@article {13022,
	title = {Pro{\v c} ch{\'a}pat Popper{\r u}v kritick{\'y} dualismus deciosionisticky},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {75},
	number = {6},
	year = {2020},
	pages = {474 - 489},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {There is not much in <em>The Open Society</em> to suggest that Karl Popper was a moral objectivist. Yet, that is exactly what he himself claimed later in life. Was the widespread {\textquotedblleft}decisionistic{\textquotedblright} reading of <em>The Open Society</em> just a grand misunderstanding, or did Popper change his metaethical views without acknowledging it? I give reasons as to why we should hold the latter to be true. I also argue that even were the former the case, decisionism would still be more compatible with the open society ideal.},
	keywords = {Critical dualism, Is-ought, Karl Popper, Moral objectivism, Moral relativism, Open society},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/06241548filozofia.2020.75.6.4.pdf},
	author = {Bur{\'a}{\v n}, J{\'a}n}
}
