@article {12035,
	title = {Searle on the Intentional Content of Visual Experiences},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {22},
	number = {3},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {345-357},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {There is no unique idea regarding the form of the (Intentional) content part of visual experience in the specification. The philosophers{\textquoteright} approaches diverge as to whether the content of visual experience is equivalent to a sentence expressing proposition or not. Some of them (mainly philosophers from the phenomenological tradition) consider that one must use a proposition for the specification of the content only when the subject, while having a visual experience, exercise a concept or judge. For the other cases, which can be called <i>simple seeing</i>, a noun phrase is preferable. I argue that, holding that the specification of Intentional content of the visual experience should be in the form of a proposition, John Searle gives up the first-person Intentionality and therefore bypasses the first-person important distinction between simple seeing and judgmental seeing. The specification of the content only in the form of the proposition does not allow making such a distinction on the level of description. Then I argue that the feature of the causal self-referentiality of the visual experience belongs to its psychological mode but not, as Searle holds, to the Intentional content of the visual experience.},
	keywords = {Intentional content, Searle, visual experience},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2015/3/345-357.pdf},
	author = {Jafarov, Anar}
}
