@article {12948,
	title = {Deconstructing the Constituency of the Public Reason. Taking Systematic Conspiracy Theorists out of the Legitimation Pool},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {75},
	number = {4},
	year = {2020},
	pages = {263 {\textendash} 278},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {In the present article I argue that there is a class of conspiracy theorists that pose a threat to liberal democratic regimes, who tend to subscribe to potentially harmful conspiracy theories and can be regarded as unreasonable in two ways: i) do not accept the burdens of judgment; ii) are not motivated by a sense of justice. If we endorse political liberalism, we ought to partially exclude these citizens from the legitimation pool. The qualifier {\textquotedblleft}partially{\textquotedblright} is important here, as I only endorse their exclusion qua bearers of an unreasonable conception. To the extent that they can employ other arguments, they will continue to be a part of the legitimation pool. Towards the end of the paper I investigate a potential counterargument to my position, which could be addressed by someone who postulates a Waldronian right to do wrong. I show that Quong{\textquoteright}s distinction between a right to do wrong and a non-right to be unreasonable can be extended in this instance and thus invalidate this potential criticism.},
	keywords = {Burdens of judgment, Conspiracy theorists, Legitimation pool, Right to do wrong},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/04211144ilozofia.2020.75.4.1.pdf},
	author = {Dumitru, Adelin-Costin}
}
