@article {12810,
	title = {What does the Premise {\textquotedblleft}a Deceiver Deceives me{\textquotedblright} Conclude? - Descartes{\textquoteright} Deceiver Argument Reconsidered},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {74},
	number = {4},
	year = {2019},
	pages = {308-317},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Descartes insists, {\textquotedblleft}[...] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me [...]{\textquotedblright} (AT-VII, 25; CSM-II, 17). In what way can we draw evidence that our existence can be drawn from our being deceived? The interpretations that the earlier studies have shown is not a monolith. Then I will search for some inherent characteristics of deception, and analyse the construction of the reasoning, {\textquotedblleft}if a deceiver deceives me, I exist.{\textquotedblright} To be concrete, I show: 1) that it is not {\textquotedblleft}I exist{\textquotedblright} but {\textquotedblleft}I think{\textquotedblright} that is concluded from the supposition {\textquotedblleft}a deceiver deceives me/I am deceived by a deceiver{\textquotedblright}; 2) that the attributions of the self as a thinking thing, i.e. understanding, affirming, and denying (AT-VII, 28; CSM-II, 19), are discovered in the very supposition of a deceiver.},
	keywords = {Cogito, Deceiver argument, Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, skepticism},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/04141915filozofia.2019.74.4.4.pdf},
	author = {Tamura, Ayumu}
}
