TY - JOUR T1 - Pojem verzus koncepcia spravodlivosti v analytickej filozofii práva (1. časť) JF - Filozofia Y1 - 2022 A1 - Neština, Marek KW - concept KW - Conception KW - Constitution KW - Dworkin KW - Interpretation KW - Law KW - Pragmatics KW - Rawls KW - Semantics AB - The author analyzes the difference between a concept and its different conceptions by using the example of the difference between the concept and conceptions of justice in analytic philosophy in the context of constitutional interpretation. The difference between the concept and distinct conceptions of the concept appears within a section of constitutional interpretation theory illustrating the change in the meaning of moral terms that denote constitutional rights and liberties, principles and values. The author argues that the distinction between a concept and its distinct conceptions may generate more controversy than it resolves in constitutional interpretation theory and should therefore be rejected. This distinction, however, points to one significant linguistic phenomenon that clearly deserves attention, and that is polysemy. VL - 77 UR - https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/04302010filozofia.2022.77.4.1.pdf M3 - State U2 - Original Articles U3 - 233250 ER -