<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hähnel, Martin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aristotelian Naturalism and the Imperfect Project of Normalizing Ethics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filozofia</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aristotelian Naturalism and the Imperfect Project of Normalizing Ethics</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Applied ethics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aristotelian naturalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Concept of a person</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Human nature</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">life forms</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Virtue ethics</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0214143210.31577filozofia.2024.79.2.5.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">79</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">184 - 194</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In this paper, I claim that the project of recovering an “ethics of normality” not only consists of the attempt to return metaphysical concepts to their everyday meaning but also is dedicated to the goal of developing a theory of the ethically self-evident that ultimately leaves things as they are. In contrast to competing ethical theories of deontology and consequentialism, Aristotelian naturalism, as a promising approach to the justification of virtue ethics, is able to provide a particular heuristic of ethical reservedness. For example, Aristotelian naturalism gives us good reasons to formulate objections to efforts to improve human nature – and even to make this improvement a moral imperative – or to implement educational programs that exceed the reasonable measure of what is ethically acceptable. In particular, I argue that the neo-Aristotelian concept of a person, expanded or grounded in the way just described, offers the appropriate basis for developing an innovative and integrative bioethical ontology of the human being.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom6><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Original Articles</style></custom6></record></records></xml>