@article {13778,
	title = {Aristotelian Naturalism and the Imperfect Project of Normalizing Ethics},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {79},
	number = {2},
	year = {2024},
	pages = {184 - 194},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {In this paper, I claim that the project of recovering an {\textquotedblleft}ethics of normality{\textquotedblright} not only consists of the attempt to return metaphysical concepts to their everyday meaning but also is dedicated to the goal of developing a theory of the ethically self-evident that ultimately leaves things as they are. In contrast to competing ethical theories of deontology and consequentialism, Aristotelian naturalism, as a promising approach to the justification of virtue ethics, is able to provide a particular heuristic of ethical reservedness. For example, Aristotelian naturalism gives us good reasons to formulate objections to efforts to improve human nature {\textendash} and even to make this improvement a moral imperative {\textendash} or to implement educational programs that exceed the reasonable measure of what is ethically acceptable. In particular, I argue that the neo-Aristotelian concept of a person, expanded or grounded in the way just described, offers the appropriate basis for developing an innovative and integrative bioethical ontology of the human being.},
	keywords = {Applied ethics, Aristotelian naturalism, Concept of a person, Human nature, life forms, Virtue ethics},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.2.5},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0214143210.31577filozofia.2024.79.2.5.pdf},
	author = {H{\"a}hnel, Martin}
}
