristická absencia počiatočného impulzu k činu. Ontologickú súvislosť môžeme vidieť aj v asymetrickej situácii v responzivite – subjekt sa snaží z patického stavu zregenerovať cez odpoveď, stáva sa však respondentom, ktorý nikdy nie je totožný s pôvodným subjektom. Úzkosť sa rodí z tenzie medzi našou túžbou pohnúť sa ďalej a nemožnosťou realizovať vlastné impulzy k tomuto pohnutiu. Sme v nej vrhnutí naspäť k sebe. Oscilujeme medzi čistou polohou vnímania existencie cudzieho a čistým utrpením, s ktorým sme stotožnení, lebo nás prestupuje. Nemáme pocit, ale pocit má nás.

Waldenfels sa úzkosti venuje iba okrajovo. Tvrdí, že vzniká, ak patické štádium neprechádza do responzívneho, ale kvôli absencii odpovede do

patologického[6] (Waldenfels 2015, 110). *Pátos* a odpoveď teda nielen predstavujú rozdielne štádiá responzivity, ale môžu byť za istých okolností od seba aj úplne oddelené. Okrem spomínaného prípadu, kedy *pátos* zostáva bez odozvy a trauma z nemožnosti odpovede sa zintenzívňuje, môže nastať opačná situácia, a to odpoveď bez *pátosu*. Príkladom tu môže byť *klišé* – stereotyp, ktorý je odpoveďou na neexistujúci impulz a reprodukuje sa sám zo seba.

Ak sa však pozrieme na responzívnu štruktúru bližšie, u Waldenfelsa hranica medzi strachom a úzkosťou stráca svoju ostrú kontúru, ale nezaniká, predstavuje dve strany rovnakého fenoménu. Ak strach reprezentuje pasívum (znehybňujúci efekt *pátosu*, v ktorom sa stávame pacientmi), úzkosť potom reprezentuje aktívum (snahu zregenerovať sa cez nevyhnutnosť odpovede, ktorú zatiaľ nemáme). Môžeme tu uviesť známy Sartrov príklad s útesom. Ak stojíme na jeho kraji, bojíme sa, máme strach, že sa šmykneme, alebo nás sfúkne, ale máme úzkosť z toho, že sa sami z neho vrhneme, keďže je to jedna z možností dokazovania si vlastnej slobody (Sartre 2006, 68). V strachu sme pasívni, vnímame sa ako objekt, podliehajúci zákonom kauzality, zvonka smerom k nám, resp. sme prestúpení druhým, zatiaľ čo pri úzkosti dominuje sebauvedomovanie cez aktívnu imagináciu možností slobody, ktorá je pre nás kľúčová. Úzkosť funguje na fenoméne príťažlivosti k negatívnej, cudzej sile, ktorej sa cítime byť odovzdaní. Rozdiel je však v tom, že Waldenfels v responzívnej fenomenológii operuje s levinasovskou etickou schémou, kedy sme cudziemu subordinovaní, a teda nenarába s pojmom slobodnej expresie. V prípade Heideggera, je prekryt s responzívnou fenomenológiou problematický. Obaja síce, podobne ako Freud, operujú s pojmom podivného – *Unheimlich*[7], Waldenfels sa však pri responzívnej fenomenológii neopiera o pojem ničoty, pokoja či ľahostajnosti a preto by sme sa Heideggerovmu chápaniu úzkosti v tomto kontexte nevenovali.

[6] Ide najmä o kapitolu *Angst und Furcht als Ausdruck des Patischen* knihy *Sozialität und Alterität: Modi sozialer Erfahrung* (Waldenfels 2015), ďalej o texty *Doubled Otherness in Ethnopsychiatry* (Waldenfels 2007) a *Role of the lived body in feeling* (Waldenfels 2008). Druhý z nich neskôr vyšiel ako kapitola *Der Liebliche Sitz der Gefühle* knihy *Sinne und Künste im Wechselspiel. Modi ästetischer Erfahrung* (Waldenfels 2019).

[7] Vrátane výskytu pojmu podivného pri rozlišovaní úzkosti a strachu. Pre Freuda, podobne ako pre Heideggera, úzko nám je z niečoho podivného, čo sa nedá dostatočne identifikovať, vrátane smeru, z ktorého prichádza. Ak sa toto „nič" stáva „niečím", začína reprezentovať zdroj strachu. *„‚Wovor der Angst' geht über in ein ‚Was der Furcht'"* (Waldenfels 2015, 110).

Fenomenologicky uchopiť cudzie je rovnako problematické, ako uchopiť úzkosť. Nenachádzame tu tradičné prepojenie medzi objektom a intencionálnym aktom. Ak by sme prijali fakt, že úzkosť je charakterizovaná absenciou svojho referenčného objektu, narážame na problém v aplikácii fenomenologickej metodológie. Waldenfels túto situáciu rieši tak, že oznámi koniec tradičnej formy intencionality a zavádza pojem hyperfenoménu, podobne ako má pojem ireacionálneho čísla v matematike sprístupniť inak nerealizovateľné výpočty. Komplexnosť fenoménu úzkosti a rôzne prístupy k nemu však fenomenologický pohľad nemusia zastaviť. Ak sa vhodne zvolia črty úzkosti z perspektívy filozofie aj psychoanalýzy, dajú sa fenomenologickou metódou skúmať zvlášť.

Stefano Micali pripomína, že problému absentujúceho objektu úzkosti sa venoval Jean Lanplanche. Ten tvrdil, že úzkosť objekt naopak má v podobe toho, od čoho sa neodvratne vzďaľujeme. Pre úzkosť charakteristické očakávanie musí zahŕňať aspoň malý intencionálny komponent (Micali 2022, 136). Ak by sme použili Waldenfelsov hyperfenomenálny prístup, mohli by sme za tento objekt azda vyhlásiť nás samých – v úzkosti sme kotvení k vlastnému obrazu o sebe, ktorý sa nám vzďaľuje, pred očami rozpadá a snažíme sa nájsť riešenie. Úzkostná príprava na budúcu traumu by mohla byť paralelou snahy o regeneráciu subjektu premenou na respondenta, ktorý sa snaží dať, čo sám nemá, navyše vníma, že je s vyhovením nároku vždy pozadu. Pri responzívnej fenomenológii aplikovanej na úzkosť teda nepotrebujeme externý spúšťač, ale môžeme ho mať z vlastnej minulosti, efekt *pátosu* sa spustí len na základe mechanizmov, ktoré sú v úzkosti automatizované a minulosť tak dominuje prítomnosti cez ilúziu falošnej nevyhnutnosti konkrétnej budúcnosti. Etické hľadisko predstavuje ďalší rozmer emocionálnej modality úzkosti – zotrvávame v situácii, kde nevieme dodať odpoveď, ale sme prestúpení pocitom zodpovednosti za túto situáciu. Chceme zároveň v realite validovať dôvod našej úzkosti, aby naša odpoveď nebola vytváraná nadarmo.

Ak sa však zameriame na pozitívnu stránku úzkosti – jej ochranné poslanie, dostaneme sa ku kreatívnej dimenzii úzkosti a jej príbuzenstvu s kreatívnym aspektom odpovedania v responzívnej fenomenológii. Môžeme tu badať podmienky pre určitú formu *fronézis*, schopnosti tvorivého prepájania pasívneho (prijímajúceho, patického) a aktívneho (praktického) príspupu. Nielen Freud vnímal úzkosť ako vakcínu proti traume. Ego podstupuje repetitívne vystavovanie sa predstavám minulých tráum, aby bolo lepšie pripravené na nebezpečie v budúcnosti. Úzkosť je teda na jednej strane očakávanie prichádzajúcej traumy, na druhej strane priebežné vystavovanie sa akémusi funkčnému modelu tejto traumy, tvorivo aktualizovanému v prospech

navodenia prežívania reálnej situácie. Trauma teda generuje úzkosť – ego používa časť tejto úzkosti ako signál na ochranu pred budúcou traumou.[8] Hranica medzi ochranným a poškodzujúcim potenciálom úzkosti je však obvykle ťažko rozpoznateľná. Úzkosť má odhaľujúci aj deformujúci charakter. Už Kierkegaard vyzdvihoval katarzný efekt jej reduktívneho a selektívneho potenciálu – máme nájsť odvahu čeliť jej, vpustiť ju dnu a nechať ju spáliť všetko umelé a prebytočné, aby sme sa mohli pohnúť správnym, autentickým smerom (Kierkegaard 1980, 155). Už sama časová orientovanosť úzkosti smerom k budúcnosti oznamuje akési volanie či výzvu k pozitívnej zmene.

Potenciál tvorivého uchopenia úzkosti poodhalil už sám Kierkegaard, ktorý úzkosť nazval sympatickou antipatiou a antipatickou sympatiou (Kierkegaard 1980, 42). Široké pole možností človeka desí a zároveň fascinuje a priťahuje. Zdá sa, že optikou Waldenfelsovej fenomenológie by sme však úzkosť vnímali ako neresponzivitu, ako nárok bez odpovede. Takáto situácia by bola blízko psychologickej interpretácii úzkosti, pre ktorú je charakteristický stav ustrnutia v trpnej polohe – *pátose*, ktorý sa živí sám sebou. Ak by sme však čo len náznakom zohľadnili možnosť Kierkegaardom zmienenej ambivalencie v podobe fascinačného priťahovania, motivácia k odpovedi by sa mala kde uchytiť a v rámci diastázy[9] by vytvorila priestor pre kreatívne uchopenie situácie. Tá by sa však začala odlišovať od etického princípu „odpovedám, lebo musím" a postupne nadobúdala charakter „odpovedám, lebo môžem". Osvojiť si zručnosť v simultánnom narábaní s ambivalentnými procesmi však nie je jednoduché. Uveďme známy príklad Orwellovho Doublethink: schopnosti udržať si naraz dve protichodné stratégie, akceptujúc obe. V takejto situácii vieme narábať s pamäťou tak, aby sme si z nej vyberali iba to, čo potrebujeme, rovnako ako z prítomnosti, bez toho, aby sme ju popreli. Proces musí byť vedomý, aby sa zaručila presnosť jeho výkonu, ale iba natoľko, aby vo výsledku nepôsobil príliš umelo (Orwell 2013, 176). Toto sa dá realizovať iba po nacvičení a zvládnutí tejto metódy. Zvládnuť úzkosť je strategická hra, v ktorej je nutné pochopiť jej ambivalentnosť. Chce varovať a zároveň zraňuje. Rozhoduje sa v nej o tom, či nám bude slúžiť (ako nástroj zvládania situácii vo svete každodennosti, hraničných situácií či umeleckej tvorivosti), alebo sa staneme jej obeťou. V úzkosti

[8] Ide vždy o časť, keďže ide o krízový algoritmus, ktorý má hyperbolický charakter a produkuje emocionálny nadbytok.
[9] Waldenfels prevzal Plotinov a Levinasov pojem diastázy na označenie časovej medzery medzi nárokom a odpoveďou. To, čo nás prekvapí, prichádza vždy priskoro, zatiaľ čo naša odpoveď bude vždy oneskorená. Tento vzťah priority a subsekvencie tvorí charakter obnovujúcej sa skúsenosti. Viac k pojmu diastázy napr. vo (Waldenfels 2013, 10).

chceme byť vždy inde. Vnímame ju ako cudziu silu (Kierkegaardov pojem[10] prekrývajúci sa s Waldenfelsovým fenoménom cudzieho), silu strhávajúcu nás k sebe vlastnými metódami, živí sa nami a rastie. V skutočnosti to však nie je úplne tak, je do veľkej miery formovaná našimi odpoveďami, ktoré sú obvykle repetitívne a predvídateľné.

Kreativita vyžaduje odhodlanie čeliť rizikám spojeným s pestrým komplexom emócií. Úzkosť nie je nikdy ďaleko, keď musíme čeliť prázdnemu plátnu, prenesene aj doslova. Ide o cestu neprebádaným priestorom, prinajmenšom na úrovni vlastnej skúsenosti. Kreativita nenasleduje určený cieľ a neriadi sa ani predpísanými pravidlami. Je teda nekonečná a vychádza z excesu, ktorý transcenduje pojem výsledku či pravidla. Je to vždy niečo, čo prichádza. Kreácia ako taká nemôže byť objektom predpokladu či plánovania, je však určite možné podporiť jej vznik prípravou vhodného prostredia a eliminovaním prekážok. Tvorivý proces je tak súboj s cudzím, chce dominovať nám, ale aj my jemu – jeho premenou na vlastné. Kľúčovým médiom kreativity pri fenomenologickom nazeraní na úzkosť aj responzivitu je práve vyššie spomínaná imaginácia. Akt imaginácie je zakúšaný vedomím ako simulácia možnej percepcie. Keďže nevieme cudzie uchopiť a privlastniť si ho, suplujeme túto absenciu imagináciou. Úzkosť predpokladá úlohu imaginácie v konštruovaní budúcich situácií a má analytickú povahu, zatiaľ čo strach je impulzívny a nereflektujúci. Inak povedané, bojíme sa konkrétneho zdroja nebezpečenstva ale máme úzkosť z toho, že nevieme, ako sa rovnáme s vlastnou situáciou, ktorá neodvratne nastane. Imaginácia, ktorou je úzkosť saturovaná, vie byť nástrojom katastrofických scenárov a slúžiť tak k udržiavaniu neresponzívneho patického stavu. Taktiež však môže podnecovať zrod odpovede, tvorivé uchopenie krízovej situácie. Odpoveď je tvorivá, rovnako ako je tvorivosť responzívna. Ľudské výtvory nie sú ani čisté nálezy, ani čisté vynálezy, vznikajú na báze skúsenosti spolupatričnosti a korešpondencie. Ide o improvizáciu – proces utvárania „niečoho ako niečoho“. Rodí sa tak niečo nové, vymedzujúce sa voči predchádzajúcemu usporiadaniu a vyznačujúce sa excesom významu.

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[10] Kierkegaard sa neraz v kontexte subordinácie subjektu a ambivalentnosti úzkosti zmieňuje o „cudzej sile“, napr. (Kierkegaard 1980, 41).

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Tento text vznikol na Filozofickom ústave SAV, v.v.i. ako súčasť riešenia grantovej úlohy VEGA č. 2/0130/23 „Princíp ľudskosti v kontexte konfliktov súčasnosti. Existenciálne a fenomenologické výzvy).“

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Pandemic as an Existential Phenomenon

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TKACZ, M. A.: Pandemic as an Existential Phenomenon
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 35 – 43

Existentialism considers the individual human existence as the subject of research and the starting point of philosophical analysis. For representatives of this trend, personal and subjective states become the basis for philosophizing. A pandemic can also be understood as a phenomenon affecting the individual sphere of the human being, the human condition – as a crisis, the concept of which is invariably present in the works of S. Kierkegaard, A. Camus, J.-P. Sartre, and many others. How do existentialists understand crisis? Is it a necessary condition, or is it a negative phenomenon? Can it be avoided? The paper aims to analyze the pandemic from the perspective of Kierkegaard's philosophy of existence and the viewpoint of existential philosophy, to refer to different perspectives on the concept of crisis, and to define a coherent vision of a pandemic as a cultural and existential phenomenon; an opportunity to make an existential decision.

Keywords: existentialism – crisis – pandemic – existence – Kierkegaard

> "But what does that mean – 'plague'? Just life, no more than that"
> (Camus 1947, 250).

> "If you have seen a physician going around among the sick, then you no doubt have noticed that he brings the best gift, better than all his medications and even better than all his care, when he brings hope, when people say, 'The physician has hope' "
> (Kierkegaard 2013, 258 – 259).

Introduction

The category of crisis, as a capacious and ambiguous concept, often emerges in philosophy. It is challenging to identify an epoch in the history of human

thought devoid of it. It is safe to infer that the sense of crisis is inherent in the development of Western thought. Moreover, it can be assumed that without the concept of crisis, philosophy, understood as critical reflection, would lack *raison d'être*. Engaging in philosophical discussions and contemplating ethical, metaphysical, or aesthetic issues necessitates the use of the concepts of crisis and development or breakthrough to address encountered challenges.

The concept of crisis permeates culture, religion, literature, politics, and economics. It appears in slogans uttered on the streets, in songs, books, newspaper pages, psychological diagnoses, and content published on social media. W. Daddario and T. Schmidt even state that we are not so much writing about the crisis as writing from the crisis (2018, 1 - 8). From the position of the crisis, we see the need for change; we create plans, reforms, and remedies.

But what does the crisis mean? The term "crisis" is defined as a situation that has reached an extremely difficult or dangerous point; a time of great disagreement, uncertainty, or suffering (Procter 1995, 647); it is the opportunity to make an existential decision, something that Søren Kierkegaard describes as "The image of the *Skillevei*, translated as crossroad (…) [that is] the space (…) between living and dying, (…) the formation of the individual self that is challenged by society and in turn confronts society" (Ryan 2014, 20).

I. Multitude of Crises

In recent years, the public has witnessed the impact of the concept of the crisis on society. For example, the expression "constitutional crisis" has slipped into everyday use in Poland concerning the current political situation (Skuczyński 2016). Many crises can be mentioned: existential crisis, psychological crisis, the crisis of institutions, legal, political, moral, scientific crisis, and the crisis of civilization. The concept of crisis affects people's imagination and motivates them to act. There are many publications on this topic, numerous proposals to overcome the crisis, different interpretations of its sources and consequences, and different approaches to the problems it brings.

The COVID-19 pandemic has also become an opportunity to reflect on the crisis that has affected many people, nations, and environments. The emergence of the virus has changed many aspects of life, not only in the external world but also in the individual existence of man. As W. Vandekerckhove emphasizes, the crisis has irreversibly influenced our thinking, imagination, language, and thus the concepts we use (Vandekerckhove 2020, 127).

II. The Concept of Crisis

The concept of crisis can be associated with many trends and schools of philosophy and with many thinkers with different views – I. Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, F. Nietzsche, E. Husserl, H. Arendt, P. Ricœur, Z. Bauman, J. Tischner. Phenomenology, critical philosophy, philosophy of culture, and especially existentialism allude to this concept.

Existential thought as a current in philosophy considers life: the individual human existence, as the subject of research and the starting point of philosophical A pandemic can also be understood as a phenomenon affecting the individual sphere of a human being—as a force influencing the human condition, as a crisis, taking over not only the external world but also the inner world of man, his thoughts, feelings and experiences. It can be understood as the Kierkegaardian *Skillevei*, as the opportunity to make an existential decision. The existential dimension of a pandemic is sometimes overlooked or underestimated – and the crisis is often discussed without reference to existential decision making. Attention is rightly paid to numbers, threats, information about restrictions, to facts. The theoretical view of the COVID-19 pandemic – understood as "a very large epidemic" that is "new, explosive, or severe" (Moners – Folkers – Fauci 2009, 1018 – 1021) does not refer often enough to the sphere of human existence – to the individual tragedy of isolation, illness, or death.

To interpret the pandemic as an existential phenomenon, it is necessary to understand what an existential phenomenon is. According to René Rosfort, "basic existential phenomena are the fundamental phenomena that constitute a human life such as love, anxiety, desire, grief, vulnerability, gender, joy, sexuality, pain, fear, anger, hope, and death" (2021, 183). It is also important to understand what makes existential phenomena existential. Rosfort explains that existential phenomena differ from other phenomena because "they depend on the individuality of the person who experiences it" and "they single out the individual" (2021, 184). What is more, "we often struggle with these phenomena. It can be both difficult and exhausting to communicate them, put them into words, or explain them to other people" (Rosfort 2021, 184). That is why it is safe to conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic, can be referred to as the existential phenomenon.

III. Kierkegaard on Crisis

Kierkegaard examines existential phenomena throughout his authorship. But how does he understand the crisis? According to this theologian, philosopher, and social critic, such concern is connected with modernity. While the first half

of the 19th century is commonly considered the Danish Golden Age, Jon Stewart, in his book *The Cultural Crisis of the Danish Golden Age: Heiberg, Martensen, and Kierkegaard* (Stewart 2015) offers a new perspective. In the text he argues that the Golden Age is actualized in the philosophical diagnosis of its cultural confusions and the struggle to provide solutions within the crisis.

Kierkegaard was well aware of the problems of his time. In the book *Philosopher of the Heart: The Restless Life of Søren Kierkegaard*, Clare Carlisle writes:

> The way of life his parents knew is coming to an end. Denmark's economy has been in crisis; a political revolution is on its way. Everyone in the university is talking of history, progress, decline, theorizing about how the old way gives way to the new. Kierkegaard is not the only person in Copenhagen who has the sense of being caught between two ages (2019, 14).

What was his diagnosis of the crisis? Stewart describes it this way: "Where Heiberg located the crisis in the cultural sphere in general, Kierkegaard shifted it to the inwardness of each individual. For Kierkegaard, the struggle (…) is not something that takes place at the level of society in general but rather in each person individually" (2015, 170). In other words, according to Kierkegaard, phenomena, such as crisis, are experienced individually. And, are an opportunity of an individual to make an existential decision, to make a choice.

IV. Existential Anxiety

Usually, crisis is linked with the notion of anxiety. What is existential anxiety? S. Kierkegaard explains in his work *The Concept of Anxiety* that there are two kinds of anxiety - the first is associated with the object that evokes it. The second type of anxiety is without an object - coming from the absurd choice between believing and refusing to believe (Kierkegaard 1980). This approach is also adopted by J. P. Sartre, who describes anxiety (*angoisse*) as the fundamental affective component of freedom, in which the source of fear is choices as such (Sartre 1993).

On the other hand, the modern definition of existential anxiety proposed by psychiatrist I. Yalom explains it as a psychological mechanism resulting from primal existential conflicts - "a conflict that flows from the individual's confrontation with the givens of existence" (Yalom 1980, 8). According to Yalom, these data are death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness.

Existential anxiety arises through a dynamic conflict between an existential given and the desire for its opposite. These conflicts have the following

structure: the first one is a specific confrontation with death, in which every living person faces its inevitability and, at the same time, the desire for immortality. The second conflict is the confrontation with freedom, in which each individual struggles with the limitlessness of the universe and the desire to be bound to it, the framework in which it can exist. The third conflict is the confrontation with fundamental isolation, in which the person is faced with loneliness in the world and a desire for contact, protection and community. The fourth conflict is the confrontation with the meaninglessness of existence, in which the individual must struggle with the sense of the meaninglessness of the universe and the desire for meaning.

V. Limit Situations

Existential data can be compared here with the limit situations described by the twentieth-century German existentialist K. Jaspers. According to Jaspers, a limit situation is a state of the inevitability of suffering, struggle and death; it is impossible to penetrate in an empirical, cognitive way; this is the final situation. According to the philosopher, limit situations "are like a wall we run into, a wall on which we founder" (Jaspers 1970, 178). He adds that we cannot change them but only illuminate them. They cannot be separated from empirical existence itself.

Examples of limit situations are death, struggle, fear, suffering, and guilt. They give us insight into experiential beings; thus, the empirical being is called into question. That is because we conceive of empirical existence per se as a limit. The experience of this being in an extreme situation shows the problematic nature of the person's being in the world and the being of the world.

VI. Pandemic Anxiety

A pandemic, as an existential experience, or rather a set of experiences, is a source of fear and suffering caused by a confrontation with something that can be called a limit situation or an existential given. According to Yalom, when fear and despair exceed an individual's ability to sustain, the result is psychopathology as "a graceless, inefficient mode of coping with anxiety" (Yalom 1980, 110). Thus, through a traumatic encounter with the unknown and inevitable, the threat posed by COVID-19 causes the person experiencing it to face the most profound existential anguish. This state can be fueled by the information that reaches us.

How to deal with pandemic anxiety? Help comes in the guise of an existentialist who never called himself one and went so far as to deny that he was one. This is, of course, A. Camus. His thought seems exceptionally accurate and timely in the face of a pandemic. In Camus' novels, individuals face and overcome the absurd. The absurdity is caused by what we discussed earlier - the inconsistency of reality with our expectations. This crisis manifests itself in the irrationality of the world and the desire for its rationality. During the lockdown, many people reached for the author's novel written just after the end of World War II and published in 1947 - *The Plague* (*La Peste*). To quote W. Vandekerckhove: "This novel about life in lockdown during a pandemic, actually becomes a different book when read in lockdown during a pandemic. The randomness of a pandemic is a cold shower of the world's indifference" (2020, 130 – 131).

VII. Crisis Described in *The Plague*

The novel is told from the perspective of a physician, Dr Bernard Rieux, as a record of his failed fight to stop the plague and his never-ending quest to treat the sick. During the initial spike in cases, Dr Rieux advises the city to take more stringent measures against the rising infection rate. However, the Oran administration ignores his warnings as Dr Rieux struggles to treat the sick, and more of them die. Dealing with the dead becomes increasingly impersonal and meaningless. Eventually, the plague takes hold of the city, and there is nothing left to do but wait for it to go away. Despite this, Dr Rieux persists, treating the infected with limited medical resources but with dignity and respect. Eventually, the plague subsides, and the city of Oran reopens to the outside world.

Camus described The Plague as an allegory of the Nazi occupation of France and a critique of French existentialism. However, he declared that this metaphor is more than a mere condemnation of the Nazi occupation. The struggle that Dr Rieux faces is an allegory in which "one may find inspiration . . . not only to honor the historical resistance, but also to support anti-totalitarian movements struggling" (Kałuża 2017, 96). To quote P. Farr:

> Scholars have interpreted the novel as an allegory of fascism, of resistance to fascism, of French colonialism in Algeria, of social hygiene, and of death and dying. Across each of these interpretations, a set of common themes jump out of the text regarding the place of

> the therapist today living under the tyranny of global pandemic—the absurdity of human existence and meaningless suffering (2021, 4).

As with the Sisyphus described by Camus in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, Dr Rieux faced a battle with the plague, facing the senseless responsibility of continuing to work and fight. Both Sisyphus and Dr Rieux continued their work without succumbing or submitting to resignation. The fight without giving up marks the absurd hero (Farr 2021, 5).

To get to this point of absurd heroism, explains Camus, one must realize one's fate and that there is no escaping the absurd. In this way, through the awareness of the irrationality of the world and the simultaneous performance of his tasks, no matter what, an absurd hero is born.

VIII. Playing One's Part

How can the se insights be applied to the COVID-19 crisis? According to Farr COVID-19 has no intrinsic meaning. It has no teleological purpose. It is a virus that passes from person to person without conscious direction. Thus, in the face of the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, existential anxiety is triggered by confronting death, isolation, nothingness, and meaninglessness. Understanding the COVID-19 pandemic existentially and explaining it like Camus, we can see that it is nothing but life itself that puts us in an either-or situation (Kierkegaard 1944).

In Camus' view, as in Kierkegaard's view, the absurdity of the crisis can be overcome with a "leap of faith," an act of tragic heroism, a choice not to stick to rational expectations of the world, and instead to openly accept the irrationality of our choices and the reality in which we live. What is more, Kierkegaard's either/or "unrelentingly allows neither a skeptical suspension of judgment, indifference, nor indecision. It persistently forces a decision, differentiates, and makes one responsible" (Nelson 2009, 177). Not only in The Plague but also in The Myth of Sisyphus and The Stranger, the characters accept what is coming, as Vandekerckhove, says: "play one's role " (2020, 130 – 131); they stick to it, despite difficulties and doubts.

These words are also spoken several times by Dr Rieux of the Plague, emphasizing the importance of "playing one's part." They have become authentic in recent months. Observing healthcare professionals, therapists, and volunteers, it is apparent what it means to "play one's role" and move forward despite hopelessness and absurdity while treating others with dignity.

Throughout the pandemic and now the war in Ukraine, the question can often be heard: what can I do? How should I proceed? Or would it be better to watch the development of events passively? Or would it be better to be suspicious and withdrawn?

* * *

As Camus says, a pandemic, a crisis, a plague is nothing other than life. Even when the pandemic ends, there will be difficulties. Even when the disease ends, there will be problems, pain, and suffering. It is impossible to run away from it. What can be done? What needs to be done? Make an existential decision. Be like Dr Rieux. No matter what. With love and dedication. For love, as Kierkegaard teaches, casts out fear. According to the philosopher, fear is a phenomenon wholly opposed to love. Fear weakens, and love gives strength. Fear destroys, and love builds. Love brings comfort and refuge from the evils of the world. Fear ends Kierkegaard's *Works of Love* (Strawser 2015, 170-173).

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Arnold Schönberg's Artwork Between Painting and Psychoanalysis

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NEUBAUEROVÁ, A.: Arnold Schönberg's Artwork Between Painting and Psychoanalysis
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 44 – 53

I would like to dedicate this paper to the Austrian composer Arnold Schönberg. His work, as well as his personality, shows us much about the development of the art scene at the beginning of the 20th century. Since he was not only a composer and a painter, but also very active on the theory of art, we can learn a lot from his correspondence with other artists of his time. It was a time of big changes – particularly in how artists began to think about their art – what and how it should reflect reality. These were the times when major-minor stopped being the only way one can express one's thoughts in music. They were also times when painters, and other artists, started to express their inner reflection of the world around them, abandoning the desire to just change it a little, to a purely abstract expression in painting. The new manner of the artwork process – the desire to express one's own inner feelings and motives, has connected art very closely to the well-known psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud.

Keywords: music – art – psychoanalysis – Arnold Schönberg – Sigmund Freud

In my contribution I would like to focus on the work of the Austrian composer, painter and theorist Arnold Schönberg. It is in particular his work from the early 20th century.

A. Schönberg at this time was making a name in the field of music theory, especially with his groundbreaking innovative approach to harmony, when around 1911 he established the exact rules of his dodecaphonic system of

composition[1]. However, it is interesting to observe the whole process that preceded this point, his gradual breaking down of the boundaries of musical convention and partly establishing and above all defining himself against the older generation of composers who had perhaps unwittingly started this process (one example for all: R. Wagner and his Tristan chord), at the same time as his very complex and even philosophical approach to the whole issue of composition. At first sight, Schönberg's thoughtful, systematic and perfectionist approach to composition (and the subsequent concert performance of his works) does not point to works with a background or storyline leading to a deep subconscious, perhaps even of the composer himself, and a pure attempt to express the innermost states and feelings that could not be enclosed in any music theoretical category and subsequently enclosed by the familiar major-minor harmony.

In this perspective, it is also important to recall that this was the time when the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud became very well-known and increasingly popular in Vienna, especially among the upper class, but also among the scientific community. The relationship between Schönberg and Freud was, however, surprisingly cold, considering that they lived in the same Viennese neighborhood at the time[2], both were of Jewish origin, and it was certainly impossible for such prominent figures of the Viennese intellectual class to be unaware of each other. Moreover, the relationship between psychoanalysis and Schönberg's work – and not only his musical composition (here his interest in painting is also intertwined) – can be seen very well, especially in his stage works, in which these two areas of interest intertwine and complement each other. In particular, there are two stage works: the monodrama Erwartung, Op. 17, and Glückliche Hand, Op. 18. In both of these works, which were written around 1910, there is a strong psychoanalytic character in terms of the plot line, which suggests that Schönberg's familiarity with this field was much greater than had been assumed and even he himself ever publicly acknowledged. The beginnings of his interest in composing music that would originate purely from the unconscious (yet without any connection

[1]Although he was neither the first nor the only one (e.g. J. M. Hauer, E. Varése, among others, are known for this), who in his compositional development came to the equalization of all twelve tones of the chromatic scale, where no tone may be repeated before the use of all the others. Schoenberg's uniqueness lies above all in all the implications he drew from the possibility of using this technique of composition, which he worked out to the smallest detail and at the same time passed on as a teacher to the next generation of composers.
[2]See Carpenter (2010, 171).

to the findings of psychoanalysis), but still, with the aim of creating the work subordinate only to the expression of his innermost feelings and dealing with the possibility of their musical elaboration in the most direct form, dates from 1908-1909 and include a few other works (for example: Zweites Quartet Op 10. 10, Drei Klavierstücke Op. 11, Gedichte aus "Das Buch der hängenden Gärten" von Stefan George Op. 15 and Fünf Orchesterstücke Op. 16).

Now, however, I would like to focus for a moment on the first of the pair of stage works, namely Erwartung, which was written during a few creative weeks in 1909 and, unlike Glückliche Hand, was written with the participation of Maria Pappenheim as far as the libretto is concerned; Schönberg himself wrote the libretto for Glückliche Hand. However, the presence of Maria Pappenheim plays a major role here, as she was not only a poet but above all a medical doctor who was certainly very familiar with psychoanalysis and the case of Anna O.,[3] who was also probably in family relationship with her.[4] Though views differ as to how the libretto was written, both Schönberg and Pappenheim have changed their versions somewhat over the years. The important point, however, is that they both worked on the text, whether it was a complete collaboration, or whether Schönberg first confided to Pappenheim the difficult life experience he had gone through the year before, and she then used these motifs, with her knowledge of psychoanalysis, the writings on The Interpretation of Dreams, and specific cases, to create this strongly Freudian symbolist text as set to music by herself.

The storyline of the work is simple: a woman wanders through the woods, looking for her lover – whom she suspects of infidelity. She is delirious, wandering along forest paths and through a moonlit glade, until she reaches the house of her supposed lover, where she finds the corpse of her lover nearby. This is where the longest part of the monodrama takes place, the Woman finds herself on the verge of losing her mind, delirious, grieving, wanting to die. However, even this is not granted to her, for the dawn comes, symbolizing the time of separation and the continuation of her life.

What is so groundbreaking about this short, 20 minutes piece is how it is handled overall. The single role – "die Frau/Women" – is a case study in hysteria, performed as a musical monodrama, with the orchestra and the voice

[3]Anna O., by her own name Bertha Pappenheim, was the first documented case of psychoanalytic treatment. Although still a patient of Freud's predecessor Joseph Breuer, she was treated of hysteria through the use of the new "talking cure", and thanks to Freud's interest of this method, this case was very well documented.
[4]See Carpenter (2010, 151 – 152).

becoming one, completing the nightmarish atmosphere of a direct expression of the inner movements of a mind wracked with madness and terror.

Although the work follows its late Romantic predecessors treating the theme of strong women with a tragic story, such as Richard Strauss's Salome or Elektra (or even some of the female roles in Richard Wagner's operas). The major breakthrough here is that there is no big story going on, and one interpretation of the work is that none of this really happened and the Woman is just raving about it all.

She's taking a journey through a dark forest full of symbolism, whether it be through her tortured soul or her unconscious. To the symbolism of gardens, still so popular at this time, the symbol of the forest stands here as a dark counterpoint. Where the forest, compared to the well-kept garden symbolizing stability and peace in life, represents anarchy, confusion. The tree, on the other hand, represents the vigour of life – which is symbolic of the moment when the woman, with horror, considers the dead branch – a symbol of death – the loss of the vigour of life – as the corpse of her beloved, and thus functions as one of the premonitions of the approaching bad end. The projection of her mind in the dark forest is accompanied by the unseen but ever-present light of the moon, which is a symbol of exaggerated imagination (sleepwalking) and clouded vision, thus reinforcing her madness. She invokes her beloved, remembering their garden as a symbol of their unity and harmonious life – of life's vigour and stability. Her hope of reunion is mixed with despair, sadness and a clear premonition of disaster. She sees shadows, hears the cry of a night bird as another symbol of imagination, sees a fantastical animal with yellow glowing eyes crawling on the ground as a symbol of low animal instincts and low desires. The eyes as a window to the soul (a motif often used by Schoenberg, especially in his paintings for portraits or self-portraits) glow yellow here in a symbol of the deception of the spirit[5]. Gradually she comes to his lover's house, glowing white as a symbol of innocence and the rival's white arms, a house with closed shutters as a symbol of being closed to her, surrounded by a garden – again the garden here also serving as a barrier to the ideal through which it is impossible to get, with red flowers growing here as a symbol of their desire and sin. The corpse of her lover is finally found near the building, was it a premonition or did she know he was dead? Did she kill him herself in her delirium? The woman loses her mind and falls more and more into despair, longing to die, but the dawn comes – a symbol of separation and the arrival of

[5]See Bavelier (2003).

a new day. The whole of this very intense musical work then ends in pianissimo with the words "Ich suchte"....

In the context of the libretto's relation to Freud's psychoanalysis, the close relationship between the case of Anna O. (Freud 1985, 20) and Schönberg's Woman of Erwartung, mentioned above, is very interesting. Although Anna O. was still a patient of Freud's predecessor Joseph Breuer, it was Freud who convinced him to describe the case completely. From this we learn – as Marie Pappenheim might have done – the symptoms and the course of the hysterical attacks, which then resemble the behaviour of the Woman in Schoenberg's Erwartung. Both women suffer from hallucinations, delusions or daydreams, they do not recognise familiar faces (when the Woman considers a piece of a dead fallen branch to be her lover), they have difficulty speaking – the Woman's monologue is not fluent, but very broken – in a way she mumbles incomprehensibly in places, repeats herself, there are various unexpected gaps or pauses. Furthermore, in both cases there are hallucinations of animals – a snake in the case of Anna O. and a fantastical animal with yellow eyes in the case of the Woman from Expectations. However, what is diametrically opposed in both cases is sexuality, which according to the study in the case of Anna O. was still completely undeveloped, while in the case of Erwartung the main motive and cause of the Woman's state of hysteria. A parallel to this overarching motif of the potential betrayal of the Woman's lover and his infidelity with his "rival" can then be found in an unfortunate incident in Schönberg's life that occurred just moments before work on this monodrama began. It had happened that his wife Mathilde was having an affair with Richard Gerstl, his closest friend at the time and the only painting mentor Schoenberg had ever had, and had wanted to leave him and his family. Under the threat of Schoenberg's suicide, and at the urging of her family, she did return to her husband, but the hopelessness of the whole situation is illustrated by the fact that Gerstl fell into depression after the affair and committed suicide in 1908, the year before Erwartung was written.

The unfortunate affair with Gerstl, however, brings us to Schönberg's painting, which falls almost exclusively into this period and can be divided into several categories: sketches and pencil drawings, portraits and self-portraits, landscape paintings, gazes or visions and fantasies, and then studies for stage works – there are indeed many of these for his stage works Erwartung and Die Glückliche Hand, so we can understand exactly how Schönberg imagined the stage and how much his painting was connected to the musical compositions of the period.

The landscapes, and again the gardens, are mostly concerned with that 'ideal' and perhaps even romanticising period before the family crisis, and Schönberg himself regarded them more as a kind of finger exercises. After the unfortunate incident with Gerstl, however, the gardens also experience a great leap in expression, from what were originally romantic places to gloomy places, grey or, on the contrary, poisonously green, full of paths that lead nowhere, with an overall impression of hopelessness and, like the forest in Erwartung, an expression of the author's battered soul.

The largest part of the painting are the self-portraits, a kind of study of himself using all possible techniques, colours (for example, there is an interesting Green Self-Portrait or Blue Self-Portrait – both from 1910) or perspectives – in one painting (a likeness from 1911) he captures himself from the back, contrapuntally as he could never see himself, as an elderly, balding pedestrian with a walking stick, walking down a grey street. Another subject he mostly devoted himself to in the period around and after the so-called Gerstl Affair is a special form of studies of his own person, but also of other persons, especially of the expressions of the eyes with penetrating gaze, which he considered to be the window to the soul, the so-called cycle of Gazes.[6] He himself writes:

> I was painting views at the time [...]. It is something that only I could do, because it has to do with my nature, and it is totally incompatible with the nature of a true painter. I have never seen a face, but because I have looked into people's eyes, I have only seen their gazes. It is also due to this that I can imitate someone's gaze. A painter grasps the whole person with one glance – I only grasp his soul (Schönberg 2004, 253).

It is a cycle of paintings where we are immediately taken in by the penetrating sharp gazes rising from otherwise completely obscured faces. The faces are without any expression, without contours, but in sharp and very specific colour combinations that do not let one pass unnoticed. Several abstract images, the so-called fantasies, are similarly captured, where the central motif is, for example, abstract concepts such as thoughts or hatred, or Christ and hands (the painting Christ Vision). The paintings from this cycle were also most revered by Schoenberg's friend, the painter Vasil Kandinsky. Here again, the paintings function as direct artistic representations of inner feelings, coming from the unconscious, not trying to be categorized into a certain style, to please. They are

[6] This cycle is also known as Visions, as the painter Vasil Kandinsky called it.

harsh to the point of being ugly, they make one feel uneasy, they are drawn in a kind of dilettantish way, but also, apart from a few sessions with Gerstl, Schoenberg was a true autodidact in painting, yet without mastering any techniques he was able to express his feelings more directly. The paintings Red Gaze and Tears, for example, can be seen as direct abstract representations of inner frustration, feelings of loneliness and hopelessness. In one of his letters in 1911, to V. Kandinsky he writes:

> Art belongs to the unconscious! One must express oneself! But he must express it directly! Not according to taste, upbringing or intelligence, education or ability. Not according to these acquired characteristics, but according to the innate, instinctive...only unconscious creation... really creates something authentic (Göbel 2013, 107).

This quotation, I think, perfectly characterizes not only Schoenberg's approach to musical composition but also his work as a painter, which was in no way limited to studying the old masters or following contemporary trends and then-recognized painters.

It must be added, however, that most of his works from this period has not been particularly understood or appreciated. In the same way, his stage works, which waited for many years for their first performance, were not appreciated in their time (and, unfortunately, to a certain extent even today). It was partly due to the great technical difficulty and Schöberg's desire for an absolutely perfect performance of his works, on which he took great pride. Therefore, Erwartung was not first performed until 1924 under the direction of Alexander Zemlinsky at the National Theatre in Prague as part of the Society for New Music, and Glückliche Hand, although completed in 1913, also waited until 1924 for its premiere at the National Opera in Vienna (directed by Fritz Turnau and conducted by Josef Stiedry). Nowadays, at least the Erwartung gets on the opera stage from time to time, but in combination with a more popular piece, for example Béla Bartók's Bluebirds Castle (in the year 2016 in Janáček Theatre in Brno) or Kurt Weill's Seven deadly Sins (in the year 2021 in the State Opera in Prague).

However, the Glückliche Hand is already a complete synthesis of Schönberg's artistic work; from the libretto to the stage design, no one else has contributed to this monodrama. It is a strongly autobiographical work, an artistic elaboration of his inner feelings about his affair with Gerstl and his ongoing compositional crisis during his theoretical work on The Theory of Harmony. This all went together with the poor reception of his works that

accompanied the breaking down of boundaries and the transition to the final resolution in the creation of the dodecaphonic system, along with his feelings of humiliation, rejection by his own wife and his overall futile efforts both on a personal and professional level.

The storyline presents us with the single roles of Man, Woman, Gentleman and Chorus. While the Woman and the Gentleman are mute characters, the Chorus represents the Man's inner voice and the scene is made to represent his enlivened images – his Gazes. The entire chorus is enclosed behind a purple velvet, and only their green lighted faces then stare out from small holes. The whole work opens with a scene of a man lying face down on the floor, with a mythical fantastical animal perched on his shoulders. The depiction of the gazes, the fantastical animals, the overall symmetry of the work, which reminds the man in those 4 acts that he makes the same mistakes over and over again, forgetting the divine within him in his desire for earthly happiness. There is the symbolism of the desire for perfect work of art – depicted by a scene in a goldsmith's shop where some men are trying to make a piece of jewelry – but the man enters and with the words " it can be done more easily" he strikes with a hammer with one blow – the anvil crumbles and with the words "that's how you make jewels" he lifts the finished jeweled piece from the ground. The workers, however, get angry and lash out at him – a depiction of society (especially the public and critics), for whom he remains misunderstood and, in turn, reacts very negatively and dismissively to his works. What follows is a kind of lighting crescendo as a symbol of the total isolation and loneliness stemming from a lack of understanding by the outside world. Technically, the crescendo of scene 3 is a very interesting piece of work, a materialized intersection between paintings and music, its course also symbolizes a kind of inner struggle of the Man depicted first by a weak breeze to a strong gale. At this moment, a complete artistic synthesis is taking place on the stage, the various instruments displaying the balanced colours with which the whole stage is bathed, pieces of motifs from the previous parts of the work are interwoven into it, and it all comes together as one big, animated picture. This is also closely related to Schonberg's desire to turn Glückliche Hand into a film![7]

Further, the work returns to the personal level in the symbolism of the abjection, humiliation, and decline of the Man, which is also evident in his lowly appearance, which is in conflict with the Woman's elegance and the monden

[7] See a 1913 letter from the composer to Emil Hertzka (printed in Schönberg, Letters. London, 1964, 44)

appearance of the Gentleman (Gerstl). The symbol of the Woman's submission to the Gentleman is then the melody of the waltz, then we come to the scene when the Woman hands the Man the cup, only to immediately turn away from him in a hasty manner, thus continuing the symbolism in Wagner's opera Tristan und Isolde. The whole work then ends as it began – the Man is lying on the floor, the mythical beast is present, the chorus in the form of the Gazes illustrates the Man's despair and futile efforts to achieve earthly happiness, and the piece ends with the words: "Must you have experienced again what you so often experience? Can you not renounce it? [...] And yet you seek! And you are suffering and have no rest! You miserable wretch!" Otherwise, on a compositional level, the work is just as atonal as the Erwartung, although completed a few years later, at a time when Schoenberg was already fully experimenting with the dodecaphonic system, in character it remained faithful to that direct expression of feelings rather than following any rules. There is rather an interesting attempt to blend in with the characters as much as possible, to copy their movements musically, to combine colored lighting with the same instruments throughout the work; even the characters are accompanied by the colour of certain instruments. However, these are not romanticizing leitmotifs or rules, on the contrary, the overall work is very abstract in nature.

So much, then, for at least a brief preview and a reference to the context and circumstances that influenced the creation of the works that were at the beginning of a new era of art associated with the personality of Arnold Schönberg. As I have already indicated in this text, I think it is really important and beneficial to look at these kind of innovative works from various angles. Most of them are best known from the perspective of music theory – chord analysis, melodic phrases, searching for theoretical connections in other compositions, level of extension of tonality, search for recurring harmonic/melodic motifs, etc. In Schönberg's example, however, it would be a pity not take advantage of such a strong connection with the newly established treatment through psychoanalysis, reflected in one of the few purely expressionist musical works ever. Of course, it is not difficult to find other monodramas and especially operas that focus on portraying the inner experiences of the main characters (inner struggle, delirium, madness, etc.) or that have a strong symbolist dimension. However, no other composition has the depiction of a person's inner experience, hysterical attack, feelings of humiliation and despair as its main theme and only plot line. It is hardly possible to find musical composition, and above all an author, brave enough to introduce the audience to the processes going on inside the deepest parts of the

human brain and to set them to music in such a direct way. These two monodramas are in some sense very descriptive, full of leitmotifs, but the leitmotifs are nothing graspable. The motifs are pure emotions, which are transformed into colors, their symbolism, then into colours of different instruments, then into rhythm and finally into melodies.

These are works that broke down boundaries and ignored old givens and conventions. They fought for artistic freedom, for art not to be mechanical, but to touch each one of us, to be an expression of the unconscious itself, of our innermost feelings and emotions. Perhaps, like psychoanalysis, with its pioneering treatment by speaking and expressing deeply buried sorrows and traumas, it could heal and help us find our way forward. So that instead of portraying the beauty of our surroundings, it can be given a chance to express ourselves.

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PART III: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The Shadow of Individual Resilience on Community Resilience

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FIGUS-ILLINYI, S.: The Shadow of Individual Resilience on Community Resilience
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 54 – 64

The notion of resilience is increasingly emerging as a concept to help crisis management and as a preparation for future challenges. Research on resilience has its roots in physics, psychopathology, and positive psychology. The detachment from inanimate materials focused on the individual, the human being. The ever-expanding scientific approaches to resilience research, and the widening range of variables that affect the individual, have resulted in an ever-widening range of environments. The multiplicity of aspects raises an increasing number of questions and uncertainties, one of which is the description of the resilience of the community. Due to diverse individuals, cultures, historical backgrounds, and economic conditions, it is challenging to formulate a single definition or model. The diversity of resilience phenomena and descriptions that focus on the individual is very large, which raises even more questions and issues at the community level. I will attempt to shed light on how closely the theory of the phenomenon of individual resilience is linked to and influenced by the focal points of community resilience. I use the term "shadow" because individual approaches in psychology cast a shadow on the development of theories of community resilience and, in many cases, cause obstacles.

Keywords: resilience – individual – community – psychology – risk – childhood

Historical Introduction

After decades of observation, theory, research, and practice addressing the impact of trauma and stress on individual and family functioning and development, systematic theory and research on human resilience emerged around 1970 (Masten 2001; Masten – Cicchetti 2016; Nichols 2013; Walsh 2016). Theories about human adaptation to change in experience have been heavily influenced by Darwin's and Freud's 19th-century ideas about natural selection or personality (Masten – Coatswort 1995). In the 20th century, global catastrophes that affected tens of millions of children and families around the world - notably the Great Depression and World War II - inspired clinicians and scientists to better understand how adversity threatens human resilience, and what measures to take to deal with it. Reduce risk or aid recovery. Studies of individuals and families experiencing traumatic loss, violence, separation, injury, torture, homelessness, and other consequences of economic, natural, and political disasters have quickly begun (Masten et al. 2015; Nichols 2013).

Research has focused initially on the negative consequences of adversity, conceptualized primarily in terms of risk of psychopathology, dysfunction, breakdown, and other problematic outcomes. Differences in the impact of similar adversities on individuals and families have been recognized and are often conceptualized as vulnerabilities in light of the diathesis stressor model of physical and mental illness (Masten – Cicchetti 2016). A great insight from pioneering resilience researchers in child and family studies was the recognition of the importance of understanding the influences that promote positive adjustment or mitigate the effects of risk or adversity. They acknowledge that certain individuals or families appear to be more vulnerable to adversity, but they find that others appear to be better protected or recover better than individuals or families who have experienced similar trauma or family crises (Masten 2018).

Nevertheless, over the years, researchers concerned with family resilience and personal resilience have continued their work with limited open integration, despite constant cross-diffusion of ideas (Hawley – DeHaan 1996; Masten – Monn 2015; Patterson 2002). This largely independent development of research on individual and family resilience is especially surprising given the geographical proximity of leading scholars studying resilience in various scientific fields. For example, Boss, Garmezy, Masten, H. I. McCubbin, and Patterson overlap at the University of Minnesota (Masten 2018).

A pioneering group of developmental scientists began to focus on the observable phenomena of at-risk adolescents who nevertheless achieve in life about the year 1970. (Masten – Sesma 1999). These researchers claimed that comprehending such events, the study of "resilience," held the potential to guide programs, policies, and interventions aimed at fostering competence and preventing or resolving issues in children's lives. Three decades of research on resilience in development, which has produced models, methodologies, and data with implications for theory, research, and intervention, have been motivated by these pioneers. As seen in myths, fairy tales, art, and literature throughout the ages that include heroes and heroines, the concept of personal perseverance in the face of adversity has been around for a very long time (Campbell et al. 1970). There was a notable interest in how individuals adapted to their environments when psychology started to become a systematic discipline in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as evidenced by theories ranging from natural selection to Freudian ego psychology (Masten – Coatsworth 1995). For instance, Freud (1928) remarked that people can overcome hardships even while facing death, describing gallows humor as "the ego's victorious assertion of its own invulnerability" (Masten 2018).

Early theories of mastery motivation, competence, and self-efficacy in 20th-century psychology, in addition to emphasizing the ego, concentrated on the advantages of adaptability in the course of development (Masten – Coatsworth 1995). In contrast, research on risk and the management of symptoms dominated studies of children and adolescents in problematic or risky circumstances for a large portion of the 20th century. "It is somewhat paradoxical that a nation which has exulted in its rapid expansion and its scientific-technological achievements should have developed in its studies of childhood such a vast 'problem' literature," wrote Lois Murphy in 1962 about the negative focus of research on individual differences in children (Masten 2018).

In the early publications on resilience and in the press about such phenomena, successful high-risk children were referred to variously as "invulnerable," "stress-resistant," or "resilient." Eventually, resilient became the most prominent term for describing such individuals. The words "invulnerable," "stress-resistant," and "resilient" were used interchangeably to describe successful high-risk youngsters in the early literature on resilience and in news coverage about such events. Eventually, the word most frequently used to describe these people was resilient (Masten 2018).

I. Psychopathology and Individual Resilience

The conception of the resilience construct has undergone a significant change during the past few decades. Children with schizophrenia in their families or poor children who avoided psychopathology and showed a healthy pattern of adaptation were once thought to be "invulnerable" or "invincible"; resilience was once thought to be a unique quality of the child. Resilience is currently referred to by modern developmental psychopathologists as a dynamic process of positive adaptation in the face of considerable adversity (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012). Instead, this viewpoint makes numerous assumptions about resilience that are false: It is not a trait, it is not static, and it cannot be quantified in any way. Risk exposure and "good" adaptation are two constructions that are subsumed under the notion of resilience, which is a "superordinate" construct (Pfefferbaum – Pfefferbaum – Norris 2010). Evidence of adaptive growth suggests that crucial protective mechanisms are at work to prevent an individual from following the unfavorable developmental trajectory that usually results from facing adversity. In an effort to clarify theory and inform therapeutic options, researchers and clinicians are looking for these protective processes (Patel et al. 2017).

Several recommendations for strengthening the idea of risk in relation to resilience are made within the context of developmental psychopathology. Developmental "turning points" might offer particularly fruitful opportunities for transformation toward greater vulnerability or greater strength, according to a fundamental premise of developmental psychopathology (Patel 2022). The ''sensitive periods'' during which a risk factor has a particularly high effect can therefore be better understood by looking into the developmental timing of exposure (Chandre et al. 2013). A rising body of evidence suggests that early life span development, including the prenatal stage, is a time when hardship can have a long-lasting effect on the life course (Patel et al. 2017).

Overall, therefore, the diversity of variables determining resilience is more significant than first hypothesized and time sensitivity may be important, which is not addressed by several authors.

II. Resilience and Developmental Psychology

The idea of resilience was inferential from the start, indicating patterns of successful adaptation to risk or adversity. These patterns served as the basis for the scientific hunt for mechanisms that could explain how successful positive adaptation was under challenging conditions. Positive adaptation and adversity were the two sets of criteria that were necessary to infer resilience, whether in the

life of a single person or a community of people. Additionally, the Project Competence researchers understood that resilience evolved and varied over time. As a result, a person may exhibit resilience at one stage of their life but not another. Additionally, we have to take developmental variations into account when defining good adaptation (Patel et al. 2017).

Along with the spread of systems theory throughout the developmental sciences, the idea of resilience in the Project Competence research also evolved through time. "Stress-resistant children... implies the presence of two components in the lives and makeup of these children: the presence of sustained and intense life stresses and (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012) the maintenance of mastery and competence despite such stress exposure," wrote Garmezy in one of his earlier accounts of the work on resilience (Garmezy 1993). Resilience is "the process of, capacity for, or outcomes of successful adaptation despite challenging or threatening circumstances," according to definition from 1990 (Masten et al. 1990)

Although there is an ambition to examine resilience in as broad and wide a context as possible, the psychopathological approach has a significant influence on the framework. Here, too, the focus is on identifying and defining the root cause used to establish a differential diagnosis. In my view, this is one of the reasons why it is difficult to map the diversity of resilience processes and narrows the scope for theorizing community resilience.

III. Individual and Community Problem

The conceptual boundaries of resilience have been clarified and improved via the convergence of theoretical and practical research. There is agreement on the fact that resilience is (Adam – Ward 2016) not a trait, even though a number of traits may be significant predictors of successful adaptation to adversity, (Aldrich, 2012) dynamic, in that it changes over time, and (Aquino – Reed 2002) multisystemic, in that it emerges through interactions between individuals and social systems (Luthar – Zelazo 2003; Masten – Cicchetti 2016; Ungar 2012; Ungar 2018). The fact that resilience is a dynamic and multisystemic concept that makes it difficult to measure directly makes this one of the most difficult aspects of resilience science (Rutter 2012). As a result, resilience must be inferred from measurements that are theorized to "tap in" into the overall latent concept (Miller-Graff 2022).

Given the widespread perception of resilience as multisystemic and contextual, the choice of the word "individual" may at first seem counterintuitive. Nevertheless, it serves as a crucial indicator of the limits. In

other words, the basic unit or level of analysis for the current review and taxonomic organization is the person. This acknowledges that while resilience is multi-systemic and transactional, many systems may be distinguished by appreciably various internal processes and change theories (Masten 2014; Norris et al. 2008).

According to social-ecological theories of development, systems are "place[s] with particular features in which individuals engage in particular activities in particular roles... for particular periods of time" (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, 514). This understanding gives rise to the concept of the individual as the unit of analysis within a series of dynamic systems. Here, rather than on the specific characteristics that control the higher level of resilience within those bigger systems, the emphasis is on how people act and function as agents within dynamic systems (Miller-Graff 2022).

By establishing shared goals and motivating residents to cooperate for the benefit of their community, community resilience is usually seen to foster greater well-being (Aked et al. 2010). Rural community resilience is frequently described in this context as both a "personal" and a "collective" capacity to adapt to change (Steiner – Markantoni 2014; Rennie – Billing 2015). According to (Magis 2010, 402), who offers this definition of resilience, "members of resilient communities intentionally develop personal and collective capacity that they engage to respond to and influence change, to sustain and renew the community, and to develop new trajectories for the communities' future." Through the inclusion of human agency (both collectively and individually), proactivity, and social capital, Markantoni offers a novel perspective on community resilience (Markantoni – Steiner – Meador 2021).

It can be seen that there is a significant effort to broaden the concept of resilience and to rethink its aspects.

IV. Conclusion

The study of resilience in psychology and psychiatry emerged from studies on kids who were at risk for mental health issues in the quest to comprehend the causes of the disorder (Masten 2007; Masten – Best – Garmezy 1990). Developmental psychopathology and resilience studies both arose from the same network of influences (Masten – Cicchetti 2010). In an effort to understand early impacts and paths to disorder, pioneers in the research of resilience looked at children who were thought to be at risk for a variety of issues because of environmental challenges, genetic vulnerabilities, or some combination of the two. However, these researchers soon realized that they were seeing a wide

range in the life course development of young people who were thought to have a higher than average likelihood of developing psychopathology. (Masten – Telegen 2012).

The complexity of the phenomena is highlighted when resilience is viewed as the end result of development of the individual or the community. Understanding that adaptation is a dynamic process taking place not only in the context of present risk but also in the context of individuals' developmental histories, scientific models that explain resilience must recognize and reflect this complexity. They now have the tools necessary to meet the demands of new difficulties, whether they be predictable or unpredictable hazards, thanks to their cumulative successes or failures in age-appropriate developmental tasks. They must accept that a variety of factors, both good and bad, including genes, physiology, psychology, relationships with family, peers, and others, school settings, religious settings, neighborhoods, social services, public policies, and more, can have an impact on the dynamic processes of adaptation (Cutuli – Herbers 2018).

In traditional communities around the world, a person is constrained and led by collective ideals, which are often referred to as social values. Communal values are "those values that express appreciation of the worth and importance of the community," according to Kwame Gyekye (Parsons 1964). These values are equivalent to notions of desired social systems that control how social actors make commitments. The attitudes and behaviors that ought to exist between people residing together in a community who not only share a social life but also have a sense of the common good are defined and guided by these ideals (Gyekye – Salminen 2009). The principles include sharing burdens and responsibilities, helping others, interdependence, solidarity, reciprocal duty, and social responsibility (Oyeshile 2006).

Taking the above brief history of resilience research into account, it can be seen that there have been significant jumps, leaving many questions at a single point of departure. With the most clarified resilience phenomenon being found in the inanimate world, subsequent research with the individual, the living person, has left many questions open as to how the phenomenon of resilience should be approached. The concomitance with psychopathology and the physical roots have significantly influenced the description of resilience. The causality known from psychopathology, the listing of variables, pushes observations more towards resilience as an outcome rather than a phenomenon. I suspect that this is one reason why it is difficult to study community resilience, where the individual and one variable model no longer works. At the

community level, there is a significant increase in the number of influencing factors and, presumably, a dominant increase in the identity of many groups, the issue of social identity, which may not always be so pronounced at the individual level.

The notion of resilience is increasingly being used in the context of future crisis management and resolution, and it is becoming increasingly interesting to know what exactly is meant by this at the community and societal level. Therefore, I think it is important to distinguish and clarify the boundaries and to highlight some of the points that could lead to potential deadlock.

It is important to note that the relationship between individual and community resilience is reciprocal, and community factors also play a role in shaping individual resilience. Building both individual and community resilience requires a holistic approach that addresses the interconnectedness of these factors.

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Suspending Babel: Communicability, Publicity, and Participation in Kant's Philosophy, and the Problem of Social Irrationality

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EISINGER GUIMARÃES, R.: Suspending Babel: Communicability, Publicity, and Participation in Kant's Philosophy, and the Problem of Social Irrationality
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 65 – 74

Kant posits Enlightenment as a gradual process, involving the use of one's own Understanding, seeking in Reason the touchstone of truth. This process, however, extends beyond individual growth, across generations, requiring the transmission of a cultural-rational heritage. Essential to this transmission are the communicability, participation, and publicity of ideas. Social irrationality, in turn, opposes this process. Understood as unreflective group thinking, where individuals share subjective thoughts as if they were objective, it is related to modern problems such as negationism, pseudoscience, and post-truth. This paper aims to discuss the relationship between (the lack of) communicability, the participation and the publicity of ideas, and the phenomenon of social irrationality (as well as how the culture of the former could avoid the latter) from a Kantian perspective.

Keywords: social irrationality – judgment – maxims of common human understanding – culture

I. Introduction

> Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech.
> (Genesis 11:7 King James Version)

At several moments in the Kantian corpus, significant emphasis is placed on the culture of communication, participation, and publicity of ideas. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that *culture*, as understood by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, assumes a dual character, incorporating both a dynamic process and the resultant outcome of it, as "production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends in general (thus those of his freedom)" (KU, AA 05:431).[1]

Now, to cultivate the aptitudes of a rational being is the self-development of one's rational faculties. And to that aim, Kant points to two precepts: to "'live in conformity with nature' (*naturae convenienter vive*)" and to "'*make yourself more perfect* than mere nature has made you' (*perfice te utfinem, perfice te ut medium*)" (MS TL, AA 06: 419). The former requires alignment with nature's ultimate end for humankind (cf. KU, AA 05: 431). However, nature does not seem too concerned about human happiness, since it has not given us the physiological attributes found in other creatures that ensure their well-being.

[1]The references to Kant's works follow the guidelines and abbreviations laid down by the *Akademie-Ausgabe*, collected in the *Gesammelte Schriften*, listed in the bibliography of this work, whose English quotations, unless noted as "altered translation," follow the also listed *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. The only exceptions are some Lectures on Anthropology (*Anweisung zur Menschen- und Weltkenntniß*), edited by Johann Adam Bergk under the pseudonym Friedrich Christian Starke, of which only excerpts were published in volume 25 of the *Akademie-Ausgabe*. This edition will be indicated by the abbreviation "Anweisung" followed by the pagination of its publication. The *Akademie's* guidelines for quoting Kant's writings are to use the siglum of Kant's work in the following form: Siglum, AA (volume in the *Akademie-Ausgabe*): page[s]. The sigla employed are: *AA* for *German Academy's Edition* [*Akademie-Ausgabe*]; *Anth* for *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* [*Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*]; *Br* for *Correspondence* [*Briefe*]; *EEKU* for *First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment* [*Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft*]; *GMS* for *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* [*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*]; *HN* for *Handwritten Heritage* [*Handschriftlicher Nachlass*]; *IaG* for *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim* [*Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*]; *KpV* for *Critique of practical Reason* [Kritik der praktischen Vernunft]; *KrV* for *Critique of pure Reason* [*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*] – to be quoted according to original pagination of editions A and B; *KU* for *Critique of the Power of Judgment* [*Kritik der Urteilskraft*]; *Log* for *The Jäsche logic* [*Logik*]; *MAM* for *Conjectural beginning of human history* [*Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte*]; *MS RL* for *The Metaphysics of Morals: Metaphysical first Principles of the Doctrine of Right* [*Die Metaphysik der Sitten: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*]; *MS TL* for *The Metaphysics of Morals: Metaphysical first Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue* [Die Metaphysik der Sitten: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre]; *Refl* for *Reflections* [*Reflexion*]; *V-Lo/Blomberg* for *The Blomberg logic* [*Logik Blomberg*]; *V-Lo/Dohna* for *The Dohna-Wundlacken logic* [Logik Dohna-Wundlacken]; *V-Lo/Wiener* for *The Vienna logic* [*Wiener Logik*]; *WA* for *An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?* [*Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?*]; *WDO* for *What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?* [*Was heißt sich im Denken orientiren?*]. As for emphasis, unless otherwise indicated, they are found in the original texts.

Indeed, were nature inclined towards our contentment, would it just grant us instincts, for, Kant claims "an implanted natural instinct would have led much more certainly" (GMS, AA 04: 396) to it.

Yet, since it endowed us with Reason,[2] and if, as Kant states, "all natural predispositions of creature are determined sometime to develop themselves completely and conformingly to ends [*zweckmäßig*]," so that any unused organ "is a contradiction in the teleological doctrine of nature" (IaG, AA 08: 18, altered translation), then it is our duty to flourish this faculty (cf. MS TL, AA 06: 444). And this process of Reason's development can be understood as the means by which one can "*make* [*oneself*] *more perfect* than mere nature has made [one]," going from the realm of instincts to that of Reason, thus making the transition from "the guardianship of nature into the state of freedom [*Stand der Freiheit*]" (MAM, AA 08: 115, altered translation) – a state in which individuals achieve rational maturation and Enlightenment.

The path to Enlightenment, however, goes beyond the individual sphere. Indeed, Kant points out that if the innate predispositions toward Reason were fully realized in a sole individual, that individual "would have to live exceedingly long in order to learn how he is to make a complete use of … such predispositions" – for, he argues, Reason "does not operate instinctively, but rather needs attempts, practice and instruction in order gradually to progress from one stage of insight to another." Given, then, the limitation of the human lifespan by nature, knowledge transfer becomes imperative in "an immense series of generations" (IaG, AA 08: 19), for not the human *being*, but the human*kind* to reach its full development.

If so, humankind's progress hinges on knowledge transmission as a cultural-rational legacy for posterity – and communication, participation, and publicity of ideas are pivotal for it. On the other hand, as a sort of "Babel Tower," social irrationality opposes the latter, risking both Enlightenment and sociability inherent to humanity,

In order to address the issue of (in)communicability of ideas and social irrationality from a Kantian perspective, this paper begins by outlining the phenomenon of social irrationality and its implications (section 2). Rooted in lapses of Judgment that obscure the accuracy of thought, it could potentially be rectified through Kant's "maxims of the common human Understanding"

[2] The terms "Reason," "Judgment" and "Understanding" are capitalized whenever they refer to faculties.

(section 3), since the confluence of the latter implies agreement between individual and third-party standpoints, ensuring that a judgment aligns with a broader human rationality. However, achieving this confluence seems to depend on the culture of our faculties – a culture which, arguably, helps to remedy social irrationality (section 4).

II. Outlining the Problem

What I am calling "social irrationality" concerns the uncritical collective adherence to a thought held to be true, in a kind of cognitive vice. This phenomenon connects to contemporary issues such as negationism, pseudoscience, and post-truth, reflecting a crisis in (the reliability of) technical-scientific knowledge and its (intended) replacement by unsubstantiated notions. If, on the one hand, Kant's *Canon of Pure Reason* emphasizes that the line between science, faith, and opinion is based on communicable and universally valid criteria (cf. KrV, A820/B848), on the other hand, social irrationality, as a cognitive vice, neglecting universal validity, is confined to the realm of belief and opinion, divergent from the rigor of science and certainty.

A cognitive vice, whereby the subjective is wrongly taken as objective, is called by Kant a vice of subreption, which consists in "giv[ing] the Understanding a false direction" (EEKU, AA 20: 222), providing flawed and insufficient grounds. Kant highlights that such a vice, in the juridical sphere, concerns the "common fault (*vitium subreptionis*) of experts on right of *misrepresen*[*ting*], as if it were also the objective principle of what is right in itself, that rightful principle which a court is authorized and indeed bound to adopt for its own use (hence for a subjective purpose) in order to pronounce and judge what belongs to each as his right, although the latter is very different from the former" (MS RL, AA 06: 297).

If so, such vices of subreption lie in lapses of Judgement rather than of Reason or Understanding, and such lapses – which, in turn, lead to social irrationality – stem from a failure to accurately distinguish the subjective from the objective, in a clouded discernment. Were this the case, it presents itself as a difficult issue: for, Kant claims, "the lack of the Judgment is that which is properly called stupidity, and such a failing is not to be helped" (KrV, A133, B172, footnote).

Now, this assertion's bleakness arises from the apparent lack of redress for cognitive vices. This, in turn, would regard those who have such vicious behaviour primarily as lost causes. It is crucial, however, to consider that, in

Kant's first *Critique*, "Judgement" is confined to cognition formation and defined as "the faculty of *subsuming* under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands under a given rule (*casus datae legis*) or not" (KrV, A132. B171). It is *in this context* that Kant designates this faculty as a "natural gift" that "cannot be taught but only practiced" (KrV, A132/B171). However, in his third *Critique*, Kant broadens the concept of "Judgement," endowing it with the ability to establish its own rules, called "heautonomy" (KU, AA 05: 185; EEKU, AA 20: 225) – an enlargement with which that incurable deficiency of the Judgment is overcome.

Judgment's heautonomy is an unfolding of the Copernican revolution (cf. Kaulbach, 1984, p. 74) outlined in the first *Critique* (cf. KrV, BXIVss) which permeates Kant's critical corpus. Through it, Judgment occupies a position within the autonomous cognitive faculties, sharing this realm with Reason and Understanding, and housing its own a priori principle. Moreover, Kant claims that aesthetic Judgement, i.e., taste, through which we decide whether something is beautiful or not, is central to discovering the principle of Judgement *per se* (cf; KU, AA 05: 193). And to clarify a "critique of taste," he stresses the relevance of "the following maxims of the common human Understanding": "to think for oneself," "to think in the position of everyone else," and "always to think in accord with oneself" (KU, AA 05: 294).

Testing One's Judgment

Such maxims of common human Understanding, Kant will say, are the "general conditions of the prevention of error" (Refl, AA 16: 294). And since "who does not judge, does not err" (Refl, AA 16: 287), they can help us understand vices of subreption from a Kantian perspective. The first maxim – to think for oneself – implies thinking without prejudices or constraints, reflecting on one's own. It means leaving the "minority" (WA, AA 08: 35) in which human beings find themselves, taking the reins of one's own thoughts. It is the search for "a Reason that is never *passive*" (KU. AA 05: 294), abdicating the guidance of others, expressed in the motto of the Enlightenment: "*Sapere aude!* Have courage to make use of your *own* Understanding!" (WA, AA 08: 35).

The weight of this maxim lies in the fact that "only what we can do ourselves we understand from the ground" (Br, AA 12: 57), while the knowledge we receive from others is never certain and can be misinterpreted: the first way concerns an active use of our faculties; the

second one, a merely passive procedure that is "fruitful soil for rapidly proliferating prejudices, and it hinders all improvement and progress in a thing" (V-Lo/Weiner, AA 24: 866). In the former case, the thought is *autonomous* and one seeks in one's one Reason "the supreme touchstone of truth" (WDO, AA 08: 146); in the latter, it is *heteronomous* and trapped in that "minority."

The second maxim – to think in the position of everyone else – involves the capacity to adopt alternate standpoints and assimilate them. Standing for the "*broad-minded* way" (KU, AA 05: 294) of thinking, it could be called "maxim of the principle of publicity" (Blesenkemper, 1987:263), of making "one's judgments publicly known" (Anweisung: 5, my translation), prompting a "*universal standpoint* (which [one] can only determine by putting [oneself] into the standpoint of others)" (KU, AA 05: 295).

Now, if this maxim claims that the touchstone of truth "belongs not only to our own but also *to the minds of others* [emphasis added]" (Anweisung: 28, my translation), it seems to contradict the former one. Yet, the apparent contra-diction fades when parsing the expressions "not only" and "but also." For, if "one need not seek to bring about an agreement of others with the cognition that one has oneself," the certainty of proper judgment rests on comparing and testing against the judgments of others, so that "a cognition is not correct when it agrees with my private Understanding but when it agrees with the universal laws of the Understanding of all [human beings]" (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 187, altered translation).

Thus, to confront our judgments with those of others is essential to evade the pitfalls of "logical egoism": a state that can result from "*indifference* toward the judgments of others, in that I hold the judgments of others to be unnecessary for ... my own judgment," as much as from "*conceit* and *arrogance*, where one allows it to himself alone to make a correct judgment about a thing for all others" (V-Lo/Weiner, AA 24: 874). Whatever the case, Kant states, it would be "unfair to condemn people to keep all their judgments to themselves [,] for *they have to communicate* [emphasis added] if they are not to lose [a] strong criterion of truth, to compare their judgments with the judgments of others" (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 740).[3] "To think for oneself" and "to think in the position of everyone else," then, are not opposing but complementary maxims; they are two movements and criteria

[3] This comparative approach is noted as preventing a "Cyclops" state (cf. Anth, AA 07: 227).

of truth: one *intra*- and the other *inter*subjective; the agreement between one's *own* thought and the thought *of others*.

Lastly, the third one – always to think in accord with oneself – gets relatively less attention from Kant. Yet, he assigns it as the maxim of "perseverance" (Refl, AA 15: 187): the hardest to attain, achievable "only ... through the combination of the first two and after frequent observance of them" (KU, AA 05: 295), thus implying the agreement of manifold standpoints in a unified voice – the voice of Reason (cf. Blesenkemper, 1987, p. 265).

These maxims of common human Understanding embody a "normative pragmatics of our Reason, that is, a piece of the theory of Enlightenment" (Kohler, 2008, p. 145), regarding "an action independent of the reflecting Judgement," "an elevation above oneself as an expansion of consciousness," and "an identification between the general standpoints and one's own way of thinking" (Kaulbach, 1984, pp. 140ss). Yet, as prescriptions (cf. Anth, AA 07: 200), these maxims concern less something-*to-be-achieved* than something-*already-established* – and, as such, they seem to have a bit of a postulate, i.e., of "a practical ... proposition, ... that determines a possible action, in the case of which it is presupposed that the way of executing it is immediately certain" (Log, AA 09: 112). Now, if a postulate serves as a means to render something possible by fulfilling its "necessary condition" (Log, AA 09: 110),[4] these maxims work as postulates since they outline the requisites for a judgment to be "appropriate to the broad horizon of humanity" (Kaulbach, 1984, p. 143), in line with "human Reason as a whole" (KU, AA 05: 293).

However, such a "broad horizon" must be sought by individuals themselves, through the cultivation of Judgement itself. And if so, the aforementioned concept of culture plays a key role in this context.

IV. Final Considerations: Challenges and Possibilities

In light of what has been said, the culture of Judgement seems related to the culture of communicability, publicity, and participation. However, it demands a two-way movement: to try to communicate our judgments and, and concurrently, to want to make them communicable, i.e., meeting the conditions of their communicability, following the prescriptions of those

[4] Consider, e.g., the practical Reason's postulates that establish conditions for realizing the"*highest good"* which the Moral Law demands "as the object of our will" (KpV, AA 05: 133).

"maxims." This, in turn, would reveal a rather ambiguous aspect of this way of thinking: it has both a *transcendental* aspect, underpinning universal communication, and an *empirical* one, requiring active search and promotion in practice.

Regrettably, Kant refrains from reconciling these two aspects, and the issue of how the transcendental and empirical interact or mutually condition one another in judgments remains unaddressed. However, it could be related to a historical-cultural dimension of Judgment, intricately linked to the possible realization of a "universal process of humanisation" (Thom, 1993, p. 23), rooted in Judgment's culture itself. Diametrically to this project, on the other hand, is social irrationality: for there is no concern to escape from a (methodo)logical egoism, nor an interest in establishing thoughts on universally scrutable grounds – in a word, there is no care to make ideas communicable, participatory and public (not, at least, with good motives).[5]

If so, social irrationality emerges as an obstacle to what Kant terms "*humaniora*," i.e., the ability to "communicate universally" (HN, AA 16: 155) with the ability "to cultivate humanity" (Refl, AA 15: 604). For "*humanity,*" he claims, "means on the one hand the universal *feeling of participation* and on the other hand the capacity for being able to *communicate* one's inmost

[5] I would like to express my gratitude for the comments of two blind reviewers – in particular, the suggestion that I "could have devoted more attention to the application of Kantian ideas to the problem of social irrationality and could have analyzed the phenomena of fake news, negationism and pseudoscience separately – … [since the] manifestations of social irrationality are more and more *communicate* in the *public* space and more and more people *participate* in them (but they are not publicly communicated and shared in the sense of Kantian principles)." I couldn't agree more. This is because, on the one hand, Kantian principles are strongly rooted, as one would expect, in a transcendental apparatus – an apparatus provided by Kant, without which part of his argument becomes incomprehensible and the discussion cannot be continued in a meaningful way. On the other hand, however, the manifestations of social irrationality – and many of those who dedicate themselves to studying them – do not have recourse to such transcendental machinery. Thus, any direct identification between the question of the communicability of manifestations of social irrationality and the question of the communicability, participation, and publicity of ideas as presented by Kant would be a shallow simplification of the problem. Aware of this, if the purpose of this paper is to be of any use, it would be precisely to show that, even outside transcendental argumentation, some elements of Kantian philosophy could be recovered and used (with parsimony) to analyze and problematize a genuinely contemporary phenomenon - such as social irrationality. Unfortunately, given the limitations of space, it wasn't possible here to devote myself more to the problem - I have, however, done so in another article (cf. Eisinger Guimarães 2023, 80 – 85) – which, in a sense, develops the ideas presented here a little further, although the present text contains elements that the other does not. However, I'm still short of the analysis that this issue deserves.

self universally" (KU, AA 05: 355): a hallmark of human rationality, the absence of which hinders its progress.

While stating the link between fake news, negationism and pseudoscience with social irrationality might seem redundant, delving into Kantian notions of "incommunicability" and "Judgment's culture" could be crucial not only to indicate the root of these phenomena but also to potentially devise solutions to overcome it, thus suspending this *Babel Tower* of incommunicable ideas.

By approaching the broad phenomenon of social irrationality from the "necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which is assumed in every logic and every principle of cognitions that is not skeptical" (KU, AA 05: 239), one could aim at a renewed understanding of Kant's philosophy; by doing so, one could claim its not always recognized topicality – of a philosophy that has its limitations and obsolescence, but which maintains (at least, it was intended to show) its relevance to contemporary issues.

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This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brazil (CAPES) – Finance Code 001, within the scope of the project *Kantian Perspectives on Social Irrationality.*

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PART IV: HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Three Early Interpretations of Schelling's Philosophy: Tillich, Metzger, Rosenzweig

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THÜMMEL, J.: Three Early Interpretations of Schelling's Philosophy: Tillich, Metzger, Rosenzweig
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 75 – 85

This paper discusses the historical constellation in the first 20 years of the 20th century concerning the interpretation of Schelling's philosophy. We will present the approach of F. Medicus, P. Tillich, F. Rosenzweig, H. Ehrenberg, and W. Metzger and we will compare them, point out their similarities and differences. A crucial common point is found in Kant's philosophy. Through the emphasis placed on the idea of development, we can reflect on the periodization of Schelling's philosophy presented by our authors. However, these periodizations are different by each named author. The result of our paper is to point out two interpretive traditions in Tillich's and Rosenzweig's works on Schelling, and to give a reason for the plurality of approaches to Schelling's philosophy.

Keywords: German Idealism – F. W. J. Schelling – F. Rosenzweig – P. Tillich – history of interpretations

In the first 20 years of the 20th century, interest in the philosophy of German idealism experienced a renaissance. However, the reception of Schelling's philosophy is conditioned by the previous interpretations of Kant's, Fichte's and Hegel's philosophy. In this text, we will describe the constellation of some initial interpretations of Schelling's philosophy in the first 20 years of the 20th century. These interpretations of Schelling's thought presented here are crucial for the further development of Schelling's reception, nevertheless they are themselves often imperfect and conditioned by the position of their authors. By uncovering these positions, we will be able to establish two things: *First*, we will

show, how the position of each interpretation is influenced by the interpreters own philosophical position, and *second*, we will compare these interpretations and show the differences between them. As protagonists of the described historical constellation, we will present on the one hand Tillich and his teacher Medicus, on the other hand, Ehrenberg, Rosenzweig, and his confrontation with Metzger's interpretation of Schelling's philosophy, as well as the connection of all of them. The aim of the text is to show the plurality of philosophical-historical approaches based on different philosophical positions and to illustrate the contradictions in their interpretations, which in the reception of Schelling's philosophy partly reach up to the present. The mentioned authors do not represent the whole discussion, nevertheless, they give us a picture of the discussion of their time.

A common denominator for our authors is the reception of Kant's philosophy. The Kant-reception of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century is the initial point for the positions of our protagonists. However, they do not take the same course. As it turns out, Medicus and Rosenzweig begin in the same tradition of Kant-reception, but they go in a different direction. To reveal the genealogy of our subject, we begin with F. Medicus. From him, we pass to his student P. Tillich. Against this first position, we set a similar one, yet rooted in a different soil, connected with the names of F. Rosenzweig, H. Ehrenberg and W. Metzger. Even if a concrete connection between these two traditions, between Tillich and Rosenzweig in their interpretation of Schelling, could not be established, we still see an interesting comparative possibility of Schelling interpretations according to their content as well as their formal and historical preconditions.

I. First Position: F. Medicus and P. Tillich

Although the Schelling interpretation of P. Tillich is our main interest, we have to go one step deeper and start with Tillich's teacher F. Medicus. Medicus, who worked at the University of Halle until 1911, was first influenced by Kant's, later Fichte's philosophy.[1] We mention only some of his works: *Kants Philosophie der Geschichte* (Kant-Studien VII, 1901),[2] *Zur Philosophie der Geschichte. Rückblicke und Einblicke* (Deutsche Monatsschrift für das gesamte Leben der Gegenwart III, (1904)[3] and *Fichte. Dreizehn Vorlesungen gehalten an der Universität Halle* (1905).[4]

[1] For Medicus see (Graf – Christophersen, 2004; Picardi 2013).
2 (Medicus 1902a, 1902b).
3 (Medicus 1904).
4 (Medicus 1905).

Medicus advocates in his studies the position of Kant. Later, he finds an affection for neo-Kantian psychologism, which also influences his interpretations of German idealism.[5] In his lectures on Fichte we clearly see his position in which he uses the formal psychologism against Fichte or precisely, through the formal psychologism he interprets Fichte's philosophy (Medicus 1905, 77 – 79, 86 – 88). In the period about which we are concerned here, Medicus dealt only with Kant and Fichte – Hegel and Schelling are mentioned only marginally. The result of his work was, among others, a new edition of Fichte's writings. This opened a door of the Fichte renaissance in the concrete, the renaissance of interest in German idealism in general.[6]

The first person we consider here, who fundamentally deals with Schelling's philosophy, is P. Tillich.[7] From Tillich's works, only two interest us here. These are two theses, one theological and one philosophical. The first thesis is from 1910: *Die religionsgeschichtliche Konstruktion in Schellings positiver Philosophie, ihre Voraussetzungen und Prinzipien*[8], and the second is from 1912: *Mystik und Schuldbewußtsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung*.[9] We do not intend to engage here in a more in-depth analysis of these texts, but only to work out the field for a possible affinity with the second position. First, however, the continuity from Medicus to Tillich will be outlined.

We do not see a strong methodological similarity between Medicus and Tillich. Nor is a concrete systematic philosophical position to be found in Tillich's work on Schelling. Thus, we cannot understand Tillich as Medicus' philosophical successor in *sensu stricto*, although Medicus' influence on Tillich cannot be denied. Tillich's early interest in Fichte and German idealism is overshadowed and directed by Medicus (Tillich 1998b). Nevertheless, Tillich does not adopt the Neo-Kantian dictum in his interpretation of Schelling. His approach is a concrete one that adheres directly to Schelling's text. In a final remark on Medicus and Tillich, we address their relation to the content of their interest itself. Anticipating the comparison with Rosenzweig, we must note that

[5] We follow this transition along Medicus' texts – first in his contributions to Kant Studies (Kant Studies III, IV, VII), which are mostly a historical reconstruction of Kant's philosophy and later a transformation in his interpretations influenced by Neo-Kantianism. This does not mean, however, that Medicus himself holds a strict Neo-Kantian systematic position. Medicus' actual position critical of Neo-Kantianism is very close to H. Ehrenberg. See the following remarks.

[6] Medicus was not the only protagonist of this turn, but his part in it should not be marginalized either.

[7] For Tillich see (Danz 2019).

[8] (Tillich 1998a).

[9] (Tillich 1956).

both Medicus and Tillich take the works of Fichte or Schelling as a whole and understand the work of each author as motivated by a unified idea throughout the entire development of their thought, which is given to us in steps or parts.

We see the periodization of Schelling's philosophy already in Tillich's 1910 work (Tillich 1998a). Tillich divides Schelling's philosophy into early and later philosophy. Although Tillich does not give exact dates, we can nevertheless see that he places the dividing point in Schelling's *Freiheitsschrift* (1809). We can also make this distinction through positive and negative philosophy (Tillich 1998a, 160 – 172). In the 1912 writing, Tillich proposes *seven parts* of Schelling's philosophy, as well as the division into *two periods* (Tillich 1956, 14f). We would have been interested in the concrete designation of the detailed periodization, but this is not explicitly presented by Tillich. We can, however, attempt a reconstruction from his text. There is the *first period*, which lasts until the year 1809. The subject of Tillich's thesis is mysticism in Schelling's philosophy, and is therefore the leading term in the development of Schelling's thought. We follow Tillich's division: As the *first part* we can name the mysticism of will – here we can include the first works of Schelling. In his 1910 writing, Tillich calls this period the *Fichtean period* (Tillich 1956, 35 – 42, 1998a, 163). This is followed by a *part*, which we divide into two: a *philosophy of art* and a *philosophy of nature* (Tillich 1956, 42 – 59). We assume that this is the *early philosophy of nature* and the *philosophy of art* up to 1800.[10] The *last part of the first period* is the *philosophy of absolute identity*, in which Tillich foregrounds intellectual intuition (Tillich 1956, 59 – 76). We have presented the *first four parts of the first period*. We could not identify the remaining *three parts of the second period* because Tillich proceeds more systematically in the third chapter of his work, and periodization is difficult to distinguish. For our further endeavour, however, this result is sufficient.

We close the first section of our text with a short résumé. We have before us two representatives of a tradition, which draws with Medicus' Fichte-renaissance the way and with Tillich turns to the philosophy of Schelling. We have also seen how Tillich classifies the philosophy of Schelling. In the further, we will keep this theme and come back again to Medicus and Tillich. Let us step up to the second position.

[10] Tillich wants to oppose Windelband by placing Schelling's *Philosophy of art* (1804) precisely not in this part (Tillich 1956, 51).

II. Second Position: H. Ehrenberg, F. Rosenzweig, and W. Metzger.

Hans Ehrenberg was, like his cousin Franz Rosenzweig, of Jewish descent. Both grew up intellectually through the common friendship and discussion with each other. Ehrenberg, in contrast to Rosenzweig, accepted Christianity. Rosenzweig, after a religious crisis, returned to the faith of his fathers. The academic lives of both cousins diverge as well. While Ehrenberg was a private docent in Heidelberg, Rosenzweig left the academic field and was involved in the founding of the *Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus*.[11] For both authors, the reception of German idealism is essential. Both have become philosophically mature in the confrontation with Kant and Neukantianism – Ehrenberg in Heidelberg, Rosenzweig in Freiburg.[12] Both, however, go beyond this position. Ehrenberg brings a critique to Neo-Kantianism[13] and Rosenzweig is interested in Hegel and Schelling.

If we juxtapose Medicus and Rosenzweig, we see that both proceed from the study of Kant. But the difference is clear. While Medicus studied Kant in his academic career, Rosenzweig was interested in Kant only as a student. The later Rosenzweig's approach to Kant is very instrumental, he uses only what brings him nearer to his goal, even if the topic should have an incorrect interpretation (Disse 2004, 249 – 271). More than Kant and Neo-Kantianism, Rosenzweig was interested in Hegel and historicism. In the spirit of historicism, he wrote his dissertation *Hegel und der Staat* (Rosenzweig 2010). During its elaboration, Rosenzweig made a discovery of the so-called *Das Älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus*, which was of the greatest importance for the study of German idealism (Rosenzweig 1917).

Among this duo of Ehrenberg and Rosenzweig, Ehrenberg is probably the one with a better historical view and knowledge of German idealism. At several places in their correspondence, Rosenzweig admits this (Rosenzweig 1984, 130). Historically critically, we can compare the correspondence of the two authors and their writings, but we cannot comprehend the amount of personal communication. Hans Ehrenberg has succeeded in a wonderful attempt, namely, to capture the history of German idealism in a dialogue: *Disputation: Drei Bücher vom deutschen Idealismus* (Ehrenberg 1924). One book

[11] For Rosenzweig and Ehrenberg see (Schmied-Kowarzik 1991, 91 – 120).

[12]For Ehrenberg see (Ehrenberg 1910). Rosenzweig elaborates Kant's concept of transcendental apperception in a seminar with J. Cohn in Freiburg (Herzfeld 2015, 45 – 152). In Rosenzweig's diary and letters, we can read about his uneasy reading of Kant (Rosenzweig 1973, 62).

[13] This criticism, as already mentioned, is close to Medicus, in that Ehrenberg is even more radical and goes beyond Kantianism (Ehrenberg 1911).

each deals with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel and gives a dialogue between numerous people about the respective philosophy.[14] Ehrenberg's dialogue presents an attempt to revive Schelling's philosophy. We assume – the reason is the unquestionable similarity – that Rosenzweig emerges from the same structure of Schelling's philosophy that Ehrenberg presents. With Tillich, we have seen how he divides Schelling's philosophy into two major periods. Ehrenberg and Rosenzweig, however, come up with a different periodization that – for not an obvious reason – limits Schelling's philosophy only to what Tillich calls the *first period*. The late philosophy mentioned by Rosenzweig is thus not the positive philosophy of the 1820s, but of the *Freiheitsschrift* (1809) and of the *Weltalter* (1811).

We will present the division of Schelling's philosophy that Rosenzweig presents in his work. Rosenzweig's motivation for this is instrumental to his essay on the *Älteste Systemprogramm*. He wants to attribute the manuscript of the *Älteste Systemprogramm* to Schelling through a precise periodization of Schelling's philosophical development and to show the unity of his development with the themes of the *Älteste Systemprogramm*. We present Rosenzweig's proposal there, based on the themes of his philosophy, specifically on the *Älteste Systemprogramm*: „Fichtesche Erzeugung des Seins im Ich, spekulative Physik … eine revolutionäre Staatslehre, eine idealistisch-aufklärerische Geschichtsphilosophie, die Kunstlehre des ‚Systems des transzendentalen Idealismus', eine Philosophie der Mythologie" (Rosenzweig 1984, 8). We even see that Rosenzweig ends the division already before *the philosophy of absolute identity* – this is because of the *Älteste Systemprogramm* in which the idea of absolute identity is not included. However, Rosenzweig also gives another periodization in the same text: *philosophy of nature*, *philosophy of art*, *philosophy of mythology* (Rosenzweig 1984, 33). If we compare this with Tillich's division and both with Schelling's own writings, this division into *philosophy of nature* and *philosophy of art* in the first phase is not problematic. The *philosophy of mythology* can be considered questionable. In current Schelling research, the *philosophy of mythology* refers to Schelling's later philosophy (Wilson 1993), to Schelling's lectures in philosophy of mythology. If we contrast Tillich and Rosenzweig, the *philosophy of mythology* should have fallen into one with the *second period* (Tillich 1956, 102ff). However, this is not the case. Rosenzweig does not refer to Schelling's late philosophy but describes *the*

[14] The dialogue was also popular with Schelling (Schelling 2021, 275). Ehrenberg and Rosenzweig see the intention of a dialog in the confrontation, which later develops into the philosophy of dialogue.

philosophy of mythology of the early romantic movement to form a new mythology, which is also included in the *Älteste Systemprogramm* and can also be found in Schlegel, Novalis, and others (Tilliette 1982, 42).

We see this problem developed further in two ways: The *first one* we can see in Rosenzweig, the *second* one in the interpreters of Rosenzweig's philosophy. At *first*: the periodization of Schelling's philosophy by Rosenzweig is not comprehensive (Rosenzweig does not describe Schelling's philosophy after 1800), and therefore it does not have the explanatory power for Schelling's whole philosophy. It comes to a terminological overlapping. Rosenzweig's term *late philosophy of Schelling* is thus not the whole *philosophy of the second period* by Tillich, but the philosophy of the *Freiheitsschrift* (1809) with the limit of *Weltalter* (1811). Rosenzweig proposes another periodization, in which he divides Schelling's Philosophy into *early*, *late*, and *last* (Rosenzweig 1984, 35). This brings us to the *second* issue. Several interpretations of Rosenzweig's philosophy presented his philosophy through the late *positive philosophy* of Schelling, concretely through the philosophy of revelation.[15] But this, according to our position, is a misinterpretation of Rosenzweig's intentions. When Rosenzweig refers in his words to "*Schellingsche Spätphilosophie*" (Rosenzweig 1976, 13), it is not the *late positive philosophy* (in Rosenzweig's periodization the *last* Schelling), but the *later philosophy in his periodization* of Schelling's philosophy, that is the *Freiheitsschrift*.[16]

That both Ehrenberg and Rosenzweig stand only in the *first* half of Schelling's philosophy may also have a reason. Just as Tillich complains that there is no literature in his time on Schelling (Tillich 1998a, 160), Rosenzweig must also make do with the minimum that is there. As a major source, Rosenzweig used a work of Metzger, *Die Epochen der Schellingschen Philosophie von 1795 bis 1802*.[17] Also in other writings that Rosenzweig cites is the focus only on the *first period* of Schelling's philosophy.[18] Although Rosenzweig is critical of Metzger, he nevertheless adopts his periodization. Metzger's periodization has a strong emphasis on the development of philosophical problems of Schelling's

[15] For example, see (Schmied-Kowarzik 2020, 395).
[16] Another argument for this is that Rosenzweig places the late Schelling next to Schopenhauer and mentions the concept of continence and the concepts of "*will*", "*freedom*" and "*unconsciousness*" in both (Rosenzweig 1976, 13).
[17] (Metzger 1911).
[18] Rosenzweig refers to several dissertations that appeared in Germany in his time. Our question was, whether Rosenzweig was familiar with the first or the second dissertation of Tillich. However, we must at this point deny a direct or indirect (through Ehrenberg) knowledge of Tillich's work in our research.

philosophy. Schelling is presented as a philosopher who tries to think his position always further and anew. The legacy of Kant's, Fichte's, but also Spinoza's philosophy is thought further, and when Schelling came to an unsolvable issue, he tries to think and develop his position anew. In Metzger's work, we see a division of Schelling's philosophy by issues, which are, however, characterized by Schelling's writings. Metzger's *first period* (Metzger calls them *epochs*) is characterized by the *Ichschrift* and *Philosophische Briefe*. The *second period* is contained in *Allgemeine Übersicht*, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur* and *Von der Weltseele*. The *third* period then by the *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*, *Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*, and *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*. This division ends in the *last period* in the writings *Über den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie und die richtige Art ihre Probleme aufzulösen*, *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* and *Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge. Ein Gespräch*. We see here that Metzger's *period*s are only the *first period* of Tillich's division.

Rosenzweig, however, also refers to Medicus in his work on *Das Älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus*. He mentions Medicus – Rosenzweig writes Medikus – and his "*Fichtebiographie*" (Rosenzweig 1984, 14). This is probably the book *Fichtes Leben* (1914). As a possibility, we have also processed Medicus's lectures on Fichte, but this has proved to be a dead end. There is also the possibility that Rosenzweig read Medicus' book or essay on Kant.[19] That Rosenzweig refers to Medicus and takes a certain position from him against Metzger shows that he has read him and understands his position.[20] In the whole of Rosenzweig's opus we cannot find any other reference to Medicus (or, as Rosenzweig writes, Medikus). The only source from Medicus should be in his writing on Fichte.

III. Conclusion

If Medicus is the representative of the Fichte renaissance and Tillich works his way from Fichte to Schelling, Rosenzweig's path is a different one. Rosenzweig, as well as Metzger and Medicus, starts with Kant. Rosenzweig sees the ahistoricity of Kant's philosophy and wants to find a new approach. Medicus

[19] Our research is still open on this point. The direct point to which Rosenzweig refers has not yet been found.

[20] Rosenzweig describes two possible understandings of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* around 1797. Metzger should understand Schelling's position through Schelling's book *Philosophische Briefe*, Medicus through Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Rosenzweig 1984, 14). Rosenzweig uses Medicus to argument against Metzger for a stronger influence of Kant on Schelling.

finds it in Fichte, Rosenzweig first in Hegel, later, when Rosenzweig's Hegelian-dialectical project fails, in Schelling (Medicus 1904, 846; Rosenzweig 1973, 410). Rosenzweig stands in a different tradition than Medicus and Tillich, yet we see a link between Rosenzweig, Metzger, Ehrenberg, and Tillich. This is evident in the periodization of Schelling's philosophy, some of which overlap. We see from all our authors a strong emphasis on the idea of development in Schelling's philosophy. Tillich presented a model of a development in Schelling's philosophy that focus on a unity of idea through the development until the end of Schillings positive philosophy. Metzger, as the main inspiration of Rosenzweig's interpretation of Schelling, elaborates a model of philosophical development, which focuses on rethinking of unsolvable issues by Schelling. This leads him to a stair like model of philosophical development, in which the next step deals with the unsolved issue of the preceding. This development is, however, considered by Metzger only to the year 1802. We could say, only to the end of the first period in Tillich's model. Rosenzweig's position is a middle one. On one hand, he adapts Metzger's limitation of Schelling's work only to the year 1802 – in Tillich's Model only to the first period. But his interpretation of Schelling's philosophical development is, on the other site, much closer to Tillich, without knowing his work. Rosenzweig understands the development of Schelling's philosophy as follows: the ideas that are discussed by Schelling later are already present in the *Älteste Systemprogramm*. This text contains all the ideas that are elaborated in his works until 1800. Rosenzweig describes Schelling's philosophical development from the *Älteste Systemprogramm*, which includes all themes of Schelling's work until 1800. Tillich, on the other hand, describes the development of Schelling's philosophy with the aim of describing the last systematic position – in what would Rosenzweig name the *last Schelling* – as a resolute of Schelling's development (Tillich 1998a, 128).

Although the development is conceived differently by our authors, they are nevertheless based on a concept of development. The approach of Tillich and Rosenzweig are, in the end, parallel interpretative traditions rooted in the common ground. The consequences are at last also different. Tillich argues for a positive historic reconstruction of Schelling's text and a systematic reconstruction for the research in religious questions (Tillich 1998a, 158). Rosenzweig's aim in his periodization of Schelling's philosophical development is not a systematic, but a historic-critical. Rosenzweig shows, through the periodization of Schelling's early work, that Schelling is truly the author of the *Älteste Systemprogramm* manuscript. In contrast to Tillich, he does not include the whole of Schelling's development. In his later work, we see the

reason for that: Following Rosenzweig, Schelling's philosophy turns off the course presented in the *Älteste Systemprogramm* and moves near to a critique of the idealistic philosophy (Rosenzweig 1976, 13). Rosenzweig uses Schelling's argumentation against Hegel. This is the adventure that lies behind Tillich's work on Schelling.

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The funding for the present text was provided by the Aktion Österreich-Tschechien, AÖCZ-Semesterstpendien (MPC-2022-05020).

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Formation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the Philosophy of Leibniz: On the Way to Monad

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CAISOVÁ, S.: Formation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the Philosophy of Leibniz: On the Way to Monad
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 86 – 95

The aim of the presented contribution is to outline the philosophical genesis of the principle of sufficient reason in the philosophy of the modern great, Leibniz. During his work, he strove to create a science in which he could combine intellectual knowledge and faith. His teaching is made up of fundamental, even axiomatic theses or principles, against the background of which he formulates his theories concerning various areas, but primarily of a metaphysical-theological nature. Despite the fact that in his philosophy everything is connected with everything, upon deeper analysis one finds oneself in a labyrinth of his thoughts. One way to read Leibniz more accurately is to focus on an analysis of one of his principles. The presented paper aims to present the formation of a key principle, the principle of sufficient reason, as it gradually crystallized in the mind of the philosopher himself.

Keywords: Leibniz – The Principle of Sufficient Reason – God – *inesse*

Introduction

Although more than three centuries have passed since Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's active life, his thought legacy still attracts attention mainly for its complexity. The picture of the world that he presented to us in his work is really like this. In Leibniz's teachings, individual principles and ideas are interconnected and everything is harmoniously related to everything else. The labyrinth of human freedom and continuum, as the thinker usually calls them, is actually a projection of his own world of thought. Leibniz's philosophy is still a labyrinth. If we wanted to find a unified system in his teaching, we would make the same mistake as those who saw it in his thinking. However, it requires

a new way of reading Leibniz's texts than they have been read and analyzed until now. One of the reasons is that today we have at our disposal from Leibniz's unpublished manuscripts until the second half of the 90s of the 20th century, one more than 3500-page volume of philosophical writings. Those who considered Leibniz's teachings as a unified system, in the manner of Aristotle's or Hegel's system, could not yet work on these manuscripts. One of the ways to read Leibniz again and this time in more detail and more precisely is to focus on the genesis of one of his supporting concepts or principles. In the present contribution, I will present the genesis of a principle in which the thinker himself did not spare superlatives - the principle of sufficient reason.

Causality in Leibniz's Philosophy

In matters of natural philosophy, Leibniz did not remain chained to mechanism, and not only Cartesian. Wherever movement and change enter the plot, cause and effect must be seen. However, according to Leibniz, nature did not receive the stamp of mechanistic causality to the highest degree. The concept of force, which became a decisive conceptual solution to the substantiality of bodies in his teachings, does not have only a physical character. On the contrary, its foundations are metaphysical. And that is the reason why Leibniz could not just stick to causality of the Aristotelian or Cartesian type. Leibniz was first and foremost a theologian. For example, the last lines of *Theodicea*, which are dedicated to Theodore's dream. The palace of unheard beauty and wealth in which he found himself is the work of the most noble architect, the God. This palace which is our world is the best possible because the supreme being, the being of infinite goodness cannot but do the best. And since God, like a caring father, takes care of his generation and leads in the best way, there is no place for chance in this world. In the best possible world, harmony reigns, which Leibniz calls predestined harmony, since it is somehow prearranged as the best of possible configurations. The state that this harmony ensures in the world is harmonious. And so it is obvious that in the created world, where predestined harmony reigns, nothing can happen by chance. The result of random action would be chaos, and this would be in contrast to the harmonious happenings in the world that Leibniz presents in his teaching.

Therefore, in a world where nothing happens by chance, everything must happen for a reason. The picture of the world that Leibniz comes up with is in accordance with the Platonic as well as the Aristotelian tradition. Overall, with the tradition that comes with Christianity and scholastic philosophers. In Plato, we find the Idea of Good at the top of the pyramidal structure. For Aristotle, as

for Leibniz, God stands on top. But while in Aristotle it is a motionless first mover that no longer intervenes in the world, Leibniz, on the contrary, understands God as the creator of the world, the sufficient reason for the existence of all things, who cooperates in the happenings of the world and ensures that this created world is harmonious. Leibniz is neither an extreme Platonist nor an Aristotelian, but the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition can certainly be felt in his teaching. He says that nothing in the world happens by chance. Everything that happens has a cause. Even Aristotle presents causality explicitly in his teaching. He talks about four main causes. And that about the material, formal, effective and purposeful cause. He defines the essence in contrast to the categorical analysis of nine categories, which in his teaching can be understood as accidents. For Aristotle, every single predicate is always an accident in some way, it is a purely accidental matter. It is a matter that does not essentially belong to the subject.

For Leibniz, however, every single predicate is always equal to an event. In an action, the agent is some subject, and the predicate in Leibniz's case always essentially belongs only to that subject. It does not admit a predicate that would be accidental, because the Latin word *accidere* means to happen, and in Leibniz's created world it is impossible for something to happen by chance. Aristotle's accident turns into a metaphysical-theological contingency in the teaching of Leibniz. We do not find any form of determinism in Aristotle. The causes he talks about in his teaching are blind, as it were, because it is not a predetermined harmony. What is behind Aristotle's accident is blind causality, which in Leibniz's teaching turns into the finality of providence. It is in this finality of providence that we find a hidden sufficient reason. And just as there is one God and this God is sufficient, there is always one reason why things are so and not otherwise and this reason is sufficient (sub specie contingentiae). The principle of sufficient reason is the architectural principle of the work of God, because that principle is God himself.

The principle of sufficient reason gradually crystallized in the mind of its author. In the early period of Leibniz's work, there are rather indications of the formation of this principle in his texts. This period corresponds to Leibniz's intellectual formation, and under the guidance of Professor Thomasius he acquires the scholastic tradition at the University of Leipzig. Gradually, after the discovery of Descartes' teachings, Leibniz became interested in studying modern philosophy and mechanistic natural science. In 1670, there was a turning point in Leibniz's thinking, and he began to confront scholastic claims with the claims of modern authors. In this context, Leibniz reinterprets some of

the claims and principles of the authors who defend the corpuscular thesis. It is in this confrontation between scholastic and modern philosophy that the first formulations of the first *principe de raison* occur, which Leibniz used primarily to prove the existence of God. During this period he strives for the systematic application of sufficient reason in the fields of metaphysics, natural theology, but also physics, morality, law, and even politics. Although Leibniz knows about the principle of sufficient reason, in this period he does not yet develop it in the form in which we know it in his later work. The principle of sufficient reason in the early period of Leibniz's work is a principle of existence as well as a principle of reasoning. Last but not least, he refers to it as a metaphysical principle that has its place in physics, but also in morality.

The most traditional formulations of the principle of sufficient reason in the early period are predominantly expressed in the causal form *nihil est sine causa*. In the Letter to Markus Wedderkopf, he says "it is necessary to refer everything to some reason and we cannot stand until we reach the first cause"[1] (A II, 186). Leibniz's goal in these years was to build a metaphysics in accordance with the doctrines to which he was initiated. That is, in accordance with the mechanistic explanation of nature, which modern philosophers came up with, and the central principles of the Christian religion. The result was the gradual elaboration of the concepts of essence, mind, and body, which was the seed of Leibniz's later metaphysics. He tried to explain that corporeality cannot be explained without the immaterial principle which is God. He held that although mechanistic physics is the best explanatory hypothesis for natural phenomena, it requires a metaphysical foundation. This principle is metaphysical, transcending our sensibility, but it is necessary to assume it as a reason to explain our very empirical experience. Leibniz comes to the conclusion that the origin of the body cannot be derived from the nature of the body itself, which is defined in the Cartesian way as existing in the space of res extensa, but requires an incorporeal principle. He argues his opinion against the background of the gradually forming principle of sufficient reason. But in this case, the mentioned principle is not established explicitly, its scope is hidden, but relatively intense.[2] At the end of this period, the principle of

[1] "Omnia enim necesse est resolvi in rationem aliquam, nec subsisti potest, donec perveniatur ad primam."

[2] Leibniz did not intend to reject the mechanistic explanation of the world, he only proposed to reject premature claims that bodies are self-sufficient and can exist without an immaterial principle – that is, bodies are substances. He embarked on an investigation in which he does not take into account an incorporeal being as the originator and therefore

sufficient reason takes the form in which we know it today - nothing is without a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise.

In one of his most important works, *Confessio Philosophie*, also called the Little Theodicea, written in an attempt to combine the question of human freedom and God's omnipotence and to refute atheism, he says "no thing would exist without it being possible (at least for the omniscient spirit) to give a sufficient reason why rather it is, how it is not, and why it is rather like this and not otherwise" (A VI, 118).[3] Apart from Leibniz trying to justify various theories of physics or ethics in this period, the proof of the existence of God lies primarily behind the principle of sufficient reason. The very formation of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz's teaching is primarily based on an effort to solve his metaphysical and theological considerations. We find hints of this principle from the beginning mainly in the field of physics, as it confronts scholastic claims with modern authors defending the corpuscular thesis, while using this principle primarily to prove the immaterial cause of the physical world, God.

Later in the middle period of his work, there is a transition to the epistemological and logical-grammatical framework of the principle of sufficient reason. It is a metaphysical principle, which in this period seems to be hidden in the field of Leibniz's logic, which we can perceive as the basis for his metaphysics. In these years the principle of sufficient reason is formulated in the field of logic as the rule of inesse. The origins of inesse go back to Aristotle, who used it in his *Categories* to specify the relationship between the concept of predicate and the concept of subject. This is a scholastic principle, which in this

seeks the reason for the existence of things in the things themselves. He tried to explain everything from the nature of the body and its primary qualities - size, shape and movement. A body is defined by existing in space. It is the same size and shape as the space it occupies. But what is the reason for something being round, square, or rectangular, or for something to be five centimeters in size rather than four? By not taking the immaterial principle into account in this investigation, Leibniz perceived two possible explanations. Either a body is of a certain size or shape from eternity, or it is the action of another body. According to Leibniz, eternity cannot be understood as the cause of anything. If we were to recognize that a body is square due to the movement of another body, the question arises as to what is the reason for the given body having a certain shape before the action of another body. In this way, however, we will not reach the discovery of the final cause. The answer would just be endlessly asking for another reason. Therefore, he says, it is obvious that the reason for shape or size cannot be found in the bodies themselves.

[3]"Hoc ego adeo concedo, ut demonstrari posse (putem) nunquam existere quicquam, quin possibile sit (saltem omniscio) assignare rationem sufficientem cur sit potius quam non sit, et sic potius quam aliter sit."

period represented the basic principle in Leibniz's theory of truth and theory of substance. The Latin verb *inesse*, which in translation means "to be in," says that the concept of the predicate of a true statement is already contained in its subject, *praedicatum inest subjecto.*

In his teaching, Leibniz distinguishes between the truths of reason, which he also calls necessary truths, whose opposite is impossible, and the truths of fact, which are not necessary and whose opposite is possible. Leibniz also calls the truths of reason eternal truths, and their necessity is metaphysical, logical or geometric. These truths are subject to the *principium contradictionis,* i.e. a sentence is either eternally true or eternally false. In the case of contingent sentences, which are not necessary, they are sentences of an existential nature. In this context, by existence, Leibniz means happening, as the sum of all past, present and future events. The principle of inesse applies to truths that are subject to the principle of contradiction. In the *Discours de métaphysique*, however, Leibniz applied inesse generally to all truths, including contingent truths. Leibniz's logic, including inesse, can be understood as a tool for the analysis of concepts (notionum) and truths (veritatum). The connection of logic and metaphysics in the solution of individual questions enabled Leibniz to arrive at the theory of individual substance. In paragraph 8 of the *Discours de métaphysique*, he used the principle of inesse as the basis of his theory of individual substance, arguing that it is in the nature of an individual substance, or complete being, to have a complete concept that contains all of its predicates.

According to Leibniz, each substance is unique, and the complete concept of each individual substance contains everything that can be said about it truthfully. "The nature of individual substance is such that we have a concept so complete that all the predicates of the subject to which the concept is assigned can be understood and deduced from it" (Husák 1982, 54). Leibniz's thesis, that the individual concept of each individual substance once and for all includes everything that happens to this substance in advance, faced many objections, the main objection in particular related to the issue of fatalism. As if from a single decision to create some individual substance that God made, all subsequent events that happen to it followed with fatal necessity. Leibniz recognizes that the connection between individual substance and events is certain, but not absolutely necessary, according to him, a person always has a choice whether to choose a given path or not. In this way, Leibniz succeeds in distinguishing the acts of God from the acts of other creatures, and the theory of individual substance against the background of the logical rule of inesse, whose consequence is the principle of sufficient reason, becomes the key on the

way to his great theory of monads, which he comes up with in his later philosophy.

The late period represents the completion of the formation of the principle of sufficient reason. The formulation of the aforementioned principle appears in the form of *principium rationis suffcientis*. For example, in the text *De rerum originatione radicali* from 1697, in which Leibniz explicitly expresses the principle of sufficient reason in several places, as well as its propositional part. "For the sufficient reason for the existence of things could not be found either in any of the individual things, nor in the whole aggregate or sequence of things... From which it follows that the last reason of things is outside the world and that is God" (G VII, 302-303). [4] Although our world is the best possible, it is a contingent world, and therefore everything in it must happen for some reason that is not absolutely necessary. The principle of sufficient reason has regulatory validity in the field of contingent matters. Wherever there is some change, movement, or event, there must also be a reason. Likewise, the fact that something is static happens for a reason.

In 1695, he published in *Acta Eruditorum* the first part of the work *Specimen Dynamicum*, in which he presented the basic elements of his dynamics to the wider public. Leibniz comes up with an important concept that connects the field of physics and metaphysics, the concept of force. He says that the concept of force will bring light to the true understanding of substance. Like in the early period of his work, even now Leibniz tries to instill metaphysical foundations in physics. For years, he has been convinced that the phenomena that are the subject of study primarily within the framework of physics also require explanations on the ground of metaphysics. It is the concept of force, located between physics and metaphysics, that made possible the connection of these two spheres, which will thus bring a coherent and correct view of reality. "In addition to the purely mathematical principles that follow from opinion, we must also admit metaphysical ones that can only be understood by thinking, and we must supersede matter on a higher, so to speak, formal principle. It does not matter whether we designate this principle as form or as entelechy or force, if we do not forget that it can only be explained and understood by means of the concept of force" (Šebestík 1956, 127).

In the *Specimen Dynamicum,* Leibniz says that in material things there is something other than extension, something that precedes extension itself. God,

[4] "Nam non tantum in nullo singulorum, sed nec in toto aggregato seriequererum inveniri potest sufficiens ratio existendi...Ex quibus patet, nec supposita mundi aeternitateultimam rationem rerum extramundanam seu Deum effugi posse."

as the creator of all existences, has put into substances a force which constitutes their very inner nature. Thus, change, movement of substance does not occur on the basis of external influence, but on the contrary, on the basis of internal, active force. Leibniz distinguishes between active and passive power. According to him, the active force is divided into the primordial force, vis primitiva, which is nothing else than the first entelechy, corresponding to the soul, or in other words the substantial form. The second type of active force is derived force, vis derivative, which it understands as a modification of the primary force. Leibniz did not consider the mechanistic explanation of physical phenomena to be sufficiently correct. The true nature of things, and thus the entire universe, can only be explained by connecting physics and metaphysics. "Only when we combine the metaphysical laws of force with the laws of extension do we get systematic rules of motion" (Šebestík 1956, 127). This principle does not derive from matter, but from a principle that is found in bodies themselves, that is, from a force that makes substance the source of its own activity. Leibniz is convinced that it is the concept of force that enables the explanation of physical things, but he understands this concept of force as belonging primarily to the realm of metaphysics.

The true nature of the universe was to be explained in terms of monadic substances. In addition to the concept of force, in this period Leibniz comes up with another key concept of his teaching, the concept of the monad. This term was derived from the Greek word monas, which means unity or unit. Leibniz was not the first philosopher to use the concept of monad in his teaching. For example, Giordano Bruno wrote a work called *De Monade* in 1591. Leibniz's first mention of the monad is in an unfinished letter to the Marquis de l'Hospital dated 12/22. July 1695 "the key to my teaching on this subject lies in the consideration that that which is its own real unity, Monas" (A III, 451). [5] One of the characteristic features of the transition from the middle period to the later, monadological period, is that the completeness of the concept, which reflects what the substance is - *ens completum* as completely being, is replaced from the moment of the monadological thesis by unity and simplicity. The individual substance developed around 1689 is transformed in a certain way during this period.

With Leibniz, there are no changes of opinion, rather individual ideas gradually develop. Thus, even the fact that he arrived at monads is the result of

[5] "La clef de ma doctrine sur ce sujet consiste dans cette consideration que ce qui est proprement une unité reelle, Monas."

long investigations in various scientific fields. In this connection, there is rather a terminological change, i.e. the completeness of the concept changes to the concept of monad as the unity of multiplicity. The concept of substance is fundamental in Leibniz's philosophical teaching, it is in the foreground and he uses all the other key principles of his teaching on it. But there is always God in the background, because without him, nothing, not only in Leibniz's teaching, would make sense. The ontological relationship between God and monadic substances is as a creator and created beings God created this world and all existing things according to the rule of choosing the best. In this period, Leibniz comes up with well-known works such as *Theodicy* or *Monadology*, where the principle of sufficient reason is presented explicitly and intensively. This principle is one of the axioms on which human judgments rest.

In *Theodicy*, against the background of the principle of sufficient reason, he provides both a priori and a posteriori proof of God's existence, and also with the help of this principle, he explains the relational relationship between God and the world, which enables him to defend the thesis of the best of all possible worlds. The scope of the principle of sufficient reason is, although not exhaustive, but aptly contained in the following words "power refers to being, wisdom or reason to truth and will to good." The object of God's will is always good, therefore God chooses according to the rule of the best in every case. In this way, when we recognize God as the final cause of all that exists, this world cannot be other than the best, otherwise God would have no reason to create it.

Conclusion

Among the main philosophical questions that philosophers have dealt with throughout history is also the question of the functioning of our world. They asked themselves why and how our world came into being and what laws sustain creation. As a philosopher, but also as a religious thinker, Leibniz believed in the existence of God, which is reflected in his entire work. In God is hidden the first and at the same time the last reason for everything that exists, and in whom is hidden the sufficient reason for the existence of the world. The question whether causality or randomness is the key to explaining the functioning of the earthly world has been investigated by many thinkers and scientists. Just as causality is characteristic of the physical world, which our empirical experience allows us to experience, Leibniz says that it must be perceived primarily in a metaphysical sense. The aim of this paper was to outline the way in which Leibniz perceived causality in the form of one of his most important principles, the principle of sufficient reason. This principle, as

it gradually crystallized in his mind, not only made it possible to explain the causality of physical phenomena and detach himself from a purely mechanistic understanding of the world, but also allowed him to provide an adequate philosophical proof of the existence of God and gradually create an interesting theory of individual substance.

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This paper is a part of the project APVV-20-0583 "Možné svety a modality: súčasné filozofické prístupy" (Possible Worlds and Modalities: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches).

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An Ethical Vice? Analysis of the Concept of Shame in Letter Eleven of Seneca's *Moral Epistles*

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NOVOSÁD, D.: An Ethical Vice? Analysis of the Concept of Shame in Letter Eleven of Seneca's *Moral Epistles*
YOUNG PHILOSOPHY 2023: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, pp. 96 – 106

This paper analyzes the portrayal of the philosophical concept of shame (presented through Latin terms *pudor* and *verecundia*), in letter eleven of Seneca's *Moral Epistles*. Firstly, the focus is on illustrating why and how Seneca uses shame in the process of educating young stoic adepts from higher casts of Roman society. Then, by referring to Seneca's stoic physics and psychology of emotions, the paper addresses why Seneca puts blushing among natural vices which also affect the ideal sage. Further sections will deal with Seneca's introduction of different Roman *exempla*. The goal is to show that the carefully selected references to known Roman individuals serves to expose the ethical connotations of shame. Finally, I shall consider possible influences from Greek philosophical tradition and Roman cultural-linguistic context to explain the multilayered, conflicting, yet unified nature of Seneca's shame.

Keywords: Seneca – shame – progressor (*proficiens*) – moral examples (*exempla*) – Stoicism

Introduction

In this paper, I will analyze the Seneca's philosophical conceptualization of shame[1] in letter eleven of *Moral Epistles*. The first allusion to shame appears

[1] I am using the English term "shame" to represent two Latin phrases used in the letter eleven of *ME*: *verecundia* and *pudor*. I do so mainly because the examined letter, while helpful with uncovering Seneca's philosophical understanding of shame, does little to explain the distinctive usage of *verecundia* and *pudor*. On the contrary, the letter points to Seneca's synonymous use of the two phrases. Hence, I shall stick to using the English phrase when reflecting on Seneca's understanding of shame in general and refer to specific terms when dealing with exact passages from the text.

when Seneca recalls a meeting with a certain young man who experiences shame while asked to perform a public speech. While Seneca considers the youthful shame a good sign, later lines deliver a seemingly contradictory assessment of blushing, which always connects to shame, as a natural evil also affecting the morally perfected sage. The letter then explores the exhibition of shame by exemplary consideration of different Roman individuals. The first section of this paper will address the initial mention of shame in reference to the young student. I shall argue that nurturing shame in a public setting marks a specific educational exercise that tests a potential for moral progress and cultivates social-ethical sensitivity to prepare students for public involvement. Further, I will turn to the subsequent description of blush as a natural vice. I shall propose that the moral devaluation of blush strains from Seneca's physical theory of passions to which shame inevitably belongs. However, I will show that the sage can be spared from any moral condemnation by looking at Seneca's psychology of emotions. Further, I shall address the role of shame in relation to the introduced Roman *exempla*. My goal will be to demonstrate that Seneca creates sort of ethical contrast by putting the impious Sulla, who lacks shame, against renowned Pompey and Fabianus who possess a sense of shame. Finally, I shall consider possible influences from Greek philosophical tradition and Roman cultural-linguistic context to explain the multilayered, conflicting yet unified nature of Seneca's shame.

I. Shame as an Educational Tool

The initial appearance of shame in letter eleven points to its use as an educational tool, used in the upbringing of young stoic progressors (*proficiens*). The letter starts with Seneca recalling an engagement that involved urging the addressee's friend to make a sudden public speech. Seneca says that "he spoke not from forethought, but was suddenly caught of his guard" (*Non enim ex preaparato locutus est, sed subito deprehensus*), which motivated "hue of modesty, which is a good sign in a young man" (*verecundiam, bonum in adulescente signum*). Subsequently, Seneca concludes that he is a "man of ability" (*bonae indolis*) who, with "his very first words showed what spirit and understanding he possesses, and what progress he has already made" (*in quo quantum esset animi, quantum ingenii, quantum iam etiam profectus, sermo primus ostendit*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 1). Since no other details regarding the speech are mentioned, shame must be the primary motive for Seneca's approving judgment. Therefore, it appears that exposure to public activity is a test designed to discover the presence or absence of shame. So,

the question arises, why is the appearance of shame in a public setting a desired occurrence in a young student?

Seneca, in a different letter, explains that the presence of shame can reveal whether a person has the potential for moral advancement. While Seneca insists that "only young minds are molded" (*tenera finguntur*) (Sen. *Ep.* 25, 2), a lingering presence of shame indicates a possibility to make moral progress even for an older person.[2] On the contrary, the complete absence of shame is a sign that an older person has lost the ability to perceive one's moral inadequacy because of long-perpetuated habits.[3] Hence, what Seneca seeks in the student is precisely the moral sensibility that accompanies an inclination to feel shame. This means that the engagement described in the letter eleven portrays a specific didactic procedure, where the sentiment for shame serves as a criterion for evaluating a young student's potential for moral education.

Additionally, the connection of shame to public speaking indicates how Seneca assimilates the Roman cultural understanding of shame as an essential social emotion into the context of stoic philosophy. As Robert Kaster points out, a developed sense of shame was a compass for the "adult elite male" (2005, 10) to navigate the numerous social obligations necessary for participation in Roman public life. And, of course, public speaking was a part of the nexus of these obligations.[4] Therefore, apart from evaluation, this passage also outlines a specific exercise where Seneca uses the cultivation of shame to prepare a young student for future responsibilities in the public sphere. Nonetheless, this training for public life is not wholly disconnected from the sphere of stoic moral education. On the contrary, Seneca understands public involvement as a stoic duty, a mean to cultivate virtue:

[2] As Seneca says elsewhere: "As regards our other friend I am not sufficiently confident, either, except for the fact that he still has sense of shame enough to blush for his sins. This modesty should be fostered; so long as it endures in his soul, there is some room for hope" (*Ne de altero quidem satis fiduciae habeo, excepto eo, quod adhuc peccare erubescit. Nutriendus est hic pudor, qui quamdiu in animo eius duraverit, aliquis erit bonae spei locus*) (Sen. *Ep*. 25, 2).

[3] Seneca insists: "Consider his age, how hardened it now is, and past handling" (*Respice aetatem eius iam duram et intractabilem*) (Sen. *Ep*. 25, 1).

[4] According to Kaster shame served crucial role in the "art of knowing your proper place in every social transaction" (Kaster 2005, 15). Kaster also lists "Bestowing favors and paying debts, conducting friendships and engaging in enmities, giving entertainments and being entertained, speaking in court, arranging a marriage for a daughter or introducing a son to public life" (2005, 10), among the many prerequisites of Roman public life where a sense of shame played a crucial role.

> For, whenever a man has the set purpose to make himself useful to his countrymen and all mortals, he both gets practice and does service at the same time when he has placed himself in the very midst of active duties, serving to the best of his ability the interests both of the public and of the individual.
>
> (*Nam cum utilem se efficere civibus mortalibusque propositum habeat, simul et exercetur et proficit, qui in mediis se officiis posuit communia privataque pro facultate administrans*) (Sen. *Tranq*. 3, 1).

Thus, cultivating shame in the public setting perfectly fits educating stoic adepts that Seneca talks about in the letter; those from a higher cast of Roman society.[5] A young Roman noble desperately needs a sense of shame to lead a successful public life. At the same time, a stoic student should strive to actively participate in public affairs to be helpful to the community, exercise virtue, and fulfill a stoic duty. Therefore, young stoic students, especially those from the Roman higher classes, need to develop a sophisticated sense of shame to succeed in both endeavors. So, in addition to serving as a testing procedure, letter eleven displays the fostering of shame in a public setting as a concrete didactic practice.

II. Shame as a Natural Vice

Another crucial aspect of shame explored in letter eleven is shame's connection to the bodily reaction of blushing. As a consequence of feeling shame (*verecundiam*) Lucilius's friend experienced blush (*rubor*), amidst the effort "to collect himself" (*se colligebat*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 1) from the unanticipated occasion. Richardson – Hay picks up on this instance, insisting that the Latin phrase *colligere*, to collect together, is used to signify "a symptom of the spiritual turmoil blushing expresses" (2006, 337). So, while being a desired occasion, being sensitive to the moral quality of our behavior, or feeling shame, seems to simultaneously disrupt the soul's tranquility. The blush, in this case, is bodily and externally perceptible symptom of this disruption. Consequently, Seneca to takes up a negative moral stance towards blushing, putting it among "natural weaknesses of the body" (*naturalia corporis vitia*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 1). In a way shame seems more akin to a passion that disrupts reason rather than moral guiding principle.

[5] The addressee of Seneca's *EM* was Lucilius Junior, who served as a procurator of Sicily during emperor Nero's rule. So, Lucilius' friend, the person considered in the discussion, is likely part of the Roman elite.

However, Seneca's appeal to nature seems to be a sort of relaxation of the grave moral implication the term *vitium* carries. As Seneca says, what "is implanted and inborn" (*infixum et ingenitum*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 1 – 2) by nature can only „be toned down by training, but not overcame" (*lenitur arte, non vincitur*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 2). This is because, as shown in Seneca's treatise *De Ira*, a person's temperament largely depends on the proportion of elements that make up one's physical composition. For instance, a warm composition arouses anger, while a colder one provokes cowardice.[6] In letter eleven, Seneca also portrays shame in a similar manner, saying that shame "is, indeed more prevalent in youth, because of the warmer blood and the sensitive countenance" (*Magis quidem in iuvenibus apparet, quibus et plus caloris est et tenera frons*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 3). Hence, as Seneca asserts, in simply being born with a certain disposition, "nature exerts her own power and through such a weakness makes her presence known even to the strongest" (*sed natura vim suam exercet et illo vitio sui etiam robustissimos admonet*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 2 – 3). This is also why, as Seneca explains, an actor can "imitate bashfulness" (*imitantur verecundiam*) but not "muster a blush" (*Ruborem sibi exprimere non possunt*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 6). In turn, one must conclude that the passionate aspect of shame that blush signifies cannot be eradicated within the framework of moral development.

It is also quite significant that Seneca asserts that even "the steadiest speaker" (*constantissimis*), is affected by different speech inhibiting symptoms, such as teeth chattering (*dentes colliduntur*) or stuttering (*lingua titubat*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 2), that additionally arise with the emotion of shame. Strangely then, the passionate aspect of shame poses obstacles for the very occupation it finds its principal role. So, while shame is crucial for a flourishing public life in Roman culture, it also directly hinders this endeavor when disproportionately present in one's constitution. Hence, despite shame's moral, philosophical, and social significance, its passionate aspect opposes the stoic (and Roman) principle of participation in a public life that serves to cultivate virtue. Interestingly, this appears to be one of the reasons why Seneca incorporates a conception of natural limitations in the corpus of stoic duties, leading the philosopher to provide alternative approaches, such as philosophical work,[7] for virtuous participation in the community.

It is important to note that the connection to nature forces Seneca to include the ideal sage among the victims of shame's passionate nature. Seneca

[6] See: Sen. (*Ira*. 2, 19, 1 – 5).
[7] See: Sen. (*Tranq.* 3, 3 – 4); Sen. (*Ep*. 8, 2).

says that "I feel sure that his habit of blushing will stay with him after he has strengthened his character, stripped off all his faults, and become wise" (*Hic illum, quantum suspicor, etiam cum se confirmaverit et omnibus vitiis exuerit, sapientem quoque sequitur*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 1). Suddenly, the blush, the passionate manifestation of shame is ascribed to the morally perfected figure of the wise man. Nonetheless, this discrepancy can be explained by looking at Seneca's psychological conceptualization of emotions and their connection to bodily movements. The purely bodily reactions, such as the onset of blush, initially appear as "first movements", not complex emotions or passions. Before a complex emotion arises, the soul receives an impression of something from the outside. The impression might accompany a bodily reaction, like flinching, sinking feeling in the stomach, or blush.[8] These arise unwillingly and irrationally, resulting from the soul's interaction with some outside stimuli. However, for any form of passion to occur, judgment is needed by the rational faculty rejecting or accepting a particular impression.[9] Therefore, sage will experience bodily movements, including blushing, without needing to give in to passion. So, while never allowing passion to override reason completely, the wise man will be subject to at least a gentle stir that a natural onset of shame causes.

III. Shame and Ethical *Exempla*

As is common across the whole of *Moral Epistles*, in later sections of this letter Seneca demonstrates the particulars of shame by means of examples (*exempla*) of individuals from the Roman life. The exemplary ascend appears in Seneca's a customary listing style, introducing a triad of *exempla*.[10] Seneca says, that "some are most dangerous when they redden, as if they were letting all their sense of shame escape. Sulla when the blood mantled his cheeks, was in his fiercest mood" (*Quidam numquam magis, quam cum erubuerint, timendi sunt, quasi omnem verecundiam effuderint. Sulla tunc erat violentissimus, cum faciem eius sanguis invaserat*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 3 – 4). Now, the thing that gives Sulla's redness a peculiar meaning is Seneca's use of the Latin verb *effuderint*. The phrase is composed of *ex* (out of) and *fundo* (pour), meaning "I pour out", which denotes a physical activity where something leaves its previous position, in the sense of leaking out or discharging.

[8] See: Sen. (*Ira*. 2, 2, 1 – 2).
[9] See: Sen. (*Ira*. 2, 1, 4 – 5).
[10] For more on Seneca's use of this literary technique see Mayer (1991, 153 – 157).

However, *effundo* here takes more the meaning of resigning[11] a certain character trait, which is consistent with Seneca's use of the word elsewhere.[12] The thing that Sulla lets go of when his blood pours into his face is precisely shame (*verecundiam*). This means that when people like Sulla redden, they lose all sense of shame. Furthermore, losing a sense of shame seems to have grave ethical consequences because, as Richardson – Hay says, "Sulla was generally regarded as an *exemplum crudelitatis*" (2006, 340 – 341), an example of harshness and cruelty. And indeed, as Seneca says in the letter eleven, Sulla's most violent (*violentissimus*) conduct appears precisely with an activity of giving up all (*omnem*) sense of shame.

An intriguing case is the second *exemplum* in the sequence where Seneca mentions the Roman statesman Pompey, who possessed "the most sensitive cast of countenance; he always blushed in the presence of a gathering, and especially at a public assembly" (*Nihil erat mollius ore Pompei*; *numquam non coram pluribus rubuit, utique in contionibus*) (Sen. *Ep*. 11, 4). While it is true that the moral significance of Pompey's *exemplum* is somewhat complicated, as Seneca does not mention Pompey exclusively with positive connotations,[13] in this letter Pompey appears with a sensitive character (*mollius*) that contrasts with Sulla's ferociousness. While Seneca refrains from ascribing either the absence or presence of shame to Pompey, the manifestation of sensitive character within a public setting likely points to Pompey's sensibility for the standards of Roman social ethics. The sequence of *exempla* reaches its apex with Seneca's mention of Fabianus, who "reddened when he appeared as a witness before the senate; and his embarrassment became him to a remarkable degree" (*cum in senatum testis esset inductus, erubuisse memini, et hic illum mire pudor decui*t) (Sen. *Ep.* 11, 4 – 5). Fabianus, was Seneca's highly esteemed teacher, whose introduction and experience of shame (*pudor*) surely denotes an attitude of ethical sensitivity and a degree of moral distinguishment.[14]

However, similarly to the case with the young student and Pompey, Fabianus' shame also appears with an appeal to above mentioned "natural

[11] Lewis – Short (1879).

[12] Seneca also uses the term similarly in *De Ira*, insisting that when people succumb to anger, among other things, "they will let their clothing trail and cast of all regard for their person" (*trahent vestem omnemque curam sui effundent*) (Sen. *Ira*. 2, 25, 3).

[13] See: Richardson – Hay (2006, 341).

[14] As Hay Richardson says: "Fabianus, both an orator and a philosopher, was a member of the Sextian School of philosophy and one of Seneca's teachers. Seneca's admiration and respect for him (his oratorical style as well as his philosophical asceticism) is evident throughout his works" (2006, 341).

tendency of the body" (*naturali in hoc facilitate corporis pronos*) (Sen. *Ep.* 11, 4), caused by the "the novelty of the sitation" (*novitate rei*) (Sen. *Ep.* 11, 5). So, even these, "most dignified men" (*gravissimis*) (Sen. *Ep.* 11, 3), no less than the sage, must be subject to the uproar shame naturally causes in the soul. However, in no way can this blush be reduced to a mere bodily movement. It is exactly Seneca's conscious choice of *exempla*, that demonstrates that the blush in these individuals is also an ethically and morally significant sign. If not marking a potential to make moral improvement, the blush signifies a sensibility for morality and social ethics – a refined sense of shame.[15]

IV. Shame in Roman and Greek Tradition

As shown, Seneca's understanding of shame in letter eleven accommodates a couple of meanings that may even seem contradictory. It is an emotion that signifies and fosters stoic progress, indicates sensibility for social ethics, and carries negative moral connotations. Now, to explain the potential motivation for this variety, I suggest first turning to the ancient Greek tradition, which reflected the philosophical significance of shame before Seneca's time. Classical Greek poetry and philosophy recognized two terms for the emotion of shame, *aidôs* and *aiskhunê*. According to David Konstan the Greeks not only recognized two phrases for shame but ascribed these phrases with specific meanings. *Aidôs* seemed to mark a sense of shame that indicates a disposition for ethical reverence, whereas *aiskhunê* denoted an emotional reaction.[16] Moreover, the preceding Greek stoic tradition also adopted the dual dichotomy of terms and meanings. Nonetheless, the stoics understood *aidôs* as a species of good emotion, an attitude of caution that belongs exclusively to the ideal sage,[17] while putting *aiskhunê* "among the vicious emotions to which that everyone except the sage is subject" (Konstan 2003, 1038). This perhaps explains why Seneca chose to maintain that shame is simultaneously a disposition and an emotional reaction.

Nonetheless, Seneca's rendering of shame in letter eleven appears to transcend the strict dual terminology of the Greek tradition. This is likely because, similar to Greek, Latin also recognized two terms for shame: *verecundia* and *pudor*. These two terms also carried a dual meaning. As Kaster

[15] See: Fraňo – Novosád (2023, 19).
[16] David Konstan in his *Shame in Ancient Greece* looks to classical Greek literature as well as Aristotle and concludes that *aiskhunê* and *aidôs* can be understood as shame and sense of shame; "Indeed, the two concepts would seem to be psychologically discrete, 'shame' being an emotion while 'sense of shame' is more like an ethical trait" (2003, 1037).
[17] Cf. *SVF* III, 432.

insists, shame was understood either as "displeasure with oneself caused by vulnerability to just criticism of a socially diminishing sort" (1997, 4) or "admirable sensitivity to such displeasure ... comparable to what we call 'a sense of shame' " (Ibid.). However, as Kaster further notes, "Romans did not mark the difference between these 'occurrent' and 'dispositional' senses" (1997, 4) of shame but often used *verecundia* and *pudor* were often used interchangeably.[18] Indeed, finding a difference between *verecundia*, experienced by the student during the speech, and *pudor*, which strikes Fabianus in the Senate, is infeasible. In both cases, shame marks ethical sensibility, which is proved by Seneca's estimation of the student's pedagogical potential and Fabianus' exemplary contrast to Sulla. However, along with shame, both individuals experience the soul shaking blush.

Therefore, Seneca's representation of shame appears to be an adaptation of the philosophical reflections of the Greek tradition and Roman cultural sentiments. This means that for Seneca, shame possesses essentially three dimensions. Shame marks sensible responsiveness to ethics (Roman social) and morality (stoic philosophical) but arises with motivating a kind of passionate unrest signified by the blush. Nevertheless, contrary to the Greek tradition, all these elements appear concurrently, marked with a single phrase – either *verecundia* or *pudor*. Moreover, Seneca also significantly strains from the radical position of Greek stoicism. For Seneca, the positive aspect of shame, the Greek *aidôs*, is no longer exclusive to the sage.[19] Actually, the ability to perceive one's moral deficiency is the very prerequisite to embark on the path of stoic education.

V. Conclusion

This paper attempted to better understand Seneca's portrayal of shame by analyzing the letter eleven of *Moral Epistles*. I have argued that the revelation of moral self-reflectiveness and social-ethical sensibility allows Seneca to use Shame as an education tool catered for young stoic adepts of the Roman elite. Furthermore, I have shown that Seneca's later assessment of shame's blush as natural vice strains from the stoic physical theory of bodily predispositions. It is this spirit-disrupting consequence that then leads Seneca to establish a

[18] On this point see: Kaster (2005, 61 – 65); Fraňo – Novosád (2023, 15).

[19] The understanding of shame as valuable for a stoic progressor seems to be particular for Roman stoicism. For example, Rachana Kamtekar explores the value of shame for moral progress in Epictetus' thinking, proposing that "Epictetus claims to have aidos himself even though he admits that he is not yet a wise man" (1998, 146).

concept of natural limitations. Moreover, I suggested that the exemplary consideration of Roman personages refurnishes the ethical connotations of shame extending them beyond the sphere of education. Namely, the absence of shame that appears with the cruel Sulla contrasts with Pompey's and Fabianus' shameful sensitivity. After that, I attempted to address the apparent inconsistency, arguing that Seneca's psychological theory of first bodily movements spares the sage from the threat of irrationality. Finally, I have considered the possible philosophical, linguistic, and cultural influences, to explain the format of Seneca's shame. My goal was to show that Seneca takes the dual significance of shame from the Greek tradition and formally adapts it to the Roman cultural and linguistic context.

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The paper was supported by grant VEGA č. 1/0020/21 The Evolution of the Concept of Shame in the Ancient and Contemporary Moral Philosophy with an Accent on Its Ethical Functions.

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