<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Zámečník, Lukáš</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explanační monismus u nekauzálních vysvětlení</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filozofia</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explanatory Monism in Non-causal Explanations</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counterfactual and unificationist views of explanation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explanatory monism and pluralism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Non-causal explanation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/10211101filozofia.2022.77.8.2.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">590 - 607</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Czech</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of non-causal explanations.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom6><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Original Artilces</style></custom6></record></records></xml>