@article {12511,
title = {Kontrafaktu{\'a}ly},
journal = {Filozofia},
volume = {73},
number = {1},
year = {2018},
pages = {36-50},
type = {State},
abstract = {The paper proposes a solution to the problem of counterfactuals building on both Rescher{\textquoteright}s epistemic and Tich{\'y}{\textquoteright}s semantic approaches. The core of the latter is the thesis that a speaker when expressing a true counterfactual assumes a set of background indicative premises as an implicit parameter. When added tacitly to an unreal antecedent, these premises entail the consequent logically or analytically. We argue against Pollock{\textquoteright}s impossibility objection concerning revision of the producer{\textquoteright}s beliefs. In accordance with the linguistic solution we distinguish between a relative and an absolute unreality of a course of events described in the consequent. Likewise, we draw a distinction between a potentially unreal and an absolutely unreal condition expressed in the antecedent. Drawing on our previous paper, Deductive and abductive retrodictions and predictions, we take counterfactuals with a positive time vector and an absolute unreal condition to be elided deductive judgements, i.e. deductive retrodictions, without any appeal to a special non-classical logic. Similarly, we consider counterfactuals with a positive time vector and a potentially unreal condition to be elided deductive predictions.},
keywords = {Abduction, Causality, Counterfactual, Deduction, epistemology, Explication, Prediction, Retrodiction, Semantics},
url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/filozofia/2018/1/36-50.pdf},
author = {Franti{\v s}ek Gah{\'e}r}
}