@article {zouhar_m1997:259,
	title = {Frege o v{\'y}zname},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {4},
	number = {1},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {15-38},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Though Frege{\'s} second semantical theory is worked out excellently, he did not precisely and explicitly answer the question, which of the two semantical notions he used in his semantics - sense and reference -, could be taken as proper explication of an intuitive notion of meaning. Intuitively, meaning of a word can be connected with an understanding of the word: if we understand the word, we know its meaning. Our problem seems to be accute in connection with present tendency to render words "meaning" and "v{\'y}znam" as proper translations of German word "Bedeutung", used by Frege to refer to named or signed objects (i. e. word{\'s} referent or denotation). Frege{\'s} basic concepts of both periods of developing of his thinking - Inhalt, Sinn and Bedeutung -, having been outlined, the author tries to explicate this intuitive notion of meaning as word{\'s} content, or word{\'s} sense and reference, respectively. This attempt is aimed to give a possible Frege{\'s} answer to the above question. Then the discussion about a few counter-arguments follows and its main profit is in illumination of some less clear aspects of our interpretation of Frege{\'s} conceptual apparatus. In the end the author argues that the word "meaning" as translation of "Bedeutung" does not cohere with Frege{\'s} possible intentions, and defends the words like e. g. "denotation" as much better and clearer translations than the above one.},
	author = {Zouhar, Mari{\'a}n}
}
