@article {13300,
	title = {Kooperat{\'\i}vny naturalizmus},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {76},
	number = {9},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {647 - 660},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {The paper deals with the cooperative model of epistemological naturalism, which, while promoting strong influence of empirical information on epistemological considerations, rejects Quinean radical reduction of epistemic relations to non-epistemic ones, e.g., causal-nomological relations. The character of this kind of naturalism is illustrated by the example of A. Goldman{\textquoteright}s epistemics. This conception consists of two intertwined elements: a priori performed conceptual analysis of epistemic concepts, supplemented by empirical studies of human cognition. First, the dynamics between the a priori and the empirical re- spective parts of this conception is explained, and, second, three important epistemological issues are discussed from its point of view: the problem of starting points of inquiry, the problem of intuitions, and the problem of normativity.},
	keywords = {A. I. Goldman, Naturalized Epistemology, Normativity, Reliabilism, W. V. O. Quine},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/112015152_Nuhl\%C3\%AD{\v c}ek_sta{\v t}_RZA_defi_647_660.pdf},
	author = {Nuhl{\'\i}{\v c}ek, Martin}
}
