<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Palovičová, Zuzana</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">K povahe silného hodnotenia</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filozofia</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Nature of Strong Evaluation</style></translated-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/filozofia/2010/6/564-573.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">564-573</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strong evaluation as a model of practical reasoning is an attractive alternative to the utilitaristic as well as Kantian proceduralism. It makes the legitimization of specific moral claims possible. Furthermore, in their justification the motivation of agency is taken into account. This enables us to show the meaning of values and evaluation in human life. The paper tries to answer the questions such as: What does strong evaluation refer to? What is its nature? What is its role in human life? What is its relevance for ethics? The author draws upon Tylor’s conception of strong evaluation, comparing it with Laitinen’s reinterpretation of the latter.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Zo súčasnej morálnej filozofie</style></work-type></record></records></xml>