@article {12307, title = {Defin{\'\i}cie z poh{\v l}adu hyperintenzion{\'a}lnej s{\'e}mantiky}, journal = {Filozofia}, volume = {72}, number = {1}, year = {2017}, pages = {15-23}, type = {State}, abstract = {We are often told that the meaning of a definiendum of an adequate definition is identical to the meaning of its definiens. This claim appears in Frege{\textquoteright}s theory of definitions, and so it appears in Russell{\textquoteright}s theory. However, it is worthwhile to remember both philosophers were advocates of the extensional semantics. Yet, the claim is often accepted beyond the realm of extensional theories. Admittedly, the claim is sus- tainable in the intensional semantics. However, as I will argue, it is untenable in the theory of definitions based on hyperintensional semantics.}, keywords = {Definition, extensionality, hyperintensionality, Identity, Semantics}, url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/filozofia/2017/1/15-23.pdf}, author = {Daniela Glavani{\v c}ov{\'a}} }