@article {13295,
	title = {Limity reprezent{\'a}cie: Charles Sanders Peirce a Nelson Goodman o reprezent{\'a}cii},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {76},
	number = {8},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {608 - 623},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Philosophical conceptions of representation developed by Nelson Goodman and Charles Sanders Peirce come from different metaphysical positions (Goodman{\textquoteright}s nominalism and Peirce{\textquoteright}s realism). This fact causes serious problems when comparing both conceptions and often results in inaccuracies or oversimplifications. The aim of this paper is to find a framework for the comparison of the two conceptions of representation and consider their possible role in understanding representation as a source of knowledge. The first and the second part of the paper shortly introduce Peirce{\textquoteright}s and Goodman{\textquoteright}s conceptions of representation. Subsequently, a comparison of these conceptions is proposed in the context of limits of our representations. The limits of representations are suggested as a basis for further comparison without the need to reject one of the conceptions. The conclusion outlines some consequences of this approach for the analysis of representations as a source of knowledge.},
	keywords = {Charles Sanders Peirce, Comparison, Nelson Goodman, Representation, The limits of representation},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/102415034_{\v S}ed\%C3\%ADk_sta{\v t}_RZA_defi.pdf},
	author = {{\v S}ed{\'\i}k, Michal}
}
