Article/Publication Details

Kooperatívny naturalizmus

(Cooperative Naturalism)
Nuhlíček, Martin
Filozofia, 2021, vol. 76, No 9, pp. 647 - 660.
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The paper deals with the cooperative model of epistemological naturalism, which, while promoting strong influence of empirical information on epistemological considerations, rejects Quinean radical reduction of epistemic relations to non-epistemic ones, e.g., causal-nomological relations. The character of this kind of naturalism is illustrated by the example of A. Goldman’s epistemics. This conception consists of two intertwined elements: a priori performed conceptual analysis of epistemic concepts, supplemented by empirical studies of human cognition. First, the dynamics between the a priori and the empirical re- spective parts of this conception is explained, and, second, three important epistemological issues are discussed from its point of view: the problem of starting points of inquiry, the problem of intuitions, and the problem of normativity.

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