<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hejduk, Tomáš</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Trojí pojetí svobody</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filozofia</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Three Concepts of Liberty</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Freedom</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ladislav Hejdánek</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Liberalism of fear</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/02261311filozofia.2020.76.2.3.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">76</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">110 – 124</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Berlin’s division of liberty into its positive and negative variants is usually men-tioned as a point of reference in the debates about freedom. However, I consider as more fundamental the difference between liberal freedom and freedom based on responsible relations with other people and the surrounding world. In other words, I question the meaning of freedom, which - with a reference to the conception of Ladislav Hejdánek, proponent of the Czech practical philosophy – I do not consider to be an elimination of various life bonds, but instead their acceptance, fulfilment, or improvement. However, such binding freedom can also find its “allies” in liberalism – namely in the so-called liberalism of fear (B. Williams, J. Shklar), which is surprisingly close to Hejdánek’s conception and represents at least one of the contemporary currents of liberalism, able to unite with a seemingly opposing tradition. In addition to introducing Hejdánek’s conception of freedom, the aim of the paper is also to outline this connection.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">110124</style></custom3></record></records></xml>