@article {12117,
	title = {The Constitution Theory of Intention-Dependent Objects and the Problem of Ontological Relativism},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {23},
	number = {1},
	year = {2016},
	pages = {21-31},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {According to Lynne Rudder Baker{\textquoteright}s constitution theory, all artworks and artifacts are constituted intention-dependent (ID) objects which are irreducibly real and cannot be reduced to the collections of particles which make them up. The constitution theory of ID objects is based on Baker{\textquoteright}s theory of practical realism according to which our everyday life-world is a resource for metaphysics. This paper will focus on the problem of ontological relativism entailed by the constitution theory of intention-dependent objects. I will argue, by way of an example, that the constitution theory of intention-dependent objects entails ontological relativism. That is because everyday life worlds vary from culture to culture. Finally, I examine if there is any possibility for the constitution theorist to avoid the problem of ontological relativism. I discuss Baker{\textquoteright}s idea of a thin commonsense framework.},
	keywords = {Constitution, everyday life-world, intention-dependent objects, ontological relativism, practical realism},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2016/1/21-31.pdf},
	author = {Tahmasbi, Mohammad Reza}
}
