@article {bielik_l2011:2343,
	title = {{\quotedblbase}Nov{\'a} z{\'a}hada indukcie{\textquotedblleft} a testovanie vlastnost{\'\i}},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {66},
	number = {8},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {746-754},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {The paper deals with the New Riddle of Induction set forth by N. Goodman in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. The problem is introduced through the definition of grue-predicate. The relation between the grue-hypothesis and empirical evidence is examined. Goodman{\textquoteright}s underlying thesis about the neutrality of empirical evidence is undermined. The intelligibility of the idea that disjunctive properties such as Grue can be observed and seen is questioned. A solution of Goodman{\textquoteright}s riddle is outlined by means of the definition of the identity of empirical properties and further deve- loped through postulating of the necessary condition of induction executability which prohibits the inference from {\textquotedblleft}Some a, b, c, d emeralds are green{\textquotedblright} to the hypothesis {\textquotedblleft}All emeralds are grue{\textquotedblright}.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/filozofia/2011/8/746-754.pdf},
	author = {Bielik, Luk{\'a}{\v s}}
}
