@article {12900,
	title = {The Food Thief: Alleviation of Responsibility in Terms  of All-Things-Considered Obligations},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {74},
	number = {10},
	year = {2019},
	pages = {841-851},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {People sometimes have to steal food to survive. Yet it is unclear whether they are to be excused for doing so. A recent paper by Alejandra Mancilla argues for the rarely defended affirmative answer. About the same time, the Italy's Supreme Court of Cassation ruled that stealing a small amount of food when in extreme need does not constitute a crime. Given that food thieves in extreme need <em>can</em> be sometimes excused, the present paper aims to offer a semi-formal account of responsibility that makes space for the alleviation of responsibility in such {\textquoteleft}food thief{\textquoteright} scenario. I argue that a solution is buried in the notion of eligible strategy employed in an account of responsibility suggested by Matthew Braham and Martin van Hees. I argue that a possible answer to the issue of (in)eligibility can be provided in terms of all-things-considered obligations, or the lack thereof.},
	keywords = {All-things-considered, Eligibility, Responsibility, State of necessity},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/12301531filozofia.2019.74.10.4.pdf},
	author = {Glavani{\v c}ov{\'a}, Daniela}
}
