@article {12307,
	title = {Defin{\'\i}cie z poh{\v l}adu hyperintenzion{\'a}lnej s{\'e}mantiky},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {72},
	number = {1},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {15-23},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {We are often told that the meaning of a <em>definiendum</em> of an adequate definition is identical to the meaning of its <em>definiens</em>. This claim appears in Frege{\textquoteright}s theory of definitions, and so it appears in Russell{\textquoteright}s theory. However, it is worthwhile to remember both philosophers were advocates of the extensional semantics. Yet, the claim is often accepted beyond the realm of extensional theories. Admittedly, the claim is sus- tainable in the intensional semantics. However, as I will argue, it is untenable in the theory of definitions based on hyperintensional semantics.},
	keywords = {Definition, extensionality, hyperintensionality, Identity, Semantics},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/filozofia/2017/1/15-23.pdf},
	author = {Daniela Glavani{\v c}ov{\'a}}
}
