@article {12002, title = {Kant and the Problem of Self-Identification}, journal = {Organon F}, volume = {22}, number = {2}, year = {2015}, pages = {178-198}, type = {State}, abstract = {Ever since Strawson{\textquoteright}s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless self-ascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein{\textquoteright}s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least two diametrically opposed attitudes: the first {\textendash} exemplified in the works by Hacker, Becker, Sturma and McDowell {\textendash} considers the features of the I think according to Wittgenstein{\textquoteright}s approach to the I as subject while the second, exemplified by Kitcher and Carl, criticizes the various commentators who turn to Wittgenstein in order to interpret Kant{\textquoteright}s I think. The hypothesis that I will attempt at articulating in this paper starts off not only from the transcendental apperception form, but also from the characterizations of empirical apperception. It may be assumed that Kant{\textquoteright}s reflection on the problem of self-identification lies right here, truly prefiguring some features of Wittgenstein{\textquoteright}s uses of I, albeit from different metaphysical assumptions and philosophical horizons.}, keywords = {Empirical apperception, Kant, self-identification, self-reference, transcendental apperception, Wittgenstein}, url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2015/2/178-198.pdf}, author = {Forgione, Luca} }