@article {13701,
	title = {Quine a naturalistick{\'y} omyl},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {78},
	number = {8},
	year = {2023},
	pages = { 664 - 674},
	type = {State},
	chapter = {554},
	abstract = {The article focuses on the problem of normativity in Quine{\textquoteright}s naturalized epistemology. Quine characterizes his epistemological project mainly in descriptive terms, which seemingly problematizes the normative side of epistemology. Although Quine offers a certain explanation of normativity within his conception, known as {\textquotedblleft}cognitive engineering,{\textquotedblright} there is a suspicion that he commits a serious logical error, the so-called naturalistic fallacy. Two attitudes can be taken to this suspicion. First, the naturalistic fallacy is indeed present in Quine{\textquoteright}s thinking, but it cannot be attributed a negative meaning because it is an inevitable consequence of the naturalization of epistemology. Second, Quine does not commit the naturalistic fallacy because he derives the normativity of epistemology from the {\textquotedblleft}terminal parameter,{\textquotedblright} i.e. an external goal against which cognitive strategies are assessed. The latter interpretation seems to be in better agreement with Quine{\textquoteright}s statements. In this understanding, naturalized normativity has an instrumental character, which ranks it among the tools of instrumental rationality, linked to practical aspects of human activities.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2023.78.8.5},
	author = {Nuhl{\'\i}{\v c}ek, Martin}
}
