@article {11664,
	title = {Against Normative Judgement Internalism},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {20},
	number = {4},
	year = {2013},
	month = {2013},
	pages = {567-587},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Normative judgement internalism claims that enkrasia is an ideal of rational agency that poses a necessary link between making a normative judgement, and forming an intention to act according to that judgement. Against this view, I argue that enkrasia does not require the formation of new intentional states; instead, it requires that the agent{\textquoteright}s intentions do not contravene her normative judgements. The main argument for considering that an intention ought to follow from a normative judgement is the claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. I will argue that this account is mistaken: practical reasoning aims at justifying certain actions or intentions, and thus its conclusion is a normative judgement. Defenders of NJI might argue, though, that intentions ought to follow from our normative judgements, because of certain requirements affecting not only practical reasoning, but rational agency. I argue that this conception of enkrasia is too demanding. Enkrasia, I suggest, is better understood as a restriction over our intentions: they ought not enter into conflict with our judgements.},
	keywords = {Akrasia, Enkrasia, normative requirements, norrmative judgements, practical reasoning},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/4/567-587.pdf},
	author = {Miranda del Corral}
}
