@article {11663, title = {Rational Akrasia}, journal = {Organon F}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, month = {2013}, pages = {546-566}, type = {State}, abstract = {It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which an akratic agent acts as he has most reason to act, and cases in which an akratic agent achieves a kind of global coherence he wouldn{\textquoteright}t have achieved had he instead formed intentions in line with his best judgment, do not establish the possibility of rational akrasia. However, I do think that rational akrasia is possible, and I present two arguments for this thesis. The first argument involves a case in which one is incapable of revising one{\textquoteright}s belief about what one ought to do, where one also acknowledges this belief to be insufficiently supported by the evidence. The second argument involves a case in which one rationally believes that one ought to have an akratic combination of attitudes.}, keywords = {Akrasia, Audi, Broome, enkrateia, Enkratic Requirement, rational requirements, rationality}, url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/4/546-566.pdf}, author = {Brunero, John} }