<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sedová, Tatiana</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Potrebujeme pri vymedzovaní sociálnych fenoménov nevyhnutne pojem pravidla?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filozofia</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Do We Necessarily Need the Concept of Rule in Defining Social Phenomena?</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">J. Bohmann</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">M. Gilbert</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">M. Hollis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Natural view</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rule following and the idea of social science</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rules as sufficient and necessary conditions for defining social phenomena</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Social dependence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Social dependence of meaning and thought</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winch’s antinaturalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wittgensteinian approach to rule</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">582-591</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paper discusses the concept of rule and its role in understanding and defining social facts. On the background of the main objections against Winch’s conception of rule as the necessary and sufficient means for identifying a social phenomenon (M. Hollis, J. Bohmann, M. Gilbert) it questions the analogy between the linguistic activity, the Wittgensteinian conception of meaning and conceiving of agency as a meaningful social activity.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type></record></records></xml>