@article {12056, title = {Interpret{\'a}cia v pr{\'a}ve I}, journal = {Filozofia}, volume = {70}, number = {8}, year = {2015}, pages = {647-658}, type = {State}, abstract = {The author shows what interpretation in law is not and offers a new hypothesis: The interpretation in law is a justified explicatory translation which meets Carnap{\textquoteright}s criteria of an adequate interpretation. He identifies interpretation in law with a set of analytical methods which as such are value-neutral. They are always related to a particular legal system with its value background, and based on a particular philosophy of law. Beside legal erudition it is logical semantics that is an important support of interpretation. The author suggests a reconstruction of legal syllogism which is the methodological subject matter of interpretation.}, keywords = {Explication, Interpretation, Law, Logic, Method, Semantics}, author = {Franti{\v s}ek Gah{\'e}r} }