<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pavel Cmorej</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">K povahe intencionálnej referencie</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Nature of Intentional Reference</style></translated-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">397-406</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Speaker’s reference is an intentional act directed, via an expression, at an object – an intentional object. The author of the paper tries to find an answer to the following question: What does a speaker refer to when he does not know what a description or a proper name used refers to? He argues that, if the speaker uses such a description, his reference is not directed at the referent of the description but at its meaning. If the speaker uses a proper name whose meaning is not known to him, he can refer neither to the referent nor to the meaning of that name.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type></record></records></xml>