@article {11988,
	title = {Ric{\oe}ur  o  praktickom  rozume},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {70},
	number = {4},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {295-306},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {The article deals with Ric{\oe}ur's idea of how we use reason in our praxis, i.e. with what in Kantian vocabulary is referred to as practical reason and in Aristotlelian terminology as practical wisdom (<i>phronesis</i>). The question is whether this mode of reason, as incommensurable with the rigorous theoretical reason as it is, can be taken as valid. Can Ric{\oe}ur's approach, trying to reconcile the two incompatible conceptions mentioned above, be of help in resolving this question? Here we have to test the arguments in support of two Ric{\oe}ur{\textquoteright}s ideas: 1) Practical reason is to be preserved as a specific mode of reason, which is irreducible to any other one. 2) The role of practical reason is not implemented by keeping its distance from practical experience (as demanded by Kant), but rather by being a prudent moral judgement in a particular situation. This, however, does not mean disregarding the morality of duty.
},
	keywords = {Aristotle, Conflicts of duties, Kant, Phronesis, practical reason, Reason of action, Responsibility, Ric{\oe}ur, Rule of action},
	author = {Dagmar Smrekov{\'a}}
}
