<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nuhlíček, Martin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kooperatívny naturalizmus</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filozofia</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cooperative Naturalism</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A. I. Goldman</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Naturalized Epistemology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Normativity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reliabilism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">W. V. O. Quine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/112015152_Nuhl%C3%ADček_stať_RZA_defi_647_660.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">76</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">647 - 660</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Slovak</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paper deals with the cooperative model of epistemological naturalism, which, while promoting strong influence of empirical information on epistemological considerations, rejects Quinean radical reduction of epistemic relations to non-epistemic ones, e.g., causal-nomological relations. The character of this kind of naturalism is illustrated by the example of A. Goldman’s epistemics. This conception consists of two intertwined elements: a priori performed conceptual analysis of epistemic concepts, supplemented by empirical studies of human cognition. First, the dynamics between the a priori and the empirical re- spective parts of this conception is explained, and, second, three important epistemological issues are discussed from its point of view: the problem of starting points of inquiry, the problem of intuitions, and the problem of normativity.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">647660</style></custom3></record></records></xml>